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The flight was being operated without a flight plan being filed under the required rules. Visual conditions prevailed at the time of the accident and due to the accident; the commercial pilot and passenger received fatal injuries. The helicopter was destroyed. The flight had started at 1835 and according to the operator the pilot had a standard pattern of usage which included delivery of cargo to a facility and the carriage of a passenger was not authorized. A witness on the ground said that the helicopter was flying at a low altitude in a terrain of a pasture with many trees. This was about 4 nautical miles south of the airport from where the pilot took off. Then the witness saw the helicopter run directly at the power lines that crossed the valley and the witness ran to avoid what he though was to be an imminent collision. According to the witness the helicopter ran into the power lines, then fell on the ground and burst into flames. When the engine and transmission assemblies were examined, it was seen that the turbine was split apart at the power turbine support and almost half of the accessory gearbox was destroyed by fire due to the impact. The compressor showed foreign object damage on the trailing edge of the inlet guide vanes and on the first stage of compressor blades. (ATL02FA003)
Conclusion:
Thus it is clear that though a lot of studies...
Yet it is a good subject for advertising and we still have statements coming out like "Studies have shown that the NOTAR system is less vulnerable to foreign object damage than the tail rotors of conventional helicopters." (MD 600N: Features and Benefits)
References
Accident and Incident Reports- Detail: Air Safety Occurrence Report" Retrieved at http://www.atsb.gov.au/aviation/occurs/occurs_detail.cfm?ID=315. Accessed on 31 July, 2005
Accident and Incident Reports- Detail: Occurrence Brief" Retrieved at http://www.atsb.gov.au/aviation/occurs/occurs_detail.cfm?ID=593. Accessed on 31 July, 2005
ATL02FA003" Retrieved at http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20011030X02163&ntsbno=ATL02FA003&akey=1Accessed on 31 July, 2005
Far NPRM" Retrieved at http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgNPRM.nsf/0/4fc87ae63811cda486256827005bc1cc?OpenDocumentAccessed on 31 July, 2005
MD 600 N: Features and Benefits" Retrieved at http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:IFcOzAdgp2oJ:www.mdhelicopters.com/Rotorcraft/Models/MD600NTechSpecs/600techd_Features.pdf+turbine+engine+accidents+foreign+objects+damage&hl=enAccessed on 31 July, 2005
The pilot then asked for emergency vehicles to meet them on runway 36 as a precaution. No total emergency was declared. The flight was able to land safely on runway 36 and the pilot was able to complete a normal shutdown. Then the rudder cable was sent to the NTSB materials laboratory and they found that the wire rope portion of the cable was fractured inside the clevis fitting
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