Threat of Terrorism Weighing Public Safety in Seattle

Terrorism in Seattle

Even before the World Trade Center attack in September, 2011, most major cities in the United States were not only aware, but anticipatory regarding the potential for a terrorist attack. Seattle has been fortunate in that it has never experienced an actual international attack, but has had three major domestic incidents since 1999 that continue to be in the minds of Emergency Management professionals. In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, an Al-Qaeda operative, was apprehended smuggling bomb-making materials into Port Angeles. Because this was so close to the New Year's Eve Millennium event, the New Year's celebration at the Seattle Center was cancelled. Subsequently, the actual target was identified as Los Angeles International Airport. Then, in 2001, The Earth Liberation Front attacked the Urban Horticulture Center at the University of Washington, causing in excess of $7 million in damages. Finally, in 2006, gunmen attacked the Jewish Federal of Greater Seattle, leaving five wounded and one dead (Seattle Office of Emergency Management, 2013). Besides the issues present in violent actions, one must also ask about the organizational identification of factors that go into decision-making policies regarding potential terrorist threats. For example, in the 1999 Millennium issue in Seattle, one may look at a number of different paradigms that mitigate the situation: public safety frameworks, political necessity, fiscal fears, media and stakeholder opinions and values, and even prior experience and background of those making the decisions.

Certainly, no one knows which city or area may face the next round of attacks -- but it is likely to be a place that has a public and widespread number of consequences. In fact, since 9/11, there have been a number of changes made in an attempt to properly safeguard America against further strikes. The Patriot Act was implemented as a way to communicate broad spectrum safety and potential attack information and to further safeguard U.S. citizens at home and abroad. The Patriot Act provides governmental agencies with the legal means to conduct electronic surveillance, search and gather data, and perform analysis. Internet eavesdropping is used to find keywords, increased security at borders for travelers and immigrants, and several new banking regulations to prevent money laundering. (Olson, 2001).

Terrorism in the Modern Urban World

The world changed on September 11, 2001 when hijackers from a group called Al-Qaeda sent planes into New York City's Twin Towers and the Pentagon in Washington DC. In total, 3,000 people died, the majority citizens and not all from the United States, but at least 90 countries. Responding to this act was a global "War on Terrorism," which resulted in an invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. Patriot Act, and several civil and social changes in American society. More than anything else, though, U.S. security policy came under intense scrutiny and a new Cabinet Level Department was formed, Homeland Security. Congress also reacted by authorizing the use of military force against any individual, group, or State that participated or had any relation to the 9/11 attacks. The changes made to the American security system because of 9/11 were vast, and affected citizens at home and abroad, with certain groups fearful that civil liberties were now less important than security. In fact, the Patriot Act provides governmental agencies with extraordinary legal means to conduct surveillance from the Internet, emails, telephones, and other communication devices; to search and gather data, perform analysis, and act without a Court warrant if there is a threat present. The technology known as "carnivore" is an example of this. Carnivore sifts through millions of emails and electronic communications to find keywords that might indicate potential terrorist threats. This also allows phones to be tapped, and surveillance to occur all without the knowledge of the subject or the Court system (Olson, 2001).

Historically, terrorism has been part of the tactics of a number of political organizations -- right and left wing, nationalistic groups, revolutionaries, religious groups and even some governments. The characteristic is an indiscriminate use of violence against civilian populations in a manner that gains publicity -- using fear to achieve a set of goals. The literature shows that there are over 100 different definitions for terrorism, and many scholars cannot agree on a precise meaning for the term. However, there are some commonalities and key characteristics that seem to be present in most scholarly works on the subject, particularly to distinguish terrorism from other types of crime: 1) Terrorism is political in motivation; 2) It is violent or threatens violence; 3) It is designed to have broad psychological repercussions beyond that of the immediate target; 4) It is conducted by an organization with a hierarchy, and; 5) It is perpetrated by a non-state organization (Hoffman, 2006, pp. 40-2).

What is at Stake for Seattle?

Seattle is a major U.S. city and important port and economic hub with almost 4 million inhabitants in the Greater Metro Area. There are several major corporations located in the area: Microsoft, Boeing, Amazon.com, Starbucks, Nordstrom, Costco, Providence Health, T-Mobile USA and PACCAR. The proximity to Canada and the relative ease of navigating the Puget still make this 15th largest city a viable target for terrorism (City Profiles, 2010). In fact, after 9/11, Seattle received millions in grants to boost anti-terrorism actions. To date, three full-scale exercises have centered on the response to terrorism from Seattle Law and Emergency professionals, with more planned (Seattle EM Office).

Overall, when viewing the organizational behaviors that occur when a direct terrorist threat is made, one finds that there is a logical process that may be used to not only identify the credibility of the threat, but to define the characteristic of the potential sites and damage. All of this, however, is based on the notion that there is a cogent "risk management" plan in place that is an amalgamation of resources, allocations, and feasibility studies (Johnson, 2013, pp. 3-44).

Risk management is a way to find, analyze, and then prioritize risks or hazards that may be associated with an organization. The purpose of Hazard Analysis and/or Risk Management is to be proactive rather than reactive in controlling potential problems that may occur -- fiscal, environmental, and human. In almost every organization there are some types of hazards and risks: safety issues, supplier issues, weather issues, legal or credit issues, disasters, completive attacks, etc. Risks and hazards are so common that standards have been set to identify, and hopefully help mitigate, potential issues (See Figure 1) (International Organization for Standardization, 2009). Basic risk management has at least six separate parts that help the organization: 1) Identification of risks or hazards within the particularly organization; 2) Setting up (the plan) a process to help mitigate the potential occurrence; 3) Mapping responsibilities, scope, objectives, involved parties, and any constraints; 4) Putting a framework in place to handle risks; 5) Analyzing probabilities of certain risks or hazards based on all available information; and, 6) Finding ways to solve risks as quickly as possible so that down time and/or fiscal risk is limited (Wan, 2009).

Seattle, of course, being a major urban center, had such a plan in place prior to the events of December 1999. The plan had two parts: one for the law enforcement/government to follow and the second to educate the populace on various aspects of terror attacks, preparedness and emergency management procedures. These plans were developed in conjunction with the Centers for Disease Control, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Washington State Departments of Health and Military. At the time, Homeland Security did not exist, and therefore many of the current mandated protocols in terms of communication and action were not yet in place (Seattle Government, 2012).

For the governmental plan, we can think of the situation as a flowchart that communicates a mind-set and directions for analyzing a terrorist threat. Note that there are two concurrent issues at play -- the threat evaluation process that moves from the planning stage to the recovery stage, and the response actions that are more tactical and operational (See Figure 2; EPA, 2004).

For Seattle, there was a great deal at stake. From the Public Health perspective there are of course death and injury to citizens. There are also concerns about acute and chronic effects if the threat were biological, chemical or radioactive. The likely closure of the ports would result in an economic disaster of a serious nature: 1/2 million per week in lost revenue affecting a minimum of 200,000 jobs (direct and indirect), as well as a substantial recovery and reconstruction project (if needed) (Port of Seattle, 2009). Economically, a terrorist attack in Seattle would have a ripple effect in that it would have an effect on families, culture, real estate prices, psychological trauma, loss of production, loss of tourism dollars, a blight on purchasing, travel, cargo in and out, and millions if not billions of lost revenue for all levels of business (Barber, 2002).

Specifically, for the New Year's Eve celebration in Seattle, some 50,000 people were expected. This is just the crowd surrounding the Space Needle and does not include those watching from the area around Lake Union or the surrounding communities. On December 29, 1999, Seattle Mayor Paul Schell with the concurrence of the City Council decided to cancel the Millennium Celebration, even though it had been planned for over 24 months. The ostensible reason was a potential terrorist attack, based on the December 14th arrest of an Algerian man, Ahmed Ressam, who was arrested in Port Angeles with enough explosives to blow up at least one major building. When Ressam was arrest boarding a ferry, investigators found that he had booked up a hotel room for one night near the Space Needle. While there was no "direct evidence" that Ressam was planning to blow up the Needle, this and recent events in Seattle led to the decision to end all events by 6pm on New Year's Eve (Lundberg, 2002).

The New York Times quoted Mayor Schell as noting that there was not just one reason for the decision, but many: "It's a combination of things. No other city has had a bomb delivered to its doorstep, or the kind of anxiety we've had over the WTO meetings, plus Y2K concerns" (Egan, 1999). Seattle, of course, had just faced massive street protests outside the city's major hotels and the Washington State Convention Center at the end of November, 1999. Estimates say that at least 40,000 people congregated in downtown Seattle to protest globalization issues. On November 30, protestors tried to block activities, traffic, and damaging police and public safety vehicles. Initial reports noted that protestors were violent and using Molotov Cocktails. This resulted in panic from the Seattle Police, the governor calling out the National Guard, and a number of violent altercations between police and protestors. By December 2, the New York Times corrected earlier articles, noting that the protest was mostly peaceful and that no protesters were accused of throwing objects at delegates or the police/military. The City Council also confirmed this, citing the notion that many in government and law enforcement may have overreacted to the potential for violence rather than the actual threat (Origins, 2008). Still, within the period of three weeks Seattle had faced global criticism for handling the WTO protests and then the realization that a foreign terrorist had almost smuggled explosives into the city, near an iconic monument, during a highly visible and popular venue.

However, there was no specific evidence that the Space Needle, or actually any structure in Seattle, was a target. In some ways, it appeared that Schell and the Council reacted strongly to "perceived" threats based on incidents in other areas and the WTO issues. The job of the city government, though, must be to find win-win situations to both protect and enhance the public. On one hand, the information was disparate and unclear; on the other hand, had Schell and the Council ignored the threat and it proved credible, we may be certain the fallout would be vehement, as well as the guilt over any loss of life. Since 9/11 had not yet happened, there was less credibility on a threat, yet the point of entry was indeed, in Washington. Putting ourselves in the shoes of Schell and the Council, we also find that they looked to the FBI for some guidance, yet despite thousands of agents actively working the Ressam case, the general consensus was that there had been multiple terrorist threats focused on Millennium celebrations, particularly in New York and Washington, DC. Indeed, there was precedent for the attack potential. In 1998 Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden told the world that every Muslim's duty was to kill Americans. In fact, the day after Ressam's arrest, authorities in Jordan raided an Al Qaeda cell and found that attacks were being planned against the U.S. And Israel, although Seattle was not mentioned specifically (Lundberg, p. 5).

Using probabilities, decision trees, logic models and statistics may be helpful, but are also problematic when dealing with actual human motivations and actions. There are a number of tools that explore scenarios, uncertain events, and help assess risk. For instance, decision trees are logic trees that include decision nodes in addition to events. Essentially, these diagrams are representations of decisions and what if statements; endpoints represent paths and alternatives, but there is still a great deal of analysis necessary. In a similar way, probability and event trees also share methodology when developing a risk protocol. In many ways, though, these tools are based on what is known vs. what is unknown, and whether there are, indeed, connections between what may appear to be disparate events. Most of the scholarly research shows that while these types of statistical tools are valuable, it is more appropriate that one understand that no single model can meet the complex challenges of tracking or predicting terrorist or criminal threats -- there is just too much information unknown. Instead, multiple models can aid the decision maker's ability to lean towards a certain decision with more information (e.g. there is a 60% chance of an attack vs. there is a 20% chance) (Ezell, et al., 2010).

Thus, if we look at the information in front of the Council, we find:

View towards status quo

View towards cancellation

18-24 months of time invested in preparation; millions in planning

Better to risk embarrassment and future political opportunities than to put citizens at risk

Vendors and citizens already made commitments; travel, etc.

Even with increased security, no guarantees could be made for safety

Cancellation would have negative future consequences

No sane person could risk 50,000 lives and millions in property damage

Extra security would increase fiscal vulnerability; would send psychological message of fear

Most events were relatively easy to cancel; allowing for fireworks to continue placates the situation

Fiscal investment in the event

WTO issues were still raw, Schell had no way of knowing if there would be more violence

Allows terrorists globally to believe they can make threats and cause terror without investing their own risk

Problems with the Ressam investigation left some law enforcement officials out of the loop; lack of information pointed towards caution

Information unclear, FBI cannot make robust recommendation; Seattle not named as specific target

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act allowed for electronic surveillance of Ressam and colleagues; finding that Ressam was part of an organized group; and more than Ressam had travelled to Seattle

Ressam arrested, so threat level already decreased

Essentially, Schell noted that the year had already been unpredictable and unprecedented; with WTO and other issues, it was more important to be safe than risk lives (Lundberg, 2002, Epilogue).

External Environment

The idea of terrorism is certainly nothing new. World War I was started by a terrorist, the Russian Revolution was a terrorist activity, and even in the Ancient world, terrorism was used as a means to sublimate the population and make it difficult for the military to continue warfare. In the 21st century, though, regional terrorism has grown to two levels: international and transnational. Globalism has changed the world in so many ways, it has brought people closer together for trade, economic benefit, culture, communication -- all with the idea that if people communicate more and have economic ties, they will not wish to have political conflict. However, as globalism redefines cultures, international terrorism has also increased. The terrorist can now operate on a global platform using modern techniques and communication to evade capture and ostensibly do more damage. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union funded these types of groups, particularly in the developing world and all to disrupt capitalism. Now that most of the world, even China, is adopting at least a semblance of capitalism, terrorists no longer focus on just the developing world, but in disrupting global trade and economic development (Wirtz, 2006).

The unfortunate consequence of the new world order is that many now see terrorism as religious based, and most focused on radical Islamic sects. This tends to predispose many against Islam, which is unfortunate because the large majority of Muslims are law-abiding, peaceful people who wish to coexist in a global world of cooperation. Unfortunately, because of the press and continued actions from groups like al-Qaeda, many in the West mistrust Islam and psychologically believe that the imagined community of patriotic Americans does not include anyone from any Muslim nation. In fact, many prejudices that arose after 9/11 focused hate-crimes and bias. This has become engendered in the advertising arena, in both the commercial and non-profit areas. Americans now see their patriotic duty to buy American, and tend to view Muslims as the "other" or the outsiders who may harbor terrorist leanings. This, of course, is unfortunate. Imagined communities in America should, in fact, concentrate not on racial profiling and hate crimes, but on the diverse nature of a community that needed to pull together against violence. Violence and terrorism benefit no one but the terrorists. The maxim for the 21st century should be watchfulness and attending to security, but remaining open to diversity of all types (Alsultany, 2007).

The external environment in the modern age is quite different from that in previous eras. The terrorist ideology (creating psychological terror) has little effect if the results of the actions are not public. Thus, media exposure is likely a primary goal for those engaging in terrorist activities; and of course the manipulation and exploitation of media based on the sensationality of the action (Wilkinson, 1997). Just as the Internet has helped increase the globalization of culture and economics, it has also created a new way for terrorists to spread their message and doctrine. Sometimes the media censors some of these messages, but the ability for a terrorist cell to instantly communicate with anyone globally has certainly changed the playing field. Ironically, despite the negativity attached to terrorist activities, there is an odd "symbiotic" relationship between the media and criminal or terrorist groups that contributes to the serious nature of the external environment. In fact, the United Nations sees this as such a threat that it created its own counter-terrorism resource (United Nations, 2013).

Indeed, Schell and the Council were pushed by media threats and the continual notion that the Space Needle was a perfect target for terrorists because of its international reputation. The idea that there might be less security in Seattle than in New York or Washington, DC also played into the picture. Even calls to the U.S. District Attorney's office were met with "we just don't know" if Seattle is a target. The issue became even more personal when City Council President Donaldson asked law enforcement officials, "Would you let your children go to the Seattle Center at midnight to watch the fireworks?" And was told "No" without hesitation (Lundberg, p. 11).

Finally, the international media climate about Y2K played into the notion that something, no one knew exactly what, but "something" was likely to happen during at least one Millennium Celebration. These issues were not simply cited by Seattle Council members on a whim, there were a number of national reports focused on Seattle:

The New York Daily News noted on December 19, 1999 that a former CIA counter-terrorism threat expert said that Ressam's arrest proved that there were active terrorist cells working in the Seattle area, and with his arrest just five blocks from the Space Needle, high suspicions that Seattle was a prime target (Saltonstall, 1999).

International media coverage of the Seattle Celebration "made it impossible for federal officials to rule out the area as a terrorist target" (Terrorism Fears, 1999).

A National Gallup Poll found that most Americans thought that it was far more likely (67%) for a terrorist attack on the Millennium than any issue with computer disruption. A full 62% of those polled through it was likely that Seattle would be a target (Saad, 1999).

Sharing of Information

Ironically, one of the key issues that came out of analysis of both the Hurricane Katrina and the 9/11 response was the lack of information sharing between relevant agencies. In Seattle, there was mistrust between the Seattle Police and the FBI, largely based on an Intelligence Ordinance from the 1970s. Federal officials noted that they did not have any information to share with Seattle because there was no pertinent information from the investigation, but the police force, while not in complete agreement about how to handle the issue, believed that "they could not rely on the FBI for complete information" (Lundberg, p. 12).

Seattle Police were also upset because they believed that they had been blindsided by the FBI regarding WTO. The FBI believed it had given Seattle an appropriate threat level, but Seattle officials found this to lack credibility until after the fact. This perception of a lack of information sharing compounded the situation for Seattle officials. The FBI was saying "We are not sure," yet if something went wrong, Seattle officials believed the FBI would later say, "We told them this would happen," and deflect blame completely upon local Seattle decision makers (Lundberg, p. 13).

In general, crisis management focuses on three major activities: 1) What are the most appropriate methods of response to both real and perceived crises?, 2) What models and scenarios need to be defined that constitute a crisis and should engage a necessary and appropriate response?, and 3) What is the communication plan and chain that is necessary to ensure that the emergency phase of crisis management is handled appropriately? (Fink, 2000). These three activities, though, require information if they are to be effective. Seattle officials had no internal information, could not get information from Federal authorities, and thus felt that with a lack of information, erring on the side of caution was far preferable to the potential risks.

Perspective of Decision Maker

It is always much easier to make decisions as a Monday Morning Quarterback. Indeed, as information continued to be revealed about the Ressam situation, it appeared that Seattle was not a targeted city, but a way for the terrorists to get the explosives into the country and then move them to the Los Angeles area. However, we must also understand that in the late 20th century, stakeholders had different expectations regarding the role of leadership in situations like that faced by Seattle. From the perspective of Schell and the Council the facts as they knew them were clear: 1) The WTO situation was not handled well between Federal and City officials or enforcement officers; 2) Schell and the Council had a precarious relationship based on prior issues, most recently the WTO protesters; 3) Schell did not believe he was getting enough, or the right, information from Federal officials; 4) There was a lack of certainty from Federal law enforcement as to the threat level; 5) Regardless of the role the Council would take, they would ultimately share responsibility with the Mayor should there be an attack. Many of these issues surrounding not so much a lack of authority, but a decision of how to lead the City during a potential crisis. Indeed, but bringing in the 25 City Council members on December 23, Schell was extending both an olive-branch and asking for input on a decision that had larger repercussions.

Leadership Issues

There is a far more robust and heightened level of expectation stakeholders have for leaders in the modern era. The issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) goes beyond the multinational corporation and has important repercussions for City and Regional leaders. Essentially, the trend in CSR is one in which public officials are expected to be more transparent in the information they share, and to elicit behaviors that comply with not only the letter of the law, but ethically as well. To do this, leaders must focus on community involvement, doing what is right for the public interest rather than their own political career, and taking a broader look at consequences both mid- and long-term, to decisions made. Research shows that the public expects that leaders will put aside differences for the greater good, and while complex in nature, will cooperate to bring ethical and moral philosophy into the public service domain. In the Seattle situation, this would be done by including the community, being transparent in operational matters, emphasizing safety and risk management. In other words, CSR is the process of the business doing what is right for the public, the employee, the business and all stakeholders, while still maintaining an organization that is fiscally sound, evolving, and in the public interest (Kotler and Lee, 2003; Quazi and O'Brien, 2000).