Special Forces operations and the Vietnam War outcome

War has undoubtedly shaped the course of human history. Conflicts, through sheer human nature often arise through disagreement. Occasionally these conflicts end with war as opposing sides believe so vehemently in their respective reasonings and doctrinal views. Oftentimes, these war's end with one "victor" and on defeated party, however, in war everyone losses.

The Vietnam War in particular is an example of how war is a zero sum game that only results in losses for all those involved. This paper examines how the conflict started, taking particular care to express both points-of-view regarding core issues followed by a discussion concerning Special Forces operations and their overall impact on the outcome of the war. Finally, a summary of the research and important findings about Special Forces in Vietnam in the conclusion.

Review and Analysis

Origins of the Vietnam War

The Vietnam War was a long, costly armed conflict that pitted the communist regime of North Vietnam and its southern allies, known as the Viet Cong, against South Vietnam and its principal ally, the United States. Although, chronologically the conflict started in 1940, the war began in 1954. For instance, according to Stanton (1995), "Since the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954, [Vietnam] had been chopped in half, divided at a line of demarcation along the 17th parallel. This was the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North and South Vietnam."

The war principally began after the rise to power of Ho Chi Minh and his communist Viet Minh party in North Vietnam. Further compounding the issue was the backdrop of an intense Cold War between two global superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. At the time, a fear of nuclear war threatened the global landscape. More than 3 million people were killed in the Vietnam War. Ironically, however, more than half were Vietnamese civilians, indicating the deadly force in which both sides engaged.

By 1969, at the peak of U.S. involvement in the war, more than 500,000 U.S. military personnel were involved in the Vietnam conflict. Growing opposition to the war in the United States ultimately led to bitter divisions among Americans, both before and after President Richard Nixon ordered the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1973. In 1975, communist forces seized control of Saigon, ending the Vietnam War, and the country was unified as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam the following year to the dismay of much of the developed world.

The United States Special Force Role in the War

The term "Special Operations Forces" is a generic reference for a wide range of commando units from the different armed forces, including Navy Seals, Army Rangers, and the covert Delta Force; however, the term "Special Forces" is used to refer to the Green Berets only.

The origin of the Green Berets dates after World War II when, in 1952, Colonel Aaron Bank, a veteran of the Office of Strategic Services, identified the need for a commando unit that specialized in unconventional warfare. According to Bering (2005), "Fascinated by their warrior mystique, John F. Kennedy saw [the Green Berets] as a useful tool for fighting communist Third World insurgencies."

Structured for unconventional warfare, Special Forces teams were originally organized into 12-man teams and then later 14-man teams known as Operational Detachment -- A teams, or more commonly ODA's, or simply "A-Teams." The total number of ODAs that were deployed at any given point during the Vietnam War was approximately 85.

The A-Teams were characterized by a "peculiarly collaborative culture where competence confers at least as much credibility as rank."

This collaborative culture was enhanced by the fact that all members of A-Teams were commissioned and noncommissioned officers.

The first A-Teams were deployed in South Vietnam in 1962, and Special Forces camps were established throughout the country, with the majority of the sites being situated near the Laotian and Cambodian borders. According to Clark (1990) "Four to five A-Teams were under the control of a B-Team, with three B-Teams controlled by a C-Team. The typical A-Team consisted of a commanding officer, executive officer, operations sergeant, heavy weapons leader, intelligence sergeant, light weapons leader, medical and assistant specialist, engineer sergeant, engineer and radio operator and supervisor."

When deployed, Special Forces C-Teams were in charge of three or four B-Teams and the average C-Team was comprised of about 20 men led by lieutenant colonel.

According to Clark, "The C-Team was the organizational equivalent of a regular Army company and was referred to as a Special Forces Company. The B-Teams were equivalent to a platoon and the A-Teams were equivalent to squads."

Although all war fields are complex environments, Special Forces teams are frequently called upon to operate in especially complicated operational settings where their special brand of training and tactics are most valuable.

According to Cate, "Only a special breed of person can operate far beyond the reach of supporting ground forces and live among indigenous peoples while training them in guerrilla warfare or conducting strategic reconnaissance and direct-action raids."

These attributes would play an important role in the prosecution of the war in Vietnam by U.S. Special Forces. In this regard, Lewis (1995) reports that, "The sensitive nature and complex politics of the actual role the Special Forces A Teams played in Vietnam [included] living among the Montagnards and exploiting their thousand-year-old hatred for the ethnic Vietnamese."

In fact, Fox (1997) argues that, "One reason the Special Forces were so successful at unconventional warfare was their respect for the various groups, including the Montagnards and the Cambodians, with whom they served -- a counterpoint to the disdainful attitude toward minorities widespread among South Vietnamese leaders and officers."

As mentioned earlier, the war in Vietnam was primarily one of guerilla tactics and unconventional methods. As such, the United States needed to resort to other, more efficient means of warfare to counteract the Vietnam method. As such, special operations and task forces were established to counteract the Vietnam methods of war. One such method was the Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols also known as LRRP. LRRP units were small, heavily armed long-range reconnaissance teams that patrolled enemy-held territory.

These units were critical in regards to intel and information regarding the jungle terrain within Vietnam. In this regard, Connery (1992) reports that, "Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols (known acronymically as Lurps), spent many days at a time observing the enemy in the darkness of the far reaches of nowhere."

By 1967, formal LRRP companies were organized in Vietnam. Most LRRP teams have three platoons, each with five six-man teams equipped with VHF/FM AN/PRC-25 radios. There primary function was to ascertain enemy territory and relay the information back to headquarters. This role was essential as the jungle terrain ultimately proved too much for the military forces of the United States. The information that the U.S. did obtain however, was funneled primarily through the LRRP Special Forces. LRRP training was notoriously rigorous and team leaders were often graduates of the U.S. Army's 5th Special Forces Recondo School in Nha Trang, Vietnam. In fact, it has been reported that the LRRP kill ratio was nearly 400 to 1.

For every LRRP death, they killed nearly 400 Vietnamese soldiers. This ultimately led to commanders using the LRRP very aggressively during the war. LRRP units accounted for approximately 10,000 enemies KIA through ambushes, air strikes, and artillery. Ultimately through the extreme success of LRRP in battle in Vietnam, they set the standard and foundation for today's Long-Range Surveillance, Ranger, and Marine Reconnaissance units.

The mobile strike force command, known as MIKE, was another critical component of the war in Vietnam. MIKE Force's mission was to act as a country-wide quick reaction force. Their primary aim was to secure, reinforce, or recapture small enemy camps. In addition, they were also instrumental in many special reconnaissance missions. According to Taillon (2001), "These units performed patrols, ran special missions, and reinforced Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camps in trouble."

In fact, Taillon argues that, "If the Special Forces had constituted effective MIKE Forces in 1964, just as the Viet Cong had begun to take on isolated CIDG camps, the need for intervention by U.S. ground forces might have been unnecessary."

The MIKE Force was particular well adept at search and destroy missions. Due primarily to their quick reaction mandate, the MIKE Force was better able to assist U.S. troops in recapturing or recovering lost comrades. Search and rescue missions were also given to the MIKE Force as they were often in close proximity to downed pilots within the battlefield. Much like the LRRP, the MIKE Force was trained in a vigorous manner, and as such, participated in many reconnaissance missions.

The Vietnamese often used guerilla tactics to help provide them with a competitive advantage in war. The jungle, the overall terrain, and field conditions were often unknown to the United States.

As such, the need to counter the Vietnamese guerilla tactics was essential to help prevent U.S. causalities. As such, the Tiger Force was created to help "out guerilla the guerillas." The Tiger Force was a platoon-sized unit, consisting of approximately 45 paratroopers.

The Tiger Force was founded by Colonel David Hackworth in November 1965 in response to the massive causalities being experienced by the U.S. due to guerilla tactics used by northern forces. In this regard, Willbanks (2008) reports that, "Tiger Force [was] a special reconnaissance platoon formed in Vietnam by the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division."

The Tiger Force was especially adept at guerilla warfare. According to records, members of the Tiger Force had the highest kill ratios of any platoon in that war. In fact, In October 1968, Tiger Force's parent battalion was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation by President Lyndon B. Johnson.

The Tiger Force, although very superior in regards to their attack and proficiency on the battlefield, has been the source of a great deal of controversy. They have been accused of numerous atrocities such as rape, killing young women and children, torture, and more.

Reports indicate that the unit has scalped many North Vietnamese civilians. There are reports of drugging, raping, and eventually killing young women. The revelations about the Tiger Force's atrocities were the result of a former head of the Army's Criminal Investigations Command bequeathing a box of secret investigative reports about Tiger Force to newspaper reporters at the Toledo Blade after his death in July 2002.

The subsequent investigation of the unit received a Pulitzer Prize for investigative reporting in 2004.

The group has been known to wear a necklace of victim's ears around their necks and even routinely torturing innocent women and children. Although many of these atrocities did occur during the war, the unit was unmatched in their ability to combat the Vietnamese forces through guerilla warfare.

Project Delta was yet another Special Forces unit that played an integral role within the Vietnam War. The mission of the Delta force was simple in concept but difficult operationally. Delta's mission included operational and strategic reconnaissance into the Vietcong areas. Through this reconnaissance, they were to direct air strikes aimed at strategically viable portions of the North Vietnamese forces. In addition to directing air strikes they were also tasked with assessing bomb damage in particular regions of Vietnam.

In addition to these duties, the Delta Force had a very important role in regards to intelligence and enemy information. They were often sent to conduct small scale reconnaissance and hunter-killer operations, capture and interrogate enemy soldier, tap communications, bug offices, rescue downed aircrew and prisoners of war.

The Delta Force, unlike many of the other special forces units mentioned above, was well trained in a variety of different wartime tasks. Records indicate that the Delta Force has been deployed to emplace point minefields and other booby traps, conduct psychological operations, and perform counter intelligence operations in addition to the tasks mentioned above.

Although the existence of the Delta Force is currently disavowed by the Pentagon, a previous description provided in the 1990s by the U.S. Army Delta states that the unit is "organized for the conduct of missions requiring rapid response with surgical applications of a wide variety of unique skills, while maintaining the lowest possible profile of U.S. involvement."

The Delta Force in the Vietnam War provided much in the way of intelligence. Because they were so multifaceted, the Delta Force could help troops avoid many of the booby traps placed by enemy forces. As the war progressed, most Vietnamese tactics resorted to booby traps, mines and guerilla warfare. The Delta Force allowed U.S. troops to avoid these traps through the use of their counter intelligence skill and ability. In addition, the team had the means to capture enemy combatants and obtain the information needed to help prevent numerous casualties on the battlefield.

Summary and Conclusions

In conclusion, the U.S. Special Forces played a very critical role within the Vietnam War. As indicated above, much of the war consisted of guerilla tactics that were often to the advantage of the Vietnamese forces. As such, counter intelligence operations were needed to help ascertain the extent of enemy capabilities. The LRRP, Delta Force, Tiger Force, and MIKE Force all conducted these operations with skill and efficiency. Although each unit was unique in regards to their mandates and overall operations, they each helped alleviate the burden placed on the conventional U.S. forces. The Tiger Force, with their high kill ratio and guerilla tactics, allowed the U.S. To have a small unit capable that could "out guerilla the guerillas." The Delta Force, with its multifaceted approach, allowed U.S. troops to conduct operations with little fear of booby traps or mines. The MIKE force provided small units primarily designed for search and destroy or search and rescue missions. Finally, the LRRP provided significant intelligence and long-range reconnaissance deep behind enemy lines. All of these attributes helped contribute to the prosecution of the war in a major way. Although the Vietnam War ended ultimately with the withdrawal of U.S. troops, the contribution of these men proved invaluable in regards to saving lives and preventing additional U.S. casualties. In the final analysis, Vietnam was a different kind of war; Vietnam was America's first conflict to be televised nightly across America. Vietnam demanded different tactics, strategy and most of all, a different kind of soldier. Vietnam would require an unusual amount of intelligence and the best way to gather intelligence is to put people on the ground deep behind enemy lines. To accomplish such a task special operations units would be heavily relied on. The U.S. Army had started sending Special Forces soldiers to Vietnam as early as 1957; the soldiers advised, assisted and trained Vietnamese soldiers but often were caught up in the middle of firefights.

The U.S. did recognize the need for a strategy against an insurgency early on, but this was a far different strategy which had been deployed in previous conflicts. The United States would learn some hard lessons from the mistakes that were made during the Vietnam War, and would make changes to the special operations community through realignment and the use of joint commands for a more versatile force as a result.

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