Unconventional Warfare in Cuba 1960s

Un-Conventional Warfare in Cuba 1960

Unconventional Warfare in Cuba 1960s

Unconventional warfare in Cuba 1960's

Unconventional warfare in Cuba 1960's

Unconventional Warfare or UW also referred to as the guerrilla, revolutionary or partisan, is a soldierly technique with political references, which is used to decrease an opponent's military capabilities leaving it vulnerable to potential attacks or threats. Its main objective is coercive compliance and voluntary submission; to stop the enemy from attacking despite having the armed resources to continue (Tierney, 2006).

Cuba has been a hub of unconventional warfare traditionally and historically specifically, in the mountains of Oriente Province. The peasants (guajiros) have a history of campaigns such as Maceo and Membises, a heritage which they cherish. And even after the evolution of the newly developed guerrilla model in the 1950s, it could not be applied without alterations in the Republic of Cuba. Now, with the changing times and technological advancement, there are no more Gomez and Maceo, Cuba has come a long way the military wise; Augusto Ce'sar Sandino has brought new innovations to the ancient guerrilla warfare (Dosal, 2004).

The CIA approved document became the Cuban policy paper for administration and also became the incoming President John F. Kennedy's first foreign policy crisis. On April 29, 1963, President Kennedy specifically wrote to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and asked him to keep the Cuban Contingency Invasion plans updated and even strengthen them, anticipating higher resilience. The new plan included massive UW equipment such as more troops, heavy combat equipment, aircraft, artillery, etc. The plan layout for the U.S. invasion other than replacing Castro also included the establishment of a Beach Head; it is a pure military term which means to breach a country's beach by sea and begin to defend the area with excess reinforcements. The UW intensified in Cuba's heating things up as it became clear that the U.S. wanted to establish a provisional government in Cuba (Russo, 1998).

Many secret code names were given to the operations underway such as MH/Apron; the upcoming revolt was known as Operation Judas, and the project as a whole was coded as AM/Trunk (Russo, 1998). President Kennedy along with the CIA made strategy for placing two key exiles as part of the movement. The exiles were trained and controlled as elements of the Unconventional Warfare. The U.S. fought tooth and nail, but they were unsuccessful in driving people to rebel in arms against Castro despite using all their military antics of a full-fledged guerrilla operation in Cuba. Several attempts were undertaken to assassinate Castro by the U.S., such as poisoning him and involving the Mafia, etc. But in vain as Castro had a strong hold on Cuba and its people. As part of the heightened and intensified Unconventional Warfare, the U.S. even encouraged anti-communist groups within Cuba. On orders of the U.S. government, the U.S. trained and armed Cuban exiles, launched a mission in April 1961 called "The bay of pig's invasion" with 1500 Cuban exiles backed by the U.S. ( Isabel Toro Morn & Alicea, 2004)which ended in failure due to navigational error of landing site selection, which was indeed called "The bay of pigs" (Stockton, 2006). Despite all the preparations of a UW, the U.S. failed in its objectives of overthrowing Castro and bringing an end to his communist dictatorship. Although, the U.S. used all sorts of resources, they used their mental prowess to induce rebellion among Cuban exiles who fled Cuba and re-settled in Miami, they used innumerable ammunition, artillery and combat equipment. It was a cold war fought on all aspects of economic, psychological, social, political and military fronts yet without success. President Kennedy who himself did not have thorough knowledge of the Latin American peninsula, was merely acting on commands of the CIA, the defeat was utterly humiliating on part of President Kennedy (Russo, 1998).