Western Sahara Conflict in the

Western Sahara Conflict In the early years of civilization in the Western Saharan regions, civilizations used trade and exchange of services as a means by which to maintain the peace, and to meet the economic and social needs of their expanding civilizations. The Western Sahara was, then, and is today rich in minerals and other resources, not the least of which is oil. For the past thirty years, there has not bee peace in the region, largely because of the natural resources that are worth billions of dollars.

The aid that has been sent to the region to assist those people of all nationalities who have become caught up in the violence and greed of the area's leaders, has been embezzled, and it is one of the reasons that the region continues to experience conflict and turmoil. Coming together in the center of the war and conflicts in the region are three major forces that carry political clout: Morocco, Algeria, and the Polisario Front; and then the Western countries that surround Morocco, Algeria, and Western Sahara.

The Polisario Front, as denoted by its name, is an opposition force, opposing Moroccan authority, and, in some ways, even Algerian leaders, and has an agenda of its own.

This essay is a study of the region, the resources, the major players and forces, and, finally, the people of the region in an effort to understand what has been done to resolve the conflict and bring about a peace settlement in the region, which would allow the people whose lives remain in constant turmoil and conflict to finally make permanent homes and focus on their daily lives of subsistent living.

The citizens of the region who are not in the military, not engaged in the conflict, but whose lives are subjected to decisions and actions of the primary forces and power elites, live in terror each day. They are the ones who suffer the losses, and their lives and losses seem to be of little relevance to the forces in conflict and control. An effort is made in this study to understand why the conflict continues, and which groups or individuals are benefitting from the continued unrest and aggression.

The actual landscape in square miles of the Western Sahara is one about 266,000 square kilometers, or the size of the United Kingdom. The population is largely of Sahrawi origins represent the majority of the total population, which numbers about 340,000 people. Moroccans, too, are part of the population diversity of the region, but like other nationalities, they are the minorities in the population. Where, then, does Algeria and the Polisario come into the dynamics of the region? The Polisario is an exiled political organization supported by a Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.

Algeria supports and provides financial aid to the exiled Polisario, which came into existence in 1973. The Western Sahara is the product of the transition from Spanish colonialism, and it goes with the "post" colonial history of European Africa, that following independence, many of the African countries continue to experience turmoil and civil war. The modern history of the "Spanish Sahara," now known as Western Sahara, begins when its Spanish colonial rulers left the region, which Spain had occupied since 1880.

Spain left the region not because of guerrilla activity and civil war, but at the urgings of the United Nations in the mid-1960. It is at this time that the current dynamics began unfolding in the region, and the modern day players all planted their stakes in the desert region.

At that time Mauritania had made its claim to the Sahara region, but then relinquished that claim in 1973, when, in response to the manipulations to the vying powers' efforts gain control over the area, the guerrilla Polisario came into existence as an organization. There is a need to understand the positions of the forces at play here. First, it is necessary to gain a sense of the region.

What is the landscape, and who occupies what section of that landscape? From where does their claim on the landscape arise from? It is only by analyzing the landscape and the positions of the players that an effort to make sense of what has gone on and continues to go on in Western Sahara can begin to make sense. Even if the sense that it brings to the understanding of the dynamics of the situation belie the true interests of the parties involved. The first is the Moroccan position.

It is unfortunate for the many citizens of Western Sahara who live in poverty and without any voice, and who are probably even less concern for the politics of the region, the status quo of uncertainty is one that each of the groups is willing to continue as it is more favorable to the alternative of resolution.

The alternative, it is pointed out in the Executive Summary of 2007, 'Western Sahara: The Cost of Conflict,' is that one part, or more than one party, would, with resolution, walk away with nothing. Peace, stability in the region, and the welfare of the citizens, whom out number those whom lead the conflict and make the decisions that keep the lives of the citizens in turmoil and pain; is not what the parties are willing to consider.

The Moroccan Position Since the Moroccans are amongst the minority population in Western Sahara, but are major players in the power struggle and in the decision making process in the region, it is necessary to consider their position. Looking at a map, the northern tip of Morocco is across the Mediterranean Sea from Spain. On its own side of the Mediterranean, Morocco is bordered by Algeria, which, like Morocco, is a former French colony.

To the south, following the Atlantic coast, beyond Morocco's own southern most border region, is Western Sahara. Western Sahara and Morocco share Algeria as a border neighbor to their west (SEE Addendum 1). To the west of Western Sahara, below the border tip of Algeria, is Mauritania, another former French colony (SEE Addendum 2). It is Mauritania that constitutes the largest western border to Western Sahara (SEE Addendum 2). In 1960 Mauritania annexed the southern "third" of Western Sahara, but relinquished that holding following three years of war guerrilla warfare with the Polisario.

Mauritania is not a player in the Western Sahara dynamics. During the mid 1960s, when the United Nations convinced Spain to surrender to the region's indigenous peoples the right of self-determination, Morocco has been a key figure in the ensuing dynamics of the region. The indigenous people, the Sahrawi, were supported in the goal of self-determination by two United Nations resolutions, one, in 1972, and a second resolution passed in 1973.

However, Morocco, having achieved its own independence from France, and having long held that it had a historic claim to the region then being referred to as Western Sahara, convinced Spain to delay referendum on the UN resolutions until King Hussan II's case asserting Morocco's claim could be heard in the International Court of Justice (ICJP). This, then, is the first element in Morocco's position: Historic claim to the region referred to as Western Sahara.

Morocco's claims went beyond the assertion that its historic claim on land formerly occupied by the Spanish, but included all of Mauritania, and parts of Algeria, Mali, and Senegal. The lands that it was claiming a historic right to was a part of what Morocco held was once "Greater Morocco." If the ICJ ruled in favor of Morocco, it would turn back the hands of territorial time by some hundred years.

This was a second point of the Moroccan position: successful claim on Western Sahara would open the door for Morocco to pursue its territorial claims against Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Senegal. However, the ICJ ruled not in Morocco's favor, but that the Spanish referendums should proceed. By this time, Spain had already begun experiencing the guerrilla activity of the Sahrawi, even though they had not yet evolved into the Polisario.

Since Spain was experiencing the guerrilla, even terrorist tactics of the Sahrawi, and it was clearly faced with a changing world where colonialism was a condition of the past, Spain had little interest in trying to sort out the differences between the ethnic conflicts of the Sahrawi, the Berbers, Arabs, and the whites who comprised the region's population.

If the ICJ ruled in the favor of Morocco, it would have been turning back the territorial hands of time in a way that it would have been flooded with claims made by other countries as to lands lost and gained during colonization, and perhaps even claims made in European territory disputes.

The IJC ruled, basing its findings on the lack of proof as to the assertion of a claim against the territorial holdings of the former Spanish colonial authority, and they found no substantiation of a claim existed prior to the Spanish colonization of Western Sahara.

The court's findings did two things; it resolved the immediate issue of a territorial claim by Morocco, but also, because its findings were based on a lack of evidence of claim, it left the door open for Morocco to reassert its claim based on new evidence that might be submitted to the court for further review.

Which historians Yahia Zoubir and Daniel Volman describe this way: At the same time, they [the Judges] are in accord in providing indications of a legal tie of allegiance between the Sultan and some, though only some, of the tribes of the territory, and in providing indications of some display of the Sultan's authority or influence with respect to those tribes." For the court to have found in the favor of Morocco based on "historic" claims, would have opened the door of a Pandora's box, and there was simply no way to legally deal with that situation.

A finding in Morocco's favor would undo the modern world. Then, strangely enough, and because if he wanted to remain in the dynamics of the argument and struggle for control over Western Sahara, Morocco's King Hussan III interpreted the court's findings in favor of Morocco, and in accordance with Moroccan law. If the referendums on the UN resolutions had been held, then this would have ostensibly made moot Morocco's claim.

Spain never held the referendums, and Zoubir and Volman offer as reasons 1) Spain's own domestic issues, which were preoccupying the political resources of the country. This is a sound reason, because, as Zoubir and Volman point out, Franco's health was failing him, and there would have been political maneuverings and vying for power for the political power players to be concerned with and intensely focused upon.

Less convincing is the argument made by Zoubir and Volman that Spain's failure to hold the referendums was as a result of global pressure, and that to do so might have caused Spain to become involved in a confrontation with Morocco. Whether or not Spain held the referendums, it was taking itself out of the African continent, and would not have been threatened by Morocco.

It is unlikely that, given the situation that Morocco was in, and the resources it was already directing towards its claim to the Western Sahara, that Morocco would have pursued Spain individually post withdrawal for holding the referendums. It is more likely that Morocco would have been contentious to whatever entity the referendum transferred power to. That is demonstrated by the fact that the powers instilled in the Sahrawi by the United Nations, remained instilled the Sahrawi even when Spain did not hold the referendums.

Spain's inaction brought about the same result that action would have yielded, and, therefore, it was simply in Spain's long-term relationship with Morocco not to act in a statement, such as a referendum. Thus, Zoubir and Volmer's argument that it would have lead to military conflict between Spain and Morocco is not a strong argument in explanation of why Spain did not hold the referendums. Spain effectively divorced itself of the problems in Africa.

Zoubir and Volmer base their theory of thought on the fact that in 1975 Morocco rallied not just its troops, but Moroccans, too, in what is known as the Green March. Zoubir and Volmer contend that Spain was intimidated by the show of force wit Morcco's military, which was supported by the civilian movement. Zoubir and Volmer think that this was also a sign of the pressure that Morocco was putting on Spain.

Zoubir and Volmer's position does not, however, originate from the perspective that Spain had already given in to the UN urgings to leave Western Sahara, and that it was only a matter of logistics that Spain was still in the country at the time that Morocco made its show of force.

Also, from Morocco's perspective, the show of force while Spain was still there was necessary in order to give rise to the idea that Spain was being pressured by Morocco, and that Morocco's forces were in some way a threat to Spain. It is not unlikely that Spain had the same logic as did the United States when the U.S.

pulled out of Vietnam; there was no loss, because the United States was a super power pulling out of a situation that could have gone very differently had the U.S. flexed its muscles in a different way. Spain was still counted among the post World War II allies and super powers, and there was no need for it to flex its muscle against Morocco, with whom Spain could better benefit in a post colonial relationship.

Morocco had everything to gain from the Green March, while Spain had nothing to lose by the March, nor by taking a sideline to sit out the situation as the powers that prevailed and remain in stalemate today, and were vying for power in 1975 when the march took place. The Executive Summary of 2007 does not provide a good insight into Morocco's position of thirty years ago, but makes good points about Morocco's present day position.

Of all the players, Morocco perhaps has the most to lose economically if it is not awarded Western Sahara under its claim. The summary points out that 85% of the Western Sahara Sahrawi population live on territory under Moroccan control, and Morocco has controlled that territory in large part for the past thirty years.

The summary points to the fact that in the thirty years that Morocco has had control of its 85% of the land of Western Sahara, the civilians who live under its control have prospered in many ways; which is not to say they enjoy a democratic style freedom.

The summary is quick to offset the financial progress of the region, giving credit as is due to Morocco for that economic prosperity; but nonetheless that the Sahrawi who live there are not at liberty to criticize the Moroccan King, or government, and that the elections cannot be verified as occurring without fraud and complicity on the part of the Moroccan governing body.

This is, however, much the same as in Morocco, and because Morocco sees Western Sahara as historically belonging to the kingdom of Greater Morocco, one should not perhaps expect the political issues to be different in nature on either side of the Western Sahara border. The biggest problem that international peace keeping organizations have with Morocco is evidenced in the Executive Summary of 2007. The summary states: Rabat (seat of Moroccan government) violently stifles any claim of independence, frequently resorting to torture and arbitrary arrests, including against human rights activists.

It has repeatedly prevented visits by international delegations wishing to observe the situation and has frequently expelled foreign journalists. Through the numerous benefits it grants, Rabat attracts populations from the north of Morocco to Western Sahara with the effect that the Sahrawis will very soon be a minority in that area, giving them a strong sense of dispossession. Moroccans as a whole have also had to bear heavy costs." Spain encountered problems when, in 1973, the Polisario began guerrilla attacks against Spanish troops.

By 1975, Spain was pulling out of Western Sahara altogether, and ceded control of the region to Morocco and Mauritania. This left Algeria out of the sphere of control, and since that time Algeria has thrown its support and resources behind the Polisario, with Sahrawians seeking refugee protection in Algeria. Morocco is perceived by some human rights organizations as an antagonist to the Sahrawians, because Morocco clings to the idea that the Sahrawians will become a minority at some point in the future.

This is difficult to grasp at this point, because the Sahrawians are a majority in Western Sahara. One conclusion that might be drawn based on the Moroccan notion that the Sahrawians will become a minority in the future, gives rise to concerns about human rights violations, and especially concerns of potential genocide. Morocco's 2003 defense budget was 2.3 billion dollars (USD). It keeps a military unit in country, and a second unit devoted to the Western Sahara.

While Algeria supports the Polisario Front (PF), Algeria has not made an aggressive military move of its own forces against Morocco. However, the PF is estimated at 3,000 to 6,000 guerrillas, who represent an exiled authority. It has been more than three decades since the Spanish left the Sahara. During that time Morocco has made a large financial and political investment in the region.

This is the third element in the Moroccan position: Extensive financial investment in the region's economic sectors Morocco, if it decided to yield to the autonomy of the Sahrawian population, would have to be compensated for its heavy investment in the economy of the area. The Executive Summary of 2007 is vague in describing the extensive investment, other than defining it as military, which is well understood as to the costs.

Then, in the southern of Western Sahara, the Executive Summary refers only to 'investment." It does not define "investment," in the "Southern provinces," leaving the nature of the investment open to interpretation. However, the summary goes on to talk about the poverty in slum areas, which contribute to the support for Salafi Islamists. This could present a problem for Morocco, but it is not a problem that has prevented the Moroccans from moving forward with their claim of sovereignty over Western Sahara.

In 2003, Morocco made an unprecedented move in asserting its ownership over the Western Sahara. Between 2002 and 2003, Morocco entered into offshore drilling agreements with private firms in the United States. It was a clever maneuver in getting the need for international recognition of its claim over Western Sahara. Morocco capitalized on a product and rights over which they might not have a right to, but they do have the present power over.

If they share the resources that belong to Western Sahara with the super powers of the world, and invest those resources in corporations and companies and business that benefits the super powers, then there will predictably come a point in time when the super powers and the United Nations will cease to acknowledge the rights of the Sahrawi in whom the UN bestowed the authority of self-determination more than thirty years ago.

This, unfortunate as it may seem, is the way of the global economy, and it is indeed a strategic move by Morocco in securing its sovereignty over Western Sahara. However, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) made an appeal to the United Nations. The UN responded this way: The signing of the TotalFinaElf and Kerr-McGee contracts were condemned by many foreign governments and campaign groups, and described as "provocative" by the president of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), Mohamed Abdelaziz, who appealed for UN intervention.

The UN responded that the licences were technically within international law but added that actual exploration and production work would not be legitimate unless the Saharawis themselves approved the contracts and benefited from them." What this demonstrates, is that the UN and other members of the international community are willing to turn a blind eye to the situation, probably because of the implications of the exploitation of the natural resources.

Protests made by foreign governments seated in the United Nations are often times more about putting a protest on the record, but acting in a completely different way. To condemn the act does not mean that the foreign government will not avail itself of the opportunity to exploit the international agreements.

For Morocco, and the final element of the Moroccan position, the focus is on the creation of an image of the "Greater Morocco." The Algerian Position The Algeria position is one that is somewhat lacking the force that might be necessary for it to assert its support of the PF in a way that would make it effective in the long-term. The Executive Summary of 2007 reads that Algeria has "paid" for the tension and conflict, which has kept the areas along its own border in a volatile state.

The Summary reports that the conflict, and the state of volatility has created a border zone along Western Sahara, southern Algeria, and the border of northern Mauritania that is highly dangerous because of drug trafficking, civil conflict, and other "contraband." The Summary also says that the United Nations has lost its credibility in the minds of people living in the region along the borders.

Algeria has enjoyed an international support because in its own right because of overwhelming post World War II sentiment of nation-state self-determination, and that notion of self-determination seems to some extent to have been justified by the fall of communism. Communism has long been perceived as holding hostage human rights and nation-state self-determination, and Algeria, having won independence from France, stands has the support of that international public. However, Algeria has, since its independence, experienced an internal conflict that does not, even today, show signs of dissipating or being resolved.

This is contrary to the ideals of the same groups of people that would support Algeria's self-determination. The longer Algeria is unable to bring about an internal political and military stability, the greater the loss in terms of United Nations and public support it will experience in the international community for its support of the PF.

The international community will come to associate Algeria's own dysfunction as inherent in the PF by way of Algeria's support of that organization, and they will not support self-determination under a PF authority because it will be too closely associated with Algeria's internal dysfunction. Therefore, as the Executive Summary says, it remains in Algeria's best interest to maintain the status quo, because Algeria can continue to offer aid and support to the PF, but can put the force of its military and focus on its own internal issues.

Algeria knows, is confident, and has issued statements to the effect that the western world would suffer among its own population in credibility if western leaders surrendered the Western Sahara to the rule of Morocco's sultan. Algeria maintains that the conflict along its border is a threat to the goals that Algeria has for itself as a country, and that Algeria must be diligent in protecting its borders from the potential peripheral manifestations of threat that arise out of the conflict between Morocco and the PF.

Lastly, Algerian stands fast that the Moroccan position prevents the fulfillment of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). That is the political and spiritual unification of the Arab states and communities. While at first glance many people might not understand how Moroccan policy or positions on Western Sahara can prevent the AMU from achieving its goals of spiritual and community unity between the Arab states, it is because Morocco is not an Arab state, its ancestry is Berber. Islamic influence began in Morocco in the seventh century a.D.

Arab conquerors converted the indigenous Berber population to Islam, but Berber tribes retained their customary laws. The Arabs abhorred the Berbers as barbarians, while the Berbers often saw the Arabs as only an arrogant and brutal soldiery bent on collecting taxes.

Once established as Muslims, the Berbers shaped Islam in their own image and embraced schismatic Muslim sects, which, in many cases, were simply folk religion barely disguised as Islam, as their way of breaking from Arab control." It is much the same as what took place in the early years of Christianity. In order that Christianity or Islam to be integrated into the lives of a pagan population, it was necessary to allow the integrating religion to combine the paganism in its practices.

Not to do would cause the integrating religion to be foreign to the pagan population as to cause them to resist or reject the integrating religion. The non-integrating religious practices are traditional practices handed down through oral traditions and generations of practice. Christianity and Islam, unlike Judaism, membership is converted and indoctrinated in addition to being born into the covenant. Morocco is a country that has a substantial Jewish population, as well as a large Christian population.

It is a cultural mixture of Arabs and non-Arabs, and for that reason Morocco is not of the pure Islamic nature that would not sustain the AMU. The world has seen how Arab nationalism has worked with non-Arab Muslims in the Darfur region of Sudan, and there is no reason to believe it would be different elsewhere. Algiers and Morocco are perhaps putting off an inevitable confrontation, which the UN seems to understand requires constant monitoring and intervention by the international community.

In summary, Algeria maintains that the conflict is one between the Morocco and the SADR. So long as Algeria is experiencing internal upheaval, it cannot involve itself in the affairs of Western Sahara to the extent that is needed for the PF to prevail. Algeria's internal upheaval is likely to end any time soon, because it has been a civil conflict that has been ongoing since independence from France.

It would be hard to imagine Algeria will both end its internal conflict, and bring about the internal stability that would be necessary to allow it the opportunity to become involved in Western Sahara full scale, full time. The Polasario Position If there is a legitimate position in the dynamics of Western Sahara, it is perhaps the position of the Polasario, who represent the region's majority population. That is not to say that the Polasario Front's politics represent the majority opinion of Sahrawian political thought.

It means only that the Polasario are Sahrawian, and that they are representative of a portion of that majority population that is asserting its political opinion by opposing Moroccan authority in Western Sahara. They are members of the PF, and they are asserting their UN granted right to self-determination. Unfortunately, their assertion goes unheeded, and Morocco has asserted its authority over the majority of the land, and, as time goes by, more and more Sahrawians are converted to the Morocco leadership, because it is, at least, stability.

The PR represents instability, and they have no power to create the stability that the region needs. Yet the PR maintains perhaps as much physical territorial control and authority as it has members. Eighty-five percent of Western Sahara land is controlled and occupied by Morocco as the governing authority. That is the majority of the land, and Morocco is unrelenting in holding fast to that land. The Sahrawi, through the PR, claim that they are not Moroccan, and that they have a right to self-determination and independence.

This is the first position of the Sahrawi. The second position of the Sahrawi is: The guarantee of this right by UN Resolution 1514 (XV). This constitutes the PR, or Sahrawian position, but it remains the most important position of all. If the UN is to be an effective world authority, then the UN must support and advocate its own resolutions. The UN has not done this, rather it has elected instead to essentially support all parties involved; it supports Morocco by upholding Morocco's international contracts.

It supports the PR with aid and money. It Supports Algeria, because it does not protest Algeria's support of the PR guerrilla activity, and the UN has worked hard to maintain the stalemate that exists in the region. Since the establishment of MINURSO in 1991, the ceasefire has generally held, but the transitional period has not yet begun due to the parties' divergent views on key issues of the settlement plan, particularly regarding voting eligibility.

These competing views notwithstanding, Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO have repeatedly reiterated their commitment to the plan, and MINURSO has carried out its functions as far as the conditions have allowed." This is the status quo, MINURSO (the cease fire) has held since 1991, and although the UN has revisited the issue of Western Sahara, it has not taken steps to force peace plans upon the parties, because at the present the cease fire as in effect served as a peace plan.

It has prevented either the Moroccans or the Sahrawians from having to initiate a new hostility or to pursue in renewed violence. Perhaps the political and territorial goals of the PR have given way to individual self-interest, because the PR are no military match for the Moroccan forces. While that might explain the PR's embezzlement, it does not serve the best interest of the Sahrawian population.

Human Rights and Loss The loss of lives as a result of the conflict between Morocco and the PR has resulted in a greater population displacement than it has loss of Sahrawian lives. As of the Executive Summary of 2007, more than 160,000 Sahrawians live in refugee camps "outside the SADR territory," and in Algeria, in the province of Tindouf. Those camps are the premise upon which the United States, the United Nations, and numerous humanitarian organizations around the world provide food, medicine, shelter, and financial aid to the region.

This aid is the source of allegations that the PR has embezzled money and aid supplies. The Executive Summary also reports that there are approximately 45,500 Sahrawians displaced outside of Western Sahara, in Mauritania, and even in Cuba. The problem is that there has been three generations of Sahrawians born in refugee living conditions, or in conditions where they are regarded as an occupying people in their own homeland.

When generation after generation are born to refugee environments, those children, who grow to adulthood, are experiencing harsh physical and psychological conditions, to which they will react by either putting aside their cultural heritage and blending into the Moroccan landscape and culture; or they will perhaps at some point become not guerrillas, but terrorists.

If the PR continues to be perceived by the Sahrawian refugees as embezzlers and as self-interested parties, their loyalties could be won over by other forces, more violent forces, a new opposing force at some point in the future. How they will direct their hostility and anger cannot easily be predicted, but they are a susceptible people. As has occurred throughout much of Africa and other war zones, landmines continue to be a problem for the civilian population in Western Sahara.

These mines, as has been seen elsewhere, will be maiming and killing civilians long after the Moroccans and the Sahrawians resolve their differences and perhaps ultimately divide the disputed territories. There are more 15 million landmines in Western Sahara, and the implications of that are staggering. Another equally harmful problem is the risk of disease and infant mortality as people are forced to endure refugee camp conditions. Diseases that are preventable are being found amongst the Sahrawian refugee children.

For the Moroccans, the losses are of equal concern, but in a different way, because Morocco's losses can be counted mostly in terms of military ones. Given the period of time over which Morocco has been an "occupying" force in Western Sahara, their losses in terms of military personnel is not as great as might be expected; some 3,000 missing and killed. There have been more than a hundred Moroccan prisoners of war taken by the Sahrawian PR, and allegations of human rights abuses.

Those losses and experiences, horrific as they are, are casualties of war, and the numbers reported by both sides, in terms of loss and refugee head count, have been disputed by both sides. All of the figures reported as pertains to the concerns surrounding refugees, the prisoners of war, and the loss of life are based on the reports of the respective sides.

To date, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been unable to access the camps or territories in a manner that would lend itself to verifying the information provided from either side. The landmine crisis has been verified, because certain NGOs participated in identifying locations and removing some landmines. The Economic Cost of Western Sahara The situation in Western Sahara has a price in terms of international aid and supplies of about $600,000,000.

The cost to Morocco in terms of military expenditures, and the cost of developing its territorial holdings in Western Sahara is reported by the Moroccans as $870,000,000. The report also says, however, that like the casualties of war and refugee crisis, there is no way to verify that the figure reported by the Moroccans is an accurate figure.

However, a Moroccan journalist maintains that these costs must be put into perspective:...because Morocco receives a lot of help from countries in the Gulf, driven by "dynastic solidarity." For example, the recent purchase of weapons from Spain and the likely purchase of aircraft from France reportedly will in part be paid for with Saudi help." What becomes noticeably clear is that much of the information and statistics, financial and human that comes out of the region is manipulated in a way that best serves the parties.

There is no way to confront the parties, and no way to ensure that information provided by the parties is accurate. The cost that Morocco claims it has spent on the Western Sahara development and infrastructure is more easily verifiable, because Morocco has built air strips, buildings, and generally improved the public service delivery system in its territorial holdings in Western Sahara. Whether not the figure is as is reported by Morocco, 2.4 billion dollars, is, again, only a figure that can be guessed as coming close by experts.

However, the discrepancies in actual cost vs. cost reported is a factor that is largely irrelevant in the greater picture. Also, Morocco has benefited from its off shore contracts, and there is, again, no way to accurately verify what Morocco has enjoyed in the way of financial windfall from those contracts. Perhaps the most accurate assessment of the cost of the conflict and stalemate in Western Sahara is a cost that has largely been borne by Morocco.

The Political Cost of Western Sahara The inability of the PR or SADR to effect a political outcome in Western Sahara has put the Sahrawian people at risk of being culturally absorbed into the Moroccan culture. It would be a loss of people, a culture that would for intents and purposes disappear. Unfortunately, the enrichment of the PR's leaders through embezzled aid, and the SADR's inability to resolve the long standing thirty year issues, has left the Sahrawian people without representation.

Many Sahrawi cadres, alongside hundreds of simple soldiers, fled to Morocco because they could no longer stand the chaotic, static, and unjust status quo.. Some even say that this exodus towards Morocco and other destinations suits the Polisario's leadership and that, in some way, they encourage it.

This is because the Polisario's leadership refuses to change its practices, review its policies and positions, or respond to the totality (or at least the majority) of its critics' claims - admittedly increasingly numerous and demanding - and therefore has opted for the politique du pire [a politics of the worse]." In the meantime, there is a perceived weakness in the United Nation's ability to enforce its own resolutions.

It is not the way in which the UN needs to be perceived in Africa, or in the Middle East Arab community. In counting the political losses, the United States takes a hit, because it is U.S. corporations that have entered into agreements with Morocco for he offshore drilling rights of Western Sahara resources.

This creates a perception of the United States that is negative, appearing as though the United States is interested only in the natural resources, and that it will therefore manipulate the political and perhaps even military conditions in the region in order to successfully exploit Western Sahara's natural resources. Also, there is a real threat to the lives of the Sahrawian people, who could ostensibly be facing genocide by the Moroccans.

Morocco, because it has expended a considerable amount of its own resources in developing Western Sahara, is perhaps the side that comes out with the best political reputation in this scenario. As mentioned earlier, many of the indigenous people are slowly changing loyalties from the SADR and PR, to Morocco. Given more time, and Morocco is likely by way of winning hearts and minds to be the "winner," if indeed there ever can be such a thing in Western Sahara.

The biggest political damage rests with the SADR and PR, and whether or not they can recover from the damage to their image as a result of their inability to work out an agreement that would cause Morocco to leave the region can only be determined by the events as they unfold going forward. The SADR has affirmed its support for the Sahrawian people, and reaffirmed their commitment to Western Sahara's right to self-determination.

Unfortunately, while all parties, including the United States, are vocal in expressing their support for the Sahrawian and self-determination, including Algeria, no entity is willing to move beyond that expression of support. There is no way that the Sahrawian can best the strength of Morocco, and none of the border countries are either in a position to flex muscles on behalf of the Sahrawian.

In the political picture, Algeria is perhaps the least damaged, and Mauritania is exempted, because it had a stake in the Western Sahara territory, but relinquished, as was expected of it. Conclusion There are more perspectives than have been presented in this essay to consider: international law, the United Nations as an entity whose mission it is to sustain global stability, and find alternatives to conflict resolutions that do not involve military aggression between the contentious parties.

However, the current forces that are at a standstill, a stalemate, at the present time are the ones with which this paper has focused upon, as must the international community. There is a lot at stake if any one of the players is declared the "winner" of the current stalemate. Once that occurs, it can reasonably be expected that violence will ensue in the region on a greater scale than what has occurred in the past.

It can be expected that should Morocco succeed in establishing itself as the "Greater Morocco," on the international stage, that Morocco will pursue its "historical" claim against Mauritania and Algeria in the same way Morocco has asserted its claim to Western Sahara.

Human rights organizations have every reason to be concerned that should violence begin anew on the scale that it has happened in the past, which Morocco will probably not stop for a new cease fire, but will pursue a course of action that is manifest of its notion that the Sahrawi will be a minority population in the region. Another concern is that the declaration of a winner, which would predictably be Morocco, would bring about a conflict on a country to country level between Morocco and Algeria.

At present, Algeria supports the Polasario Front, through financial aid and refuge as ruling government in exile. That would change if Morocco was recognized by international law and the United Nations as the official governing body of Western Sahara. The conflict would, then, be between Morocco and Algeria, and it would take on an altogether different nature, different level of warfare.

The stakes for Algeria would be much greater, in that it would then be protecting its own territorial claim from Morocco's "historic" claim on its territory on behalf of Greater Morocco. If that happens, then it can be expected, too, that the level of intensity in the conflict will escalate according to each nation state's own military capabilities, as well as those of each nation state's support system in other nation states.

Algeria would have the support of the Polasario Front, but that support would be reduced by the casualties of war, presuming that there would be fatalities occurring in the ranks of the Polasario Front as a result of their confrontation with Morocco, and before Algerian would become engaged in its own conflict with Morocco. Then, too, Mauritania would be forced to join forces with Algeria, because Morocco has a "historic" claim on behalf of Greater Morocco against Mauritania too.

This would bring together the two countries militarily; but that still would not bring them to the level of military readiness to confront Morocco, because, whether overtly or covertly, it could be expected that Morocco would enjoy the support, financially, of those entities contracting for offshore oil exploration with Morocco as the ruling power in Western Sahara.

The issue for Algeria is that it is focused on its own internal turmoil, and is not able to spread itself militarily thin as to confront Morocco on a greater scale than lending asylum and financial resources to the PF. There cannot be any doubt but that this is a major reason why Algeria has not become more involved militarily in Western Sahara. Algeria simply cannot risk the outcome of dividing itself between the internal conflict, and the external conflict in Western Sahara. The Polasario Front continues to serve.