U.S. Force in the Pacific War

¶ … War

Many renowned military analysts argue that concentration or mass is the most important principle of war. This is primarily because the combat tactic involves the concentration of an extremely huge quantity of military manpower and material as well as the development of military power with complete superiority over the enemy in relation to quantity. This principle of war is regarded as superior to other tactical approaches in battle such as combination of inferior mass with tactical opportunities for victory. Generally, the concentration of soldiers entails the decisive, harmonized use of superior fighting power for victory over an enemy. Given the significance of this principle in war, there are arguments that the U.S. committed a strategic mistake through breaching this principle of war through dividing its forces between Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific battles against Japan between 1943 and 1944. An analysis of the approaches employed by the U.S. Army in this war demonstrates that it did not commit a strategic mistake by violating this principle of war.

Overview of this Principle of War

According to military analysts, mass or concentration is the most important principle of war that is used to obtain considerable tactical advantage over the enemy. This tactical approach involves the application of a large quantity of military manpower and material with complete superiority over the enemy. This tactic has been used by various forces to seize tactical opportunities and victory such as the Soviet forces that utilized it as an essential condition of combat. The other examples of the use of this principle of war include its application in World War II in the German-Soviet battle in which the German soldiers were crushed by it.

In some cases, the use of this tactic requires its combination with other strategies in combat power and battles. One of the most important strategies that can be combined with this tactic is tactical opportunity because of its relationship with mass or concentration. Throughout the history of military battles and struggles, mass has sometimes been used in combination with tactical opportunity and seizing victory. The combination of these two is associated with the fact that mass provides superiority in military manpower and material whereas tactical opportunity provides tactical and strategic advantage in war. Generally, the combination of mass with tactical opportunity provides complete superiority that enhances the chances of the force to be successful in combat while limits the ability of an inferior side to become victorious.

The Pacific War

The Pacific War is a battle that was fueled by the challenge that an emerging Japan brought to the United States and the imperial rule by Europe in the region. Japan had become a regional colonial and imperial power by the 1930s and was determined to stamp its authority as a great power. Through stamping herself in this status, Japan would assure herself of independence and self-sufficiency that would help in conquering markets and obtaining important raw materials that were largely controlled and dominated by European rivals. Japan achieved this status through assault of China in late 1930s that resulted in closure of Asian markets. This contributed to significant and fatal challenges to the United States, which desired and promoted an increasingly open world economy.

While American reacted to these events by increasing military help to Chinese forces that were combating Japan, negotiations were carried out in late 1941. However, Japanese forces carried out a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. naval base, which worsened the conflict between the United States and Pearl Harbor. According to Smith (2006), America had minimal hope in stopping Japanese imperialism because it was crippled at Pearl Harbor and was without Australia (p.50). The U.S. responded to the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor by adopting various measures including relocation policy through which many Japanese-Americans lost their constitutional rights. In early 1942, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt authorized relocation and militarized internment of every resident alien that targeted people of Japanese descent.

Generally, the Pacific War was the core of the Second World War whose combat extended over a huge area that included Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific as well as parts of Asia. The Pacific War started in 1941 following Japan's invasion of Thailand and assault on British possessions and American military and naval bases. The combat later involved the fight between Japan and the Allied forces or powers in attempts to prevent the prevalence of Japan's rising imperialism and dominance.

During the initial stages of the World War II, the Japanese army and navy initiated various amphibious landings against several British possessions of Malaya, Singapore, and Philippines that they conquered through speedy and vigorous attacks that demoralized their enemies. These attacks were based on Japan's decision to carry out an imperial and naval campaign whose strategic planning was based on geopolitical factors and timing (Millet, 1996, p.56). During the interwar period, Japan was America's most probable enemy that would expand naval campaign across the central Pacific Ocean, which would require combined forces by Allied powers to defeat it. As a result, the United States increasingly monitored the Japanese forces to develop appropriate tactics for the amphibious warfare.

U.S. Division of Forces between Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific Battles

During the Pacific War, the United States divided its forces between the Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific battles against Japan from late 1943 to late 1944. The United States has developed some conditions that should be met before its involvement in military conflict including the application of adequate force to reflect overwhelming desire for victory. The application of enough force is fueled by the need to prevent the U.S. Army from engagement in half-hearted measures that may jeopardize the ability of the force to seize victory (Handel, 2001, p.55). This condition requires maximum concentration of force in major tactical positions or places that enhance the likelihood of winning the battles. Notably, the United States military involvements have always been characterized by the use of military power, which is based on concentration of force in order to achieve superiority in military manpower and material.

There are various approaches to dissect a battle in evaluating its strategies including military and non-military, defensive and offensive, and based on general operational patterns of strategies (Wylie, 1989, p.117). In the Pacific War between 1941 and 1945, the United States carried out two distinct combats against Japan. One of these wars was sequential strategy campaigns, which involved drives across the Pacific, the coast of Asia, and the shores of the Empire of Japan (Wylie, 1989, p.118). Secondly, the United States also conducted a cumulative strategy that was geared toward affecting the Japanese economy. The use of the two tactics was fueled by strategic factors that were crucial in this battle i.e. attacking the strategy of the enemy, achieving decisive victory, and intelligence (Handel, 2001).

The division of soldiers by the U.S. Army was geared towards enhancing the effectiveness of the force in fighting a potent and determined Japanese enemy or force. In the Central Pacific, the U.S. forces prepared and carried out various naval campaigns that acted as a model for carrying out joint operations amidst persistent resistance from the Japanese. One of the reasons that fueled the division of forces to Central Pacific was the need by the U.S. force to fight its way through various points at the beginning of the war. The American services gave much attention to the Central Pacific based on the belief that military activities in this region would be crucial in easing the stressed American soldiers in the Philippines and Guam. Moreover, military actions in Central Pacific were regarded as necessary to bring back Mariana, Marshall, and Caroline Islands in case they had already fallen (Martson, 2005, p.159). However, the forces did not make plans for any operations or activities in the region between Australia and the Philippines.

Similarly, the U.S. force in Southwest Pacific was geared toward combating the Japanese tenacious force. However, this force was led by a commander from a different service who would report to the Joint Chiefs of the force. The force in the Southwest Pacific area was crucial in the implementation of major amphibious offensives that would initially be launched from this region. In essence, the Southwest Pacific area offered a critical strategic position for the U.S. force by acting as the base for the initial execution of amphibious offensives. Moreover, the operations of this force were designed to follow the series of military operations in the Southwest Pacific area despite the existence of a complicated command structure in the U.S. force.

Even though the U.S. forces were divided between the Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific offensives, the commanders were reporting to the Joint Chiefs of these forces. The division was characterized by a complex organizational structure that had two distinct commands for the two regions. The main goal of this division or arrangement was to design military operations in a sequence that will collectively result in the realization of the assigned eventual objective of the U.S. force within a short time period and minimal losses in manpower and material resources.

Arguments on Violation of Principle of War

As previously indicated, there are concerns or arguments on whether the division of U.S. forces between Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific resulted in a strategic error through violation of mass or concentration as a principle of war. These concerns are not only based on the significance of mass or concentration in battle but on the immediate impact of this decision in the war and accomplishment of specified objectives. Based on arguments by prominent military analysts, mass or concentration is the most important principle of war. This principle is characterized by superiority in military manpower and material resources that contribute to complete dominance of the enemy that eventually results in victory.

Based on the definition of this principle and what it entails, the United States committed a strategic error by violating this principle of war through dividing its force between Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific offensives against Japan. Prior to this, the U.S. force was already beleaguered with the imperialism and seeming dominance of the Japanese force. The state of the U.S. force required concentration rather than division in order to boost its military operations and activities. By dividing this force, the United States was committing a strategic error that would overstretch its capability in dealing with the tenacious resistance from Japanese forces and eventually violate this principle of war. The separation of the force further compromised one of the conditions that were established as pre-requisites for engagement in war i.e. The presence of adequate soldiers to prevent half-hearted measures (Handel, 2001, p.55).

The second argument in support of the claim that the division of U.S. forces was a strategic error that breached this principle of war is counter-measures utilized by the resistant Japanese forces. Martson (2005) argues that the Japanese forces expected these moves and designed a strategy to counter them (p.160). The counter-measures involved occupying an internal geostrategic position in the Pacific that gave the Japanese a huge advantage over their American adversaries (Martson, 2005, p.161). The positional advantage enabled Japanese forces to respond quickly to offensives from the U.S. side of advance and overcome it before other Allied forces could intervene. Therefore, the division of the U.S. forces was a strategic error in which this Army experienced shortage in manpower and material resources for its effectiveness. Actually, the separation relatively worsened the competition for the already scarce resources in an economy dominated by forces.

Counter-Argument

There are various counter-arguments that can be raised in opposition to the claim that the United States committed a strategic error by violating the most important principle of war in division of its forces between Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific. First, while concentration or mass is a great element of success in combat, it does not necessarily enhance the likelihood of success (Handel, 2001, p.3). This implies that the United States could not only rely on superiority of armament and manpower to achieve success since this does not necessary guarantee success. The success of the United States in dealing with the Japanese imperialism in the Pacific War required combination of various strategies rather than just mere dependence on superiority of armament and manpower. Through the division of its forces, the United States was demonstrating its strategic plan that was not entirely based on this principle of war. Therefore, the United States did not make a strategic mistake but supplemented this principle of war with other initiatives that were geared towards ultimate victory over its greatest adversary. This was also forced by the fact that the U.S. military was already beleaguered and the concentration of manpower and material could have done little to salvage the situation as compared to adoption of other approaches through the separation.