Misguided rules of engagement during the Vietnam War

Vietnam -- Rules of Engagement

There are many reasons given for the fact that the United States lost the war in Vietnam, and that America was basically pushed out of the country by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army even though the U.S. had far more firepower. Among the more credible reasons America lost the war was the failure on the part of the political leaders back in Washington to allow soldiers, marines, Air Force pilots and others to take the fight to the enemy. In short, the rules of engagement (ROE) were misguided. The rules of engagement were those authorized by politicians, and not only were they very difficult to follow, they tied the hands of those men fighting the war. This paper reviews the ROE from the perspective of: a) the soldiers on the ground; b) battalion commanders; c) division commanders; d) General William Westmorland; e) Robert McNamara (secretary of defense); and f) President Lyndon Johnson.

Soldiers on the ground

The rules of engagement for soldiers on the ground in Vietnam were constricting, according to authors John Nichols and Barrett Tillman. "In Vietnam the political leadership adopted rules of engagement that ensured that America could not win the war" (Nichols, et al., 1987). The civilian authority constantly "overruled the unanimous recommendations of the military commanders," Nichols explained.

Douglas Willoughby explains that the infantry (troops on the ground) were "forced to follow" a strategy that was devised in order to "…reduce the risks to the Vietnamese civilians" (Willoughby, 2001). The rules that were handed down were "rigidly enforced" and when there were "perceived" violations, careers were "destroyed," Willoughby writes on page 23 of his book. Often soldiers needed to contact headquarters "to get permission to shoot at the enemy," and sometimes permission was granted but it "…came too late, if at all" (Willoughby, 23). The rules dictated "…when and how troops…could employ their weaponry," and this was supposed to be a strategy that would minimize the "collateral damage" to civilians (Birtle). In fact General Westmoreland issues "…forty directives regarding battlefield conduct" (Birtle).

Division Commanders

Major Ricky James Drake writes that the ROEs became "…a weapon for the enemy to use against America," and division air commanders prevented many military targets in North Vietnam from being destroyed (Drake, 1992). The ROEs were so "complicated and changed so often" that pilots didn't know what the rules were from "day-to-day" (Drake, 1). The ROEs issued by division air commanders "…were tremendously restrictive and caused pilots to assume a defensive posture," and no attacks on North Vietnam could be carried out "…without special approval from the White House" (Drake, 6).

General William Westmoreland

Westmoreland followed the rules of engagement by conducting "search and destroy" missions in which the infantry would go out into the jungles and engage the enemy. Of the Army generals who served in Vietnam, "Nearly a third stated that [search and destroy] was 'not sound'… and 51% thought it 'left something to be desired'" (Wiest, 2007). Westmoreland predicted that the enemy would "…run out of men" -- as a way of justifying search and destroy and the rules of engagement he followed were failures because the terrain "…favored" the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong (Wiest).

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara

The rules of engagement for pilots flying attack missions over North Vietnam "…were created by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara"; in 1965 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites were "off-limits" according to McNamara's ROEs (Santoli, 2011). "We watched them being built and become operational, but were not permitted by [McNamara] to take them out…it was ludicrous" (Santoli). But after a SAM shot down an RF-4 Air Force plane, McNamara authorized air strikes on those missile sites (Santoli). The mission "…was just stupid…it causes troops in the field to lose confidence in their military leadership" (Santoli).

President Lyndon Johnson

President Johnson's biggest worry didn't seem to be about winning the war, it was fear that if he changed the ROEs and allowed the bombing of Hanoi and, the bombing of the harbor at Haiphong, the Chinese might get involved because those targets were just south of the Chinese border. The "political meddling" by Johnson "handicapped U.S. military effectiveness," James Forest explains. American military veterans recall "with disgust" that Johnson's rules of engagement imposed "limits on the numbers of sorties" over the north, which "ultimately lost the war despite overwhelming U.S. military superiority" (Forest, 2011).

Johnson met weekly for lunch with McNamara, advisor McGeorge Bundy, and others and basically decided which targets were acceptable under Johnson's evolving and changing rules of engagement. Johnson's target decisions were "…relayed from Johnson through Secretary McNamara" to Westmorland and on to his commanders. But Air Force and Navy brass "…chafed at [Johnson's] rules of engagement" because it made their attacks "…predictable and easy to counter" as the North Vietnamese moved assets; Johnson was going on old intelligence, which "…endangered U.S. airmen" (Head, 2011).

In conclusion, it is clear from the history that the U.S. lost the War in Vietnam largely due to the limited and often wrong-headed rules of engagement that the politicians in Washington handed down to the men fighting in the jungles of Vietnam. Those ROEs were not always followed, of course, but when a ROE was ignored by an officer, that individual could well lose his standing and be dismissed.