Sociology of Religion Resistant Towards Scientific Approaches to Studying Religion

Introduction
For grasping religion and science’s scope, besides the connection existing between them, it is imperative to acquire, at a minimum, a general idea of what entails religion and science. In any case, the two concepts aren’t invariably rigid terms having definite meanings. In fact, both words coinage dates back to the recent past and their meanings differ for different cultures and eras. Two centuries ago, the word “religion” was seldom utilized. Aquinas and other medieval era writers interpreted religion as prayer or piousness; besides orthodoxy, no other “religious” systems was ever conceived of (Harrison 2015). “Religion” as a term garnered its significantly more wide-ranging present meaning owing to initial anthropologists’ efforts.
Further, the word “science”, as employed presently, became widely known and utilized during the same century. Earlier, “science” as we know it was represented by a different name – experimental philosophy or natural philosophy. Only in the year 1834 did William Whewell standardize the word “scientist”, defining it as experts of different natural philosophies (i.e., sciences) (Somerville, 2016). Scientific philosophers have aimed at distinguishing their field of science from the remaining knowledge-seeking disciplines, especially religion. In the year 1959, Karl Popper declared that contrary to theories in religion, it is technically possible to falsify scientific theories (Popper, 2010). Several experts, for instance, Taylor (1996) assert the existence of a distinction between religion and science, despite the historical contingence of the two words’ meanings (Taylor, 1996). But they fail to concur on the precise means of segregating both spheres across cultures and eras.
Distinguishing between science and religion
One means of differentiating religion from science is the assertion that the latter deals with nature; on the other hand, the former entails supernatural as well as natural. Scientific justifications prove unsuccessful when it comes to appealing to the Almighty, angels (even fallen ones) and other supernatural entities, besides non-natural entities such as Qi, miracles, or karma. Neuroscientists, for instance, tend to give explanations for human thought based on brain states, instead of grounding their theories in the immaterial spirit or soul.
Naturalists distinguish the epistemological idea of methodological naturalism which constrains scientific investigation to natural rules and bodies from philosophical or ontological naturalism, which denotes a metaphysical concept which spurns the notion of supernatural entities (Forrest, 2000). As the former form of naturalism deals with scientific practice (especially types of processes and beings/objects brought into play), it refrains from commenting on the existence or non-existence of supernatural entities (Okello, 2007). While they may exist, they are not covered by scientific analysis’s scope. Rosenberg (2015) and a few other researchers maintain that a serious consideration of scientific outcomes involves negative replies to pressing issues like moral knowledge and free will. But such stronger inferences are contentious, as Muller and Bashour (2013) prove under their standpoint with respect to naturalism’s effects.
The notion that it is possible to separate religion from science under the methodological naturalism sphere is more widely acknowledged (consider the Kitzmiller v. Dover case, wherein Robert Pennock, the scientific philosopher, was summoned by the petitioners for testifying whether or not Intelligent Design represented a kind of creationism, thereby representing a religious form (Pennock, 2000). Had the answer been in the affirmative, the policy of the Dover board would be in violation of Constitutional Amendment I’s Establishment Clause. Deriving from prior research, the scholar contended that the Intelligent Design concept, in appealing to supernatural systems, wasn’t procedurally naturalistic; further, methodological naturalism basically represents a scientific element. While this is no inflexible requisite, it emanates from sound evidence-linked requisites (e.g., the capability of empirically testing theories).
Isaac Newton, Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke, Johannes Kepler, and other natural philosophers, at times, called on supernatural entities within their scientific or natural philosophy. Nevertheless, on the whole, they typically preferred naturalistic justifications. Such an inclination towards naturalistic sources was potentially inspired by prior successful naturalistic justifications. Consequently, certain experts asserted that methodological naturalism’s success could provide proofs for the ontological naturalism discipline (Wainwright, 2010). Precise methodological naturalism sprang up during the 19th century after Thomas Huxley, along with his friends, established the scientific professionalization interest group, X-club, in the year 1864. Their goal was the promotion of a science free of the doctrines of religious. This group was probably partly inspired by a need to eliminate competition from amateur-clergymen working as scientists, thereby opening the discipline up to full-time working scientists (Garwood, 2008).
As the concepts of religion and science resist definition, generally, a debate on the link of religion and science may be pointless. For instance, in the year 2014, Kelly Clark claimed that it is only possible to reasonably examine the association between a broad scientific claim and a distinct claim by any given religion (Clark, 2014). The example used was a comparison of neuroscientific discoveries or quantum mechanics with the Buddhist ‘no-self’ concept or Islam’s perceptions in relation to fate or divine providence.
This does not imply, primarily, that a theoretical or rational or essential incompatibility exists between religion and science. They ought not to be pronounced as incompatible solely on grounds of what the two fields are, as certain individuals tend to do. Undoubtedly, the scientific field functions based on proofs and justifications; meanwhile, religion usually appeals to belief and faith (however, this, in no way, implies that proofs and justifications are entirely non-existent in religion).
The argument of Incompatibility between Science and Religion
Carroll’s (2009) claims commence with a clarification. The author holds that one cannot necessarily find a rational or theoretical incompatibility existing between religion and science. The two mustn’t be pronounced as incompatible solely on grounds of what the two fields are, as certain individuals tend to do. The author believes that the scientific field functions based on proofs and justifications; meanwhile, religion usually appeals to belief and faith (however, this, in no way, implies that proofs and justifications are entirely non-existent in religion). All this, however, simply implies the two are different; one cannot cite this as proofs of their incompatibility.
Carroll (2009) further claims that the scientific field functions through the proposing of theories which are subsequently utilized for making predictions, tested against practical proofs. This is followed by judging, using available information, on which theories appear to be more plausible. Formalization of such judgments is extremely difficult – scientific philosophers lack a precise grasp of the way these judgments are carried out. However, this is cause for concern only at the highest degree of rigor. Generally speaking, the process is rather well-defined. Scientists definitely desire their theories to fit facts; however, they desire consistency with other proven concepts as well, in addition to explicitness, unambiguousness, simplicity and width of scope (Carroll, 2009). Scientists are more pleased when their theories are able to explain more concepts based on minimal input. Though such a process fails to prove anything, an adequately successful theory may be appraised immensely better as compared to alternatives claiming ongoing compliance with these alternatives (Steady State cosmology, phlogiston combustion theory, Lamarckian evolution, etc.) are scientifically unsound (Carroll, 2009).
Strictly scientifically speaking, as Carroll (2009) points out, that God exists is a weak hypothesis. The above assertion may account for the fact that hardly any cosmologist believes in God (Carroll, 2005). The author claims religion is imprecise for the following reasons: fitting information is entirely needless, and the concept simply complicates things without correspondingly improving insights. Once again, the above outcome is not theoretically based. The theory relating to God could fit facts in a better way as compared to alternatives. In fact, one can continue to find distinguished religious authorities who claim it does. Their wrongness is similar to the wrongness of Steady State advocates (Carroll, 2005). Half a century earlier, the Steady State idea was reasonable; so was the idea of God two thousand years back. However, over time, human information and understanding has undergone considerable improvements rendering the above theories infeasible. A similar reasoning may be made with regard to creation stories and miracles (Carroll, 2005).
Conflicting perceptions about the existence of God
Dutch (2011) opposed the presence of definitive evidence by reasoning that definitive evidence would disturb free will, coercing individuals into believing. There are numerous shortcomings linked to this approach. Firstly, rather definite assumptions are made with regard to God’s nature and presence. By adopting the above standpoint, one may only be able to state that God’s presence cannot be proved if one is already a believer. Then again, the ‘free will’ principle, as evidenced by the name itself, is free. Pseudoscientific history clearly reveals that the soundest proof also leaves a person at liberty to refuse to believe (Dutch, 2011). Were God to actually materialize before mankind, one would still find a large number of individuals willing to rationalize away the vision by putting forward reasons such as the vision was technology-generated or that’s not my God and should hence be fake. Hence, one can reasonably doubt that the most awe-inspiring demonstration is capable of infringing free will. Irrespective of how compelling the evidence is at the moment of occurrence of the event, several individuals would be quick to disregard it, claiming it was an illusion, trick or legend (Dutch, 2011). Lastly, even the existence of free will is something that religious believers do not invariably concur with each other about (for instance, numerous Protestants, especially Calvinists, raise doubts with regard to free will).
Moreover, Dutch (2011) asserts that radical unbelievers criticize believers of childish wish fulfillment. On the other hand, radical believers claim that unbelievers do nothing but stubbornly defy authority. Individuals belonging to either group will, perhaps, be unlikely to be convinced by the arguments of the opposition, resulting in an enigma. Further, to the degree that the allegations hold true, individuals with rigid outlooks will not be convinced by any form of reasoning which is in opposition to their entrenched beliefs. Therefore, besides the frankly maintained and discussed proof regarding God’s existence, one is forced to traverse a copse of academic dishonesty. Certain notions put forward by philosophically-minded individuals hold some merit, while other theories are simply hollow. Again, one needs to contend with the problem of competence. A few claims with regard to God’s existence are grounded in profound, informed contemplation whereas a few others are painfully ill-informed and immature (Dutch, 2011).
Personal perspective
Besides the issue of psychological aspects, applicability, and doctrinal postulations, one can unearth a number of other reasons which raise doubts regarding whether scientific circles will ever successfully say anything regarding God’s existence. The basis for these reasons is scientific evidence applicable to a multifaceted reality. With increasing complexity of questions, the likelihood of the emergence of several interpretations equally fitting the information increases; additionally, it becomes more difficult to segregate relevant proofs as the proofs increase in complexity and indirectness. Increased complexity of reasoning and proofs increases the probability of outcome contamination by inaccurate facts and reasoning misconceptions. This perception doesn’t relate to esthetic or ethical claims supporting or opposing God’s existence. This deals wholly with the application of scientific processes and empirical facts.
Dutch (2009) concurs with Carroll (2009) in establishing that within the scientific domain, fact establishment after controlling conditions is relatively simple. A controlled experiment constitutes the classic method of achieving the above. To study the interaction between a couple of atomic particles, the potential of a particular medication to treat a particular disease, or the reaction between two chemicals, one typically constructs an experiment. One will naturally be rather confident of one’s ideas if one is able to forecast beforehand what will occur and see it occurring precisely that way. The abovementioned technique proves successful as it is possible to re-experiment whenever one desires, any number of times one desires; further, one may simplify the system to examine the phenomenon under study independently, without any extraneous factors (Dutch, 2011). Re-experimenting can help eliminate the possibility of mistakes, unnoticed elements or fakery. Moreover, repeatability protects one from arriving at the incorrect conclusion simply due to the fact that particular experiments end up in a particular way unintentionally.
If one is unable to control conditions but capable of observing several examples of any given event, it facilitates fact establishment as well (Dutch, 2011). While no two asteroids, solar eclipses, volcanic eruptions, mountains or hurricanes are identical, they may be considered repeatable as they share common characteristics; the observation of a sufficient number of examples of the above phenomena may help one in arriving at accurate conclusions with regard to their working. For instance, one may decide that every hurricane has an eye, every solar eclipses happens on a new moon day, every mountain possesses thrust faults, and gas pressure fuels every volcanic eruption (Dutch, 2011). Additionally, one may forecast what to anticipate when the event next occurs. For instance, when a neighboring galaxy’s supernova erupted during the 80s, astronomers were thrilled to see nearly all details forecasted by them occurring according to schedule.
For example, theoretically, every supposition pertaining to the crime rate decline in the US may be examined in a controlled way. Individual variables need to be independently tested and as a few associate changes to events after two decades, the minimum period after which a test may be run is a couple of decades. For being absolutely certain of the results, observing identical results for a number of experiments would be prudent, the point being evolving phenomena’s ‘testability’.
Findings
Reasons for the opposing views
As mentioned previously, Pennock (2000) states that science incorporates methodological naturalism despite it not being a strict necessity. The scientific field emanates from sound evidence-linked requisites (e.g., the capability of empirically testing theories). Wainwright (2010) refers to an inclination towards naturalistic sources potentially inspired by prior successful naturalistic justifications. Meanwhile, Clark (2014) affirms that the concepts of religion and science resist definition and, generally, a debate on the link of religion and science may be pointless. Carroll (2009) maintains that the scientific field functions based on proofs and justifications; meanwhile, religion usually appeals to belief and faith. Such different views render it rather unreasonable, in the opinion of such professionals, to explore religion from a scientific lens. Lastly, Dutch (2011) reveals that convincing individuals holding either perspective pertaining to God’s existence of the logic in the opposition’s standpoint is unlikely.
Conclusion
The notion of objectivity may be defined as reliable acquisition of unbiased social scientific or scientific knowledge via the systematic examination of external realities. Nevertheless, when one adopts qualitative interviewing and observation techniques for exploring religious life, will one be able to grasp the meaning of religious life for individuals, in an unbiased or objective way, without the superimposition of one’s personal value judgments, predilections and emotions? When research scholars serve as data acquisition and assessment tools, their views and prejudices within societal contexts are unavoidably included in the research. After all, a researcher is no blank slate when he/she comes to the table; instead, they come with specific interpretive systems whose roots may be found in their non-religious as well as religious cultural norms. This usually shapes their explanation and interpretation of other individuals’ religious and spiritual worlds. Scientists or research scholars tend to resort to the intrinsic biased human penchant of foisting their personal opinions, unintentionally making them an observable reality. This possibly accounts for the ‘intenability’ of applying scientific principles to religious study.
Hence, one may logically deduce that religion and science adopt diverse strategies when it comes to the advancement of their courses. Isaac Newton, Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke, Johannes Kepler, and other great scientists popularized their belief in God despite their scientific endeavors being totally reliant on naturalistic approaches. They seem to have been unready to apply scientific theory to prove God’s existence or possibly felt it would be impossible for the scientific field to prove God’s existence. To sum up, it may be considered rather challenging, if at all possible, to achieve religious advancements through science.









References
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