Roadblocks to Democracy in Iraq

Roadblocks to Democracy in Iraq

When President Bush was looking for justifications as to why America should invade Iraq, one of the most convincing pieces of evidence was the assertion that the 9/11 terrorist hijackers had met surreptitiously with Iraqi officials a few months before the 9/11 attacks in the United States (Janda, Berry, & Goldman 2009). He was also on a mission to find the infamous weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since the invasion of Iraq (and Afghanistan), the United States has been focused on introducing and implementing democracy in Iraq -- an idea that has both inspired and aggravated people around the world.

Democracies are not built easily and this is especially true in countries where economic difficulties and ethnic tensions complicate the situation. Iraq is haunted by many decades of authoritarian rule (i.e., most notably, the tyrannical Saddam Hussein) and ethno-sectarian separation; not to mention the domination of the state over the national economy (Dawisha 2005).

Even though Iraq has a constitution and an elected parliament, transition to democracy will not be an efficient or a struggle-free transition. It is hard to build any democracy from the ground up, but building democracy in a place with the historical legacy found in Iraq will be even more challenging. Democracy in Iraq will test the assertion that the forces of federalism can overcome long-term religious, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural division (Janda, Berry & Goldman 2009). If democracy is obtained in Iraq, it is something that is far off in the distance. It will take years to build the infrastructure, the institutions, and, probably most importantly, the trust needed to "sustain a peaceful democratic mechanism for the transfer of power in Iraq" (Munson 2009).

Fundamentally speaking, Iraq as a nation will have to be rebuilt from the ground up in order for transition to be possible. Rebuilding in itself is not easy, but in the case of Iraq, there will be many opportunists who are looking to cause trouble, which means that Iraq, while trying to be rebuilt, will also forced with the necessity of defending itself. New laws will be written, and the people all must learn to respect these laws and to obey them, so enforcement of the laws will be needed as well. While building the new infrastructure will, undoubtedly, be a major task unto itself, preparing the people to use the new infrastructure wisely and to respect the rules that govern it is a whole other challenge.

Munson (2009) insists that we must go back to the past and face the history of tyranny in Iraq in order to understand Iraq and the challenges that will be met when building a democracy in the country. John Agresto, CPA Senior Advisor for Higher Education, quoted in Chandrasekaran's (2010) book, The green zone (Imperial life/emerald city):

Thirty years of tyranny do terrible things to a people: It breeds a culture of dependency; it breaks the spirit of civic responsibility; it forces people to fall back upon tight-knit familial, ideological or sectarian groups for safety and support… Freedom, democracy and rights are not magic words. The transfer of sovereignty will bring about some form of "democracy." But a liberal democracy, with real notions of liberty and equality and open opportunity -- without strongmen, or sectarian or sectional oppression -- well, I think that's doubtful (Chandrasekaran 2010).

Chandrasekaran (2010) explains that Agresto believed that Iraqis had not paid attention to -- or focused on -- ethnic and religious division before the war, and that it was the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA), the Bush administration's provisional government for Iraq, quota system that had encouraged them to identify themselves by race and sect.

For thirty-five years before the war, Saddam Hussein stained the history of Iraq and his shadow will continue to penetrate and darken the country over the next at least two decades (Munson 2009). Saddam's regime was the most authoritarian, but Iraq has existed under authoritarian rule since the founding of the Republic in 1958. Saddam was sentenced and executed for his killing of 148 Iraqis, but many believe he is responsible for so many more -- up into the hundreds of thousands. His legacy will continue to shape the people in Iraq as it did for those thirty plus years that he was in power. Understanding his legacy is an important element in understanding some of the roadblocks that will be endured on the road to democracy in Iraq. What is more, "Saddam's bizarre end and the significance of Iraqi reactions to the event, for all of these products of Saddam's brutal rise to power and the violent stranglehold he maintained on the nation for more than twenty years" (2009).

In is not a stretch to say that most of Iraq's problems are because of or associated to Saddam's tyrannical rule, but while that is true, "Al-Qaeda foreign fighters, Iraq's neighbors, incompetent Iraqi politicians and Iraq's communal complexity, none of these factors could conceal or wipe out the consequences of American and British post-war mismanagement" (Kubba; Paya & Esposito 2010). Laith Kubba (2010) insists in the essay "Lessons from Iraq," that under Saddam's rule and UN sanctions, Iraq was headed downward -- however, the war gave Iraq a chance to rebuild itself and become democratic while also being united. According to Laith (2010), "Instead of helping Iraq heal its wounds, the war accelerated its demise" (2010). The U.S. And UN handed power to an interim government and rushed through election laws, forcing Iraqis to take responsibility for their country under American terms. "For a combination of reasons, the UN proposed an electoral law, which was based on national proportional representation. Inevitably, this electoral system irritated ethno-religious agendas and consolidated identity politics" (2010). This election system was the only real way that Iraqis could pick candidates and then vote how they wanted. They endorsed communal lists and not candidates. Many of the Sunnis boycotted the elections and hoped for an unsuccessful experimentation. "Iraq's first elected parliament and government was dysfunctional and the closed electoral lists were packed with incompetent exiles. Inevitably, Iraq sunk deeper into violence and disorder" (2010).

Looking back at the issues between Iraqis and Kurds is also helpful in understanding some of the challenges that Iraq will face on its journey toward democracy. Kurdistan, a region in Northern and North-Eastern Iraq without any real boundaries or defined borders, defines itself as a nation distinct from Iraq, Turkey and Iran. They are an ethnic minority, currently [2009] at 15 to 20% of Iraq's population (Munson 2009) and they speak a distinct language -- Kurdish; their ethnic origin is completely distinct as well in origin (2009).

There are three major provinces in Kurdistan: Duhok, Arbil, and Sulaymania as well as portion of the Kirkuk, Mosul, and Diyala provinces (Aziz; Paya & Esposito 2010). Kurds have been fighting to maintain their culture, identity, and political rights since the modern state of Iraq was established in 1922. During Saddam's reign of terror, more than 180,000 Kurds were killed. Five thousand villages were obliterated, and hundreds of thousands were displaced in what is known as the "Al-Anfal" operation (2010).

The Kurds in Iraq have struggled for democracy for nearly 50 years and they had a chance to try it for the first time on May 19, 1922, "when the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the largest political parties in Kurdistan-Iraq, agreed to hold a parliamentary election in the area outside Iraqi control" (Aziz; Paya & Esposito 2010). However, when competition between KDP and PUK led to a disintegration of the union, civil war broke out. The civil war increased Iraqi and Iranian intervention in Kurdish affairs (2010).

Kurdistan did not have a constitution for 14 years -- 1991 to 2005 (Aziz; Paya & Esposito 2010) -- and because of this Iraqi laws governed the Kurds (as well as some legislation that was passed by the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA), KDP and PUK administrations during 1997 to 2002. In 1992, KNA and KRG set up policies and procedures to get rid of all of Saddam's laws that went against the principles of democracy and basic human rights.

As a result, political parties -- regardless of size -- were free to actively advocate their ideas and programs, new party -- and publicly-owned media outlets were developed; people were able to move and travel freely within the Kurdish provinces, despite their political affiliation (Aziz; Paya & Esposito 2010).

From a Kurdish perspective, there are many roadblocks ahead of them in terms of the political and security future of Iraq and Kurdistan. Because of the events in the twentieth century, Arbil and Baghdad have had a tough journey because of things that occurred in the twentieth century, regional and international interference, as well as the short-lived democracy in Iraq (Aziz; Paya & Esposito 2010). There is not as much trust between certain Iraqi communities as well, which has only gotten worse since sectarian violence began in recent years (2010). One of the important steps that will need to be taken is the attention to the fact that each group is satisfied and the major political parties must present this in order for peace to be maintained.

The other major communities in Iraq are both ethnically Arab -- though from different areas -- or sects -- of Islam: the Sunni and the Shi'a (Munson 2009). The Shi'a in Iraq make up about 20% of the current [2009] population while the Sunni make up about 20% of Iraq's [2009] population (2009).

The Shi'a, Sunni and Kurds are important to the overall picture of democracy in Iraq since primary identity has always been an important factor in Iraqi politics and across the broader Middle East. "Although primary identity changes over time, even within the span of a single lifetime, it is the most basic level of group identity and can engender strong feelings" (Munson 2009). These feelings can also be overwhelmingly powerful when "primary identity is politicized and used to draw seemingly ancient distinctions between peoples, even though the distinctions may be imagined or recently concocted" (2009).

Munson (2009) notes that in the long-term Iraq may have the ability to build trust, reconciliation and the legal institutions needed to support democracy, however there are many spots in which the whole process of transition could go awry.

While transition to democracy requires years of accumulated progress, only one short series of events could send Iraq down the path of illiberal majoritarian rule, dictatorship, civil war, or state collapse. Each of these outcomes has regional implications that must be considered before action is taken. Partition of the country, a move opposed by most Iraqis, leaves Sunnis with barren desert devoid of resources. Turkish officials, fearful than an independent Iraqi Kurdistan could encourage violent separatism in Turkey's Kurdish southwest, have strongly warned Iraqi Kurds against secession from Iraq/. Shi'a majoritarian dominance has been decried by other Sunni governments who may provide material aid to Sunni insurgents should the United States pull out (Munson 2009).

Two-thousand and nine and 2010 saw far less violence on the streets of Iraq than earlier years; in fact, the levels are at their lowest since the invasion (Munson 2009). Parliament appears to be coming together on certain issues and there has been some important legislation passed, opening the door for elections. While everything may appear to be going back to "normal" in Iraq, there are many issues looming in the air. Even though there has been an improvement in violence, they levels are still incredibly high by any American's standards and violence claims "nearly five hundred civilian Iraqi lives a month in addition to a monthly toll of nearly one hundred Iraqi police and soldiers. Enemy-initiated attacks still approach two hundred per week" (2009).

While noting all the roadblocks and looking at the historical legacy of Iraq, it is also important to ask the question: Is democracy a desirable political ideal for Iraq? Keane (Paya & Esposito 2010) asks:

Might it be a universal norm, as relevant and applicable to the vineyard people of Kandahar as it is to bankers in Frankfurt and London and cell-phoning businessmen in Mumai and Delhi, as well as to dalit women in that country who battle for panchayat representation, or to the factory workers and peasants of China, the Kurds of Turkey, or even to powerful bodies that operate across borders, like the WTO and the World Bank? Or might it be that democracy is a fake universal norm, just one of those pompous Western values that jostles for our attention, dazzles us with its promises and -- for a time -- tricks us into believing that it is not a mask for power, a tool useful in the struggle by some for mastery over others? (Keane; Paya & Esposito 2010).

Why should we in the West believe that Iraq needs to have a democratic system? Especially if the roadblocks it will face along the way will cost millions of dollars and require military presence? There is evidence to suggest, especially when the talk of ethical superiority is backed up by military force, that the results are probably going to give democracy a bad name. Democracy is viewed in the West as being "morally superior" because it is a part of a "culture of hope" (Kean; Paya & Esposito 2010) -- hope that the world can be made a better place by social and political effort combined -- as opposed to characteristics of the East apparently (2010). What is basically being said is though democracy is one norm among others, it is self-evidently superior in practice (2010). If it doesn't feel right for the people living in it or transitioning to it, why do we have to force it on a people? Munson (2009) notes that Iraqis have a difficult time coming to terms with the new order. In the words of one Iraqi: