The Role and Function of Special Interest Groups

The role of interest groups in democracies presents one of the greatest conundrums in civic affairs. On the one hand, interest groups potentially represent collective power and agency. On the other hand, interest groups can easily become hegemonic and even corrupt. The crux of the problem is that some interest groups can become more endowed financially than others, or have unequal access to the social capital needed to wield power. As Binderkrantz & Beyers (2013) also point out, inequities in power distribution among interest groups can also be traceable to the process of professionalization: to formalizing interest groups until they function like corporations and become equally as formidable.
Interest groups may be inevitable in a society that categorically affirms the right to free assembly. Yet within the liberalist framework of governance, it is still possible to envision ways the power of interest groups can be more equitably distributed. In a large, heterogeneous, pluralistic society, a multitude of interest groups create a cacophony of voices that in many cases drowns out reason, foments tension, and confuses voters. Ideally, interest groups continue to function as mediators between concerned citizens and elected officials. This is especially true in an indirect democracy like that of the United States. Not all voters are issue-bound, but all voters will ultimately cleave themselves to specific issues that influence their voting habits.
Changing the present election system so that it runs on limited public financing via direct tax dollars, instead of contributions from interest groups and wealthy donors, would make the system more democratic and open. Attempts to genuinely overhaul campaign financing have stalled, largely because it is difficult to place limits on private donations and still uphold the tenets of free speech. It is possible, though, to show that limits to such special interest groups’ donations undermine Constitutional rights rather than affirm them. By reframing the issue, it may be possible to legislate spending caps on special interest financing.
References
Binderkrantz, A. & Beyers, J. (2013). The role of interest groups in democracy. ECPR General Conference, Panel Paper P371. https://ecpr.eu/Events/PanelDetails.aspx?PanelID=291&EventID=5