South Korea: Multilateralism, Regionalism and Its Future Political Outlook
The Korean Peninsula is frequently the provocateur for headlines in the global community, both for its proclivity toward tension and conflict and for its relative importance in its region and the world. Perhaps most problematically and tellingly captured by the Korean War that brought so many American, Soviet and Chinese forces and resources to the peninsula from 1950 to 1953, the two-state landmass remains today a focal point for many of the world's industrial powers. This is at least in part due to South Korea's great economic capability and a political orientation that has especially in the two decades to follow the Seoul Summer Olympics (1988), opened itself to the graces of the world community. Channeled most directly through its relationship with the United States, initiated by their alliance in the Korean War and cemented through phases of occupation, military installation and economic stimulation, South Korea would become one of the great and dynamic economies of the world, a genuine military power, a force of instrumental relevance to affairs in its region and a leader in free trade developments. All of that noted, its present is steeped in contentious regional relations and a great deal of uncertainty with respect to its future.
Past:
It should certainly be seen as scarcely surprising that the Korean Peninsula remains steeped in conflict. Indeed, it is a region that was outfitted according to its current model by a state of brutal war. The Korean War was, like so many conditions set in motion on the world stage in the latter part of the 20th century, a repercussion of the events leading up to and occurring during World War II. Occupied by the Japanese at this juncture, the peninsula exited the war in a diminished economic, infrastructural and educational state, leaving it subject to the interests of outside forces. The 38th Parallel became the logistical dividing line, north of which became a Soviet occupied territory and south of which became an American occupied territory. In the years to immediately follow the war, this dividing line would become a flashpoint in the emergent Cold War. The point of conflict over the form of governance between communism and democracy would take hold amongst the domestic populations, with tensions ultimately spilling over into outright conflict. In 1950, according to a primary source compiled by Evanhoe (2008) the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea Army (DPRK - North Korea) artillery and mortars open fire on Republic of Korea (ROK - South Korea) Army positions south of the 38th Parallel, the line then serving as the border between the two countries. The opening barrage is followed shortly by tank/infantry attacks at all points along the Parallel. At 11 a.m. North Korea announced a formal declaration of war and what is now known as 'The Korean War' officially began." (Evanhoe, 1)
The conflict would persist for three years, taking a terrible toll both on the Korean people as a whole and on the long-term relationship of the warring sides. Unique to the conflict in the Korean Peninsula, and a testament to the causal force of foreign occupation, the two sides would be characterized by no ethnic or, at least initially, ideological differences. However, the imposition of communism and democracy respectively would demand a commitment of the respective publics to conflicting ideologies.
So ingrained would these ideologies and their power-seats become in so short a period of time -- likely owing to Korea's long-standing subjugation by foreign occupiers -- that the war would settle nothing. At its resolution, no reunification could be resolved. According again to a primary source, on July 27th, 1953, "The United States, North Korea and China sign an armistice, which ends the war but fails to bring about a permanent peace." (Evanhoe, 6) By consequence, the two nations would develop along distinctly different, separate and counter-balancing paths. North Korea would take on the mantle of Soviet and Chinese totalitarianism, institutionalizing policies of oppression and strict governmental authoritarianism. By contrast, South Korea would develop into something modeled more closely after the democracies established in Japan and Western Europe. These differing paths would prevent any reconciliation between the sides, persisting to present date and defining for the larger part South Korea's regionalist disposition.
Indeed, "to date, the Republic of Korea (South) and Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (North) have not signed a peace treaty. North and South Korea did sign a non-aggression treaty in 1991." (Evanhoe, 6) Though both sides are guilty of detectable human rights violations, their differing paths would ultimately leaving North Korea more isolated and, thus, more prone to widespread abuses. This has deeply impacted its standing in the world community, leaving it prone to an orientation directly the opposite of South Korea's relative multilateral success outside of the Asian Pacific region.
Present:
With respect to its region, South Korea's present circumstances are both unique and precarious. As a neighbor to the secretive, isolated and embattled 'rogue state' to the north and, simultaneously, as a long-occupied ally of the imperial impulses of the United States, South Korea's record on political affiliation is mixed but rife with potential for improvement. Its relationship with the United States will be addressed more extensively as we come to speak more comparatively of its virtues and challenges. But first and foremost, it is acknowledged here that South Korea is imperfect, given over both to a democratic progressivism stimulated by its relationship to the west and to a simultaneous tension with its public over resentment toward the very same western allies.
This might best be highlighted by an incident occurring during the spring of 2008, which helps to denote the clear correlation between American interests and the South Korean public's interaction with its government. As we address this condition, we note that the two primary realities to emerge here do help to largely sum up the political challenges in South Korea. Contending both with the pressures of applying national security that is simultaneously effective and respectful to the rights of the individual citizen and with those relating to international economic trade relations, the government has attempted to find balance without ceding its authority. In April May of 2008, this would come to a head for the South Koreans, with issues of unilateral American corporate interest and national security coinciding.
As the Korean government renegotiated a trade pact with the U.S. concerning the importing of American beef -- in the midst of a global 'mad cow' scare -- the South Korean public expressed distress over the absence of proper protections against the spread and transmission of the potentially fatal bacterial disease. (AP, 1) The protests which spontaneously organized against the trade deal -- distinguished by its free trade principles of battering through obstructions to unfettered commercial interaction -- highlight the challenge to a nation which has in many ways defined its human rights stance based on international relations. In this instance, "South Koreans held a candlelight rally on Monday [May 26] against a beef import deal with the United States, following clashes that led to dozens of people being detained by police." (AP) The candlelight vigils, which would persist for more than two weeks, would suggest a South Korean public with a resentment toward American entitlements which might seem at times to undermine the entitlements of South Koreans themselves. The centrality of the unilateral relationship between South Korea and the U.S. is observably problematic to a nation with great economic prospects.
And even more than that, the incidences surrounding the vigils also highlighted a number of immediate human rights matters with which the South Korean government is currently contending. Particularly, the incidences would highlight the matter of protest and peaceable assembly, which would be subject to reports of oppression and abuse during this time. Accordingly, Amnesty International, the global human rights watchdog group, observed the protests and the law enforcement efforts to contain or curtail them. In a report which it released in October of 2008, it identified a series of disconcerting behaviors with respect to the policing of protests which helps to point to South Korea's current quandaries. Namely, Amnesty International reports that police were observed to engage in "unnecessary or excessive use of police force, including the misuse of police and security equipment during the protests; arbitrary arrest and detention; a lack of adequate training of the police; and a lack of police accountability." (Amnesty International, 1) All of these are conditions which, Amnesty International denotes, qualify as abuses of human rights and point to a need for improvement in these areas within the context of South Korea.
This reflects a general discontent in South Korea over what is proving to be an inherent byproduct of its increasing economic entanglements both globally and regionally. According to a press release submitted by the Human Rights Education Associates, South Korea has experienced waves of peaceful protest in recent years, stimulated by a sense amongst the public that South Korea's government has sought to insulate itself from criticism and dissent for its geopolitical policies. Certainly, this is reinforced by recent legislative efforts currently under discussion in the parliament. The ruling Grand National Party has been the subject of public resistance more recently, perhaps owing to the global economic slowdown which has caused widespread discontent throughout the world. In response, and with elections -- at that time -- approaching, the South Korean government considered the passage of legislation that would both place limitations and legal liabilities on those assembling for protest and would place parameters on the consequences for what may be identified as internet-based libel.
To the second edict, the condition is suggested as a means to "increasing penalties for online defamation and insult. Senior policy coordinator Chang Yoon-seok submitted this bill, which will allow prosecutors to press charges for 'cyber defamation' and 'online libel'. (AHRC, 1) Such legislation does distinctly set South Korea apart from the principles of Western Democracy, even if we may argue that in so many other regards there is a close resonance between the southern part of the peninsula and the western world. Particularly, both the issues of assembly and online speech addressed here are considered constitutional rights in such nations as the United States. So too are they regarded this way by the South Koreans. However, by contrast to the United States and other constitutional democracies which consider libel an issue of civil dispute, this legislation imposed criminal penalties for the same type of activity.
Accordingly, "the proposed revisions include the assessment of up to nine years imprisonment or 50 million won in fines for spreading information defamatory to others through the internet, regardless of whether it is fact or falsehood." (AHRC, 1) Naturally, this last clause is also a considerable distinction, dictating a problematic degree of subjectivity entitled to governance and law enforcement where this 'crime' is alleged. Additionally, this demonstrates that the unilateral relationship maintained with the United States has not been, in and of itself, sufficient to protect the constitutional rights of all citizens. The ultimate outcome, therefore, is a restrictive policy that entitles the government to levy real and harsh limitations on the freedom of individuals to criticize state, policy or leadership. Indeed, such legislation would ultimately serve to intimidate voters, activists, journalists and everyday citizens from honestly and openly engaging in a political process. Such legislation is a violation of human rights which quite distinctly bears a chilling effect on the democratic freedoms and impulses of a nation that is relatively new to both of these areas.
In these instances, we can see that South Korea's contention with issues of human rights centers largely on its economic ambitions, but also touches on motives relating to national security. Owing to the condition between itself and North Korea, as well as the latter's relationship to the United States, South Korea's government has found ways to justify an increase in authoritarian proclivities. With respect to the internet, a recent evaluation of the new legislation has recently been produced by the South Korean government agency, the National Assembly Research Service (NARS). The "group of 228 legal experts, journalists and law scholars issued a press release on November 11, 2008 likening the proposed revision to a national security law for cyberspace. They also denounced it as a blatant attempt to silence political and social criticism via South Korea's vibrant online citizen media and a severe restriction of the freedom of expression." (AHRC, 1) This indicates both a divide within the government over such issues and a tendency on the part of the public to engage its expectant freedoms. Indeed, as of a 2006 article from The New York Times, South Korea was identified as the nation most densely populated with internet users in the world. These two points stand in contrast to one another, reflecting the contradiction in South Korea's general orientation toward the world, its region and its own people.
South Korea's regionalism is largely its most afflicted of areas of concern. The persistent state of conflict and hostility with North Korea is underscored by their divergent sets of allies and by their divergent political orientations. Most significant amongst allies, China has long served as North Korea's patron in the way that the U.S. has effectively served South Korean interests. Therefore, in a region where the primary powers are North and South Korea, China and Japan -- the latter of which has been previously identified in this discussion as having engaged in a brutal occupation of the peninsula during WWII -- South Korea truly has had no closely identifiable ally.
North Korea, a nation both deeply guilty of massive human rights violations and with a nuclear power which it has developed against the will of the world community, represents a significant problem to the region and to South Korea. To the point, in a fairly bold move, South Korea informally noted that it would agree to a United Nations resolution condemning the North for its abuses of human rights in 2008. (Achin, 1) Given their history of conflict and the sensitive state of precarious proximity of the two nations, this is a rare effort on the part of South Korea to intervene in a state where such is needed but scarce. The extent of North Korea's record on human rights abuses is unclear. As reported by Amnesty International, "information and access to the country remain tightly restricted. Despite repeated requests, the government continues to deny access to the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in North Korea and the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food. It also denies Amnesty International and other independent human rights monitors." (Amnesty International1, 1) The presidency of Kim Jong Il, an eccentric and often violently dictatorial 'president for life,' has pursued a deeply isolationist policy approach, resisting oversight and attention from the international community where democracy and human rights are concerned. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the extent of its abused, but given the shared heritage, ancestry and even familial ties across the peninsular border, the South Koreans have come to view North Korean human rights offenses as being of particular concern to the whole of the region.
Indeed, the Achin (2008) article denotes that the damage may be catastrophically widespread. Accordingly, "a group of North Korean defectors to the South held a traditional funeral for two million of their former countrymen they say have died of starvation and persecution under the rule of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il." (Achin, 1) A horrific number to be sure, its accuracy is impossible to verify. That aside, we do know with great certainty that North Korea has demonstrated itself to be amongst the worst offenders in the world to the set of standards upon which the global community has collectively arrived. The general consensus is held by most human rights watchgroups and democratic nations engaged on the international level that the northern part of the peninsula is a place which has for too long been plunged into a nightmarish scenario of oppression and authoritarianism. To this end, "Institute for National Security Strategy Chief Hong Kwan Hee pointed out that, 'North Korea has been being classified as 'the most oppressive regime,' by international human rights organizations' research, and Kim Jong Il is also named as the worst dictator. With the exception of war or domestic warfare, we can hardly find a situation as tragic as North Korea in the world.'" (Yang, 1) This is especially so because, at present, one of the greatest obstacles to helping the publics in North Korea is the international community's willful disconnection from the 'rogue state.' This is a disconnection that begins with its frigid relationship to South Korea. Based primarily on the issue of North Korea's alleged ambitions to create nuclear weaponry against the desires and regulations of the international community, the global community has moved increasingly toward sanctions and isolation as a way of punishing the nation.
Unfortunately, this also tends to take parties away from the negotiating table, allowing North Korea to persist in governing its people according to its own wishes. This process has intensified in recent years, particularly during the War on Terror. In 2002, the United States had claimed that "North Korea is enriching uranium in violation of agreements." (Amnesty International1, 1) This perception and the pursuit of action in response thereto have both have far-reaching effects for the state of affairs in South Korea, which as a matter of policy must stand firm with its ally in the United States. Unfortunately, according to most accounts, this is a matter which both detracts from the world community's focus on the immediate concerns of human rights and further removes North Korea from the process of critical engagement.
As a report from this year cites, "the North Korean human rights issue has not been downgraded on the priority list of the U.S. By the nuclear issue but is being utilized as a tool for negotiation or pressure on North Korea. Therefore, practical efforts to improve human rights were insufficient" (Yang, 1) This is to say that the human rights concerns in North Korea have taken a back seat, even in an explicit negotiation context. This remains the current position within the broader world community, where North Korea's threat to those outside of its borders has manifested far more action and rhetoric than have those conditions which are widely reported to subject the Korean people to a terrible reality. In most categories assessed by such groups as Amnesty International, North Korea has a deeply troubling record. For South Korea, while this remains a clear and present reality demonstrated by the frequency of defection for political asylum, it also remains relatively outside its realm of control. Its regionalist interest in improving relations has experienced mixed outcomes at best.
One of the most significant steps forward for South Korea would be the inception of its increasingly important relationship to China. Indeed, "China-South Korea relations have expanded steadily since diplomatic relations were formalized in 1992. For China, this came at the expense of its traditional ally North Korea, but Beijing placed the economic benefits of aligning its burgeoning market economy with Asian Tiger South Korea above its political and military alliance with Pyongyang." (Klingner, 1) Clearly, this is an indication of the increasing moderation of China to global free trade than anything else. Interestingly, this is an instance in which South Korea has actually seen the ascendance of China to its approach rather than vice versa. This relationship has therefore become extremely beneficial to its posture in the region.
Even beyond the region itself, this relationship is showing South Korea to be evermore minded toward multilateralism. Though the importance of its relationship with the United States has not diminished, it must now be shared. To the point, "in 2003, China displaced the United States as South Korea's largest trading partner in a significant strategic shift that elicited little apparent attention in the U.S. media. Whether the economic realignment was simply a reflection of changing economic realities or was the result of political decisions by Seoul remains a matter of debate." (Klingner, 1) However, it is not debatable that this has significantly altered -- perhaps even improved -- the political prospects for the region as a whole. By no coincidence, it would be during this time that moderate leadership in South Korea would aim to refine a "Sunshine Policy" intended to open the lines of communication cultural interaction and possibly economic interaction between the North and South. The policy would experience only short-lived success as continued provocations in the scope of its nuclear ambitions and with regard to its human rights record would demonstrate North Korea to be continually out of step with the world community. Today, with more conservative South Korean leadership in place, prospects for reconciliation have dimmed once again, threatening only to further isolate a North Korea that though still receiving strong support from China, must recognize that which its isolation has denied it in terms of economic or political opportunity. South Korea's prosperity and inherent attractiveness to China helps to underscore this lost opportunity.
Quite strangely, North Korea is proving itself willing to pronounce alliance with South Korea on issues of regionalism, finding a common enemy in the imperialist agency of Japan. Today, a dispute known as the Liancourt Rocks Issue pits South Korea and Japan directly against one another over lands which have not brought parties to military blows but have instigated tension and reawakened old hatreds. The disputed islands reflect the difficulty for South Korea in forging beyond an isolation bred by centuries of war. In this case, "the islands, known as Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan, are claimed by both countries and could be rich in natural resources." (NAP, 1) Both have taken postured moves to claim the islands, which are occupied by a small group of South Korean police officers but which Japan has recently cited in history books as belonging within its historical boundaries. (NAP, 1)
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