Introduction For grasping religion and science’s scope, besides the connection existing between them, it is imperative to acquire, at a minimum, a general idea of what entails religion and science. In any case, the two concepts aren’t invariably rigid terms having definite meanings. In fact, both words coinage dates back to the recent past and their meanings differ for different cultures and eras. Two centuries ago, the word “religion” was seldom utilized. Aquinas and other medieval era writers interpreted religion as prayer or piousness; besides orthodoxy, no other “religious” systems was ever conceived of (Harrison 2015). “Religion” as a term garnered its significantly more wide-ranging present meaning owing to initial anthropologists’ efforts.

Further, the word “science”, as employed presently, became widely known and utilized during the same century. Earlier, “science” as we know it was represented by a different name – experimental philosophy or natural philosophy. Only in the year 1834 did William Whewell standardize the word “scientist”, defining it as experts of different natural philosophies (i.e., sciences) (Somerville, 2016). Scientific philosophers have aimed at distinguishing their field of science from the remaining knowledge-seeking disciplines, especially religion. In the year 1959, Karl Popper declared that contrary to theories in religion, it is technically possible to falsify scientific theories (Popper, 2010). Several experts, for instance, Taylor (1996) assert the existence of a distinction between religion and science, despite the historical contingence of the two words’ meanings (Taylor, 1996). But they fail to concur on the precise means of segregating both spheres across cultures and eras.

Distinguishing between science and religion

One means of differentiating religion from science is the assertion that the latter deals with nature; on the other hand, the former entails supernatural as well as natural. Scientific justifications prove unsuccessful when it comes to appealing to the Almighty, angels (even fallen ones) and other supernatural entities, besides non-natural entities such as Qi, miracles, or karma. Neuroscientists, for instance, tend to give explanations for human thought based on brain states, instead of grounding their theories in the immaterial spirit or soul.

Naturalists distinguish the epistemological idea of methodological naturalism which constrains scientific investigation to natural rules and bodies from philosophical or ontological naturalism, which denotes a metaphysical concept which spurns the notion of supernatural entities (Forrest, 2000). As the former form of naturalism deals with scientific practice (especially types of processes and beings/objects brought into play), it refrains from commenting on the existence or non-existence of supernatural entities (Okello, 2007). While they may exist, they are not covered by scientific analysis’s scope. Rosenberg (2015) and a few other researchers maintain that a serious consideration of scientific outcomes involves negative replies to pressing issues like moral knowledge and free will. But such stronger inferences are contentious, as Muller and Bashour (2013) prove under their standpoint with respect to naturalism’s effects.

The notion that it is possible to separate religion from science under the methodological naturalism sphere is more widely acknowledged (consider the Kitzmiller v. Dover case, wherein Robert Pennock, the scientific philosopher, was summoned by the petitioners for testifying whether or not Intelligent Design represented a kind of creationism, thereby representing a religious form (Pennock, 2000). Had the answer been in the affirmative, the policy of the Dover board would be in violation of Constitutional Amendment I’s Establishment Clause. Deriving from prior research, the scholar contended that the Intelligent Design concept, in appealing to supernatural systems, wasn’t procedurally naturalistic; further, methodological naturalism basically represents a scientific element. While this is no inflexible requisite, it emanates from sound evidence-linked requisites (e.g., the capability of empirically testing theories).

Isaac Newton, Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke, Johannes Kepler, and other natural philosophers, at times, called on supernatural entities within their scientific or natural philosophy. Nevertheless, on the whole, they typically preferred naturalistic justifications. Such an inclination towards naturalistic sources was potentially inspired by prior successful naturalistic justifications. Consequently, certain experts asserted that methodological naturalism’s success could...

Precise methodological naturalism sprang up during the 19th century after Thomas Huxley, along with his friends, established the scientific professionalization interest group, X-club, in the year 1864. Their goal was the promotion of a science free of the doctrines of religious. This group was probably partly inspired by a need to eliminate competition from amateur-clergymen working as scientists, thereby opening the discipline up to full-time working scientists (Garwood, 2008).
As the concepts of religion and science resist definition, generally, a debate on the link of religion and science may be pointless. For instance, in the year 2014, Kelly Clark claimed that it is only possible to reasonably examine the association between a broad scientific claim and a distinct claim by any given religion (Clark, 2014). The example used was a comparison of neuroscientific discoveries or quantum mechanics with the Buddhist ‘no-self’ concept or Islam’s perceptions in relation to fate or divine providence.

This does not imply, primarily, that a theoretical or rational or essential incompatibility exists between religion and science. They ought not to be pronounced as incompatible solely on grounds of what the two fields are, as certain individuals tend to do. Undoubtedly, the scientific field functions based on proofs and justifications; meanwhile, religion usually appeals to belief and faith (however, this, in no way, implies that proofs and justifications are entirely non-existent in religion).

The argument of Incompatibility between Science and Religion

Carroll’s (2009) claims commence with a clarification. The author holds that one cannot necessarily find a rational or theoretical incompatibility existing between religion and science. The two mustn’t be pronounced as incompatible solely on grounds of what the two fields are, as certain individuals tend to do. The author believes that the scientific field functions based on proofs and justifications; meanwhile, religion usually appeals to belief and faith (however, this, in no way, implies that proofs and justifications are entirely non-existent in religion). All this, however, simply implies the two are different; one cannot cite this as proofs of their incompatibility.

Carroll (2009) further claims that the scientific field functions through the proposing of theories which are subsequently utilized for making predictions, tested against practical proofs. This is followed by judging, using available information, on which theories appear to be more plausible. Formalization of such judgments is extremely difficult – scientific philosophers lack a precise grasp of the way these judgments are carried out. However, this is cause for concern only at the highest degree of rigor. Generally speaking, the process is rather well-defined. Scientists definitely desire their theories to fit facts; however, they desire consistency with other proven concepts as well, in addition to explicitness, unambiguousness, simplicity and width of scope (Carroll, 2009). Scientists are more pleased when their theories are able to explain more concepts based on minimal input. Though such a process fails to prove anything, an adequately successful theory may be appraised immensely better as compared to alternatives claiming ongoing compliance with these alternatives (Steady State cosmology, phlogiston combustion theory, Lamarckian evolution, etc.) are scientifically unsound (Carroll, 2009).

Strictly scientifically speaking, as Carroll (2009) points out, that God exists is a weak hypothesis. The above assertion may account for the fact that hardly any cosmologist believes in God (Carroll, 2005). The author claims religion is imprecise for the following reasons: fitting information is entirely needless, and the concept simply complicates things without correspondingly improving insights. Once again, the above outcome is not theoretically based. The theory relating to God could fit facts in a better way as compared to alternatives. In fact, one can continue to find distinguished religious authorities who claim it does. Their wrongness is similar to the wrongness of Steady State advocates (Carroll, 2005). Half a century earlier, the Steady State idea was reasonable; so was the idea of God two thousand years back. However, over time, human information and understanding has undergone considerable improvements rendering the above theories infeasible. A similar reasoning may be made with regard to creation stories and miracles (Carroll, 2005).

Conflicting perceptions about the existence of God

Dutch (2011) opposed the presence of definitive evidence by reasoning that definitive…