Space shuttle Columbia: history and missions

Reporting Methods and Columbia

In early 2003, the space shuttle Columbia broke apart as it returned to earth, and the shuttle and crew members were lost. In response to this tragedy, an Accident Investigation team was appointed to investigate the cause for the accident, and make suggestions as how to improve the safely of future missions. For the purpose of this report, the e-mails between NASA employees will be reviewed, and recommendations made on this basis.

In reviewing the NASA e-mails it is readily apparent that there are many areas that can be improved. Improving reporting methods is one key area. A number of internal NASA e-mails identify potential problems with foam tile damage, but these were not undertaken in an "official" capacity. As such, it is important to consider that the NASA reporting process may have failed in not taking these "unofficial" concerns seriously. In essence, a safely concern is always valid, and the presence of an "official" and "unofficial" safety discussions at NASA may have played a role in NASA's failure to address the problem. As such, one recommendation may be to incorporate all safety-related issues under one umbrella, treating all safety concerns as "official."

It appears from the e-mails there is a method of reporting that is present in the NASA infrastructure. A number of issues from Robert H. Dangherty identify some key safety issues caused by tiles breaking off and damaging the main door thermal barrier. However, it appears that many instances of foam breaking off and striking the shuttle were not regarded as a key safety issue, and not sent in an "official" capacity, as noted earlier. Specifically, an e-mail from David M. Lechner to Mr. Dangherty notes that "the input (from Dangherty) is beneficial," and that Dangherty's "points have generated extremely valuable discussion in our group." What is not clear, however, is why Dangherty's issues seem to have gotten little serious consideration after this point.