Transparency in Corporate Political Spending

Corporate Political Spending The lack of transparency in corporate political spending has is an ethical issue, because the lack of transparency has very much worked in favor of corporate donors. This is a high moral intensity issue because corporations have unique ability to earn income, essentially unmatched by individuals. Individuals who control corporations -- people who are already rich and powerful -- then control an even greater amount of assets with which to influence the political process to their benefit.

However, when political actions serve the interests of those who are wealthy and powerful, in general there is a trade-off and those who lack this wealth and power pay the cost. Evidence suggests that corporate political activity is positively correlated with financial performance (Lux, Crook and Woehr, 2011). This is where the transparency issue arises. When corporations can donate as much as they want to any candidate, but have those donations remain secret, the public then has no idea which candidates are dependent in which corporations.

It takes a lot of money to run a political campaign, so there is a dependency relationship between politicians and large donors. While typically the quid pro quo in this relationship is unstated, in the form of understanding and favors to be repaid later, this is still corruption. It undermines the spirit of the democratic system under which we theoretically live, if not the law.

With limitless corporate political spending, and no transparency with respect to that spending, it can be difficult for the media and by extension the general public to know whether politicians are acting in an impartial manner with the laws that they pass. This is the reason why campaign finance laws were passed in the first place, if for nothing else than to assure public confidence in their government, and the recent end of campaign finance regulations all but destroys that confidence (Kang, 2012).

There is sufficient evidence to show that they are not. In many cases, industry or its lobbyists write laws, which politicians then sign. This is not how the system is intended to work, and there is minimal debate about these laws. The interests of voters is thus circumvented, so that only the corporate interests are represented, or for that matter any group with enough money to hold influence over politicians.

The evidence of the perils of this system is not just found in the way that the system functions today, either; it is evident in the outcomes. Banks were bailed out in 2008, at a cost of $431 billion taxpayer dollars in the case of TARP. As a result, the financial sector remained healthy, while the rest of the U.S. economy stagnated. The stock markets have doubled, but unemployment is only now returning to pre-recession levels. Real wage, on the other hand, have stagnated since the 1970s. Corporate profits have not.

The government controls how our economic system works, how resources are deployed in the economy, and under what regulations people and corporations conduct their business. The political environment, if judged by either inputs or by outcomes, has been exceptionally favorable to corporate interests for the past several decades -- all new wealth created has landed in the hands of corporations and the wealthy class. One of the issues with the approach that has been taken is that not all that is of value in this world is quantifiable.

Corporate interests work on numbers -- dollars, usually - and seek to commoditize as much as possible. This is an economic system where control over resources is theoretically left to the free market, but in practice is apportioned by government through its policies regarding taxation, natural resources and market access. Ultimately, corporations purport to work on an economic value orientation, but this seems to be the case only to the extent that they are also granted control over that which is valuable.

There is the idea that corporations, as legal entities, are allowed legal rights, including that of.