The UAE's Warm Relationship with Israel

The UAE-Israel Agreement in Comparison to Other Arab Countries

Introduction

The UAE is not the only state in the Arab world to have normalized relations with Israel—but its normalization is different from what other Arab countries have done. Egypt and Jordan established a peace with Israel decades ago, but it was not the kind of warm peace that the UAE has negotiated with Israel. Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan have normalized relations with Israel, but the motives prompting their agreements have been questioned by critics. When compared to these other countries, the UAE-Israel Agreement stands apart as unique. This paper will explain why that is and what it means for the rest of the Arab world.

Egypt and Jordan

Egypt signed its peace treaty with Israel in 1979, while Jordan signed its peace treaty with Israel in 1994. The former was the result of the Camp David Accords, overseen by US President Carter. The latter was the result of two leaders in the Middle East coming together to cement an existing relationship on intelligence matters. Neither peace, however, was viewed with much warmth but rather an outcome of political pressures that necessitated these steps.

Egypt had just gotten a new leader in Anwar Sadat, who was determined to reverse the policies of his predecessor Nasser. Nasser had controlled a command economy in Egypt, which prevented the private sector from materializing. Sadat wanted the private sector to grow and he believed it was in Egypt’s best interests to shift from alliance with the Soviet Union to alliance with the US. Thus, he instituted the policy of Infitah, which was meant to open up Egypt’s economy, and to do this he had to make peace with Israel. Sadat’s intention was “not only to transform the economy according to the free-market model, but also to correct the deficiencies of state control and achieve integration with the world economy” (Ates, 2005, p. 134). By choosing peace with Israel, Sadat sought to show that Egypt was turning over a new life. Unfortunately, the economic reforms he intended did not materialize and Egypt failed to prosper from the new policy. The peace remained somewhat cold, in spite of the favorable press given it by the US during the Camp David Accords.

But since 2013, Egypt and Israel have worked more closely on security matters, as they have a common interest in containing Iranian influence in the region, particularly when it comes to Hamas (Mitchell, 2021). The two countries are also working more closely on energy matters; still, the Egyptian public largely opposes normalization of ties between the two countries so long as the Israel-Palestine conflict continues (Mitchell, 2021). Thus, even though the two states’ leaders share energy and security concerns, and diplomatic ties have never fallen off even in the face of the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict, the peace remains somewhat cold and lacks the warmth seen in relations between the UAE and Israel in the past year.

With Jordan, the peace has not been much different. It too spawned from geopolitical necessity. Jordan’s King Hussein had been working with Israel’s Mossad for years before the peace treaty was signed (Riedel, 2019). At the same time, Israel was having talks with the PLO, of which Hussein knew nothing about (Riedel, 2019). Initially, Hussein was upset by these secret talks, but then he viewed them as an opportunity, as Hussein realized “the negotiation of a peace treaty with Israel would also open the way for a rapid restoration of ties with Washington” (Riedel, 2019). Since the Kuwait-Iraq hostilities, Jordan had been lost in the shuffle of geopolitics. This was a chance to regain some leverage in the region. Since Hussein trusted Israel’s leader Yitzhak Rabin, the time for peace made sense.

Yet, 25 years later, the peace between Jordan and Israel remains cold. Ahren and Rasgon (2019) note that between the two states “security cooperation is in good shape, but trade is declining, diplomatic relations are frosty, and the imminent retaking of ‘Isle of Peace’ symbolizes ties under growing strain.” Moreover, the 25th anniversary of the peace came and went without either side celebrating the important date (Ahren & Rasgon, 2019). In effect, the peace was merely a security peace, and did little to fully extend the relationship between the two countries. The UAE on the other hand is working closely with Israel on all fronts—tourism, energy, diplomacy, security, technology, and agriculture. It is establishing a very warm peace with Israel in hopes that this approach will increasingly warm the entire region.

Essentially, Egypt and Jordan sought to maintain a level of peace with Israel with their treaties—but this peace was a cold one rather than one that actually elevated the countries and turned a page in the history books. Egypt and Jordan still have security ties with Israel, but the ingredients for growth are missing. Cooperation exists in some aspects, but overall the peace is viewed more as a maintenance project than as the solid foundation for real development.

Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan

The other Arab states that have normalized ties with Israel, aside from the UAE, are Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan—and their motives are all different. Critics argue that Morocco agreed to normalize ties with Israel in order to obtain support from the Trump Administration for the Sahara conflict (BBC, 2020). Sudan is said to have normalized ties with Israel so as to get off the US’s terror list (Gramer, 2020). Pressure on these states was placed on them by the US to some degree, and that is why they are said to have been part of the overall Abraham Accords. Yet, there is a significant difference between these states’ relations with Israel and the UAE’s relations. One big difference is that all three have condemned the fighting between Israel and Hamas (Sherlock, 2021). The UAE has voiced concern, too, “saying it was concerned over ‘acts of violence committed by right-wing extremist groups in the occupied East Jerusalem’” (Sherlock, 2021). However, the UAE is also in a position of deference and warmth, whereas Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan stand on uncertain ground.

Bahrain

Starting with Bahrain, one reason uncertain ground exists for the state is that the country is somewhat divided in terms of how to view Israel. As Reuters (2020) reports, “Bahraini opposition groups have said they reject a decision by the Gulf state to normalise relations with Israel.” Moreover, the foreign minister of Bahrain has stated that the rights of Palestinians “remained a priority for the kingdom” (Reuters, 2020). And in April of 2020, the Parliament of Bahrain “joined social media calls to stop Israeli business and government officials attending an international entrepreneurship conference” (Reuters, 2020). None of this bodes well for the establishment of a warm peace.

Bahrain’s leaders are somewhat tied at the hip to Saudi Arabia, even though the majority of the Bahraini population aligns itself more closely with Palestine (Telci, 2020). This puts Bahrain on uncertain ground as well. If leaders push for too close of ties with Israel, as they might like to do, the population in Bahrain might revolt, seeing such a maneuver as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. Bahrain is also seen as more of a puppet state by some critics—for instance: “Another interesting component of Bahraini foreign policy is its activities that seek to strengthen the image of the Emirati-Saudi axis globally. In this regard, Bahrain has been involved in various PR campaigns and think-tank funding activities. In one such incident, it was revealed that the person who was heading the Bahraini PR campaigns in Europe actually had fake academic credentials” (Telci, 2020). Bahrain has also funded the British think-tank International Institute for Security Studies, which hosted the Manama Dialogue (Telci, 2020). The Dialogue was meant to bring various diplomats, politicians and leaders together to talk about the future of the Middle East. But Bahrain is not really in a fundamentally strong position when it comes to discussing the future of the Middle East, as “in recent years, Bahrain has been bailed out by a stimulus and financial stability package worth 10 billion dollars. The package was delivered gradually by Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Kuwait” (Telci, 2020). This need for a bail-out by other Arab countries suggests Bahrain’s ties with Israel are more about political pressure from abroad than they are about country adopting a new, warm position toward Israel.

Morocco

Morocco has the same problem as Bahrain when it comes to normalizing ties with Israel: many people in the country oppose it. As Riboua (2020) reports, “Moroccans expressed their concerns online over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, declaring that the normalization was a trade-off between the Palestinian state and Western Sahara. Many used the hashtag  #???????_????? (normalization is treason) to express their disapproval.” However, there is a strong Jewish community in Morocco that has applauded the normalization of ties between Israel and Morocco (Riboua, 2020). Those leaders in government, like Muhammad Amkraz, the Minister of Employment and Professional Integration and a member of the Justice and Development Youth Party, who have voiced opposition to normalization “are now being considered unpatriotic for not supporting relations with Israel as it pertains to Western Sahara’s status” (Riboua, 2020). So, again, there is the problem of conflict within the state populace—a conflict between leaders and citizens to some extent, if one excludes the Jewish community, regarding how to view this normalization.

Abouzzohour (2020) has stated that the normalization is a strategic step for Morocco, but one that also comes with risks. Normalization allows Morocco to enhance its diplomatic and security interests; however, internally, there is consternation: “88% of surveyed Moroccans said they would oppose diplomatic recognition of Israel, and 70% viewed the Palestinian cause as one that concerns all Arabs (according to the 2019-2020 Arab Opinion Index). While this discontent may not translate into immediate contestation, it will taint citizens’ view of the regime and may shift state-society relations in the long term” (Abouzzohour, 2020). The strategy of strengthening ties with other Gulf States by normalizing relations with Israel is thus offset by the opposition voices of its own populace. It therefore remains to be seen what the long-term effect of normalization will be for Morocco—whether it will spell warmth for the country in the Middle East or whether it will spell upheaval within its own borders.

Sudan

Prior to normalization, Sudan actually had a law prohibiting normalization of ties with Israel. Now, Sudan has reversed that law, which has existed since 1958. The problem Sudan faces is that it may be rushing into normalization too quickly. As Knopf and Feltman (2020) explain, “A unified Sudanese government with a popular mandate will be better able to forge a warm and sustainable peace with Israel, whereas a rushed Israeli-Sudanese agreement has the potential to unravel Sudan’s transition and generate renewed support for Sudan’s Islamists and their foreign backers.” Knopf and Feltman (2020) note that the situation in Sudan could end up resembling the Israel-Lebanon peace from 1983, which was rushed and ended up failing within a year of signing because the people did not support it.

The overthrow of Sudan’s Al-Bashir precipitated a transition in Sudan. Under Al-Bashir Sudan had a vibrant and diverse political landscape, with many parties voicing the visions of many groups. The current situation now faces in-fighting among these groups, which were largely kept in check by the former dictator. Sudan is not in a stable position, as Knopf and Feltman (2020) indicate: “One year into the transition, the security and economic crises that were the proximate trigger of the anti-Bashir demonstrations have worsened. Millions remain displaced. The value of the Sudanese pound has plummeted from 45 to a U.S. dollar in August 2019 to nearly 300 this month. More than half of the country is severely food insecure. And despite pledges of support, the international community has failed to mobilize resources commensurate with the historic opportunity of the transition. Public disaffection with the transitional government has increased, and divisions not only between security and civilian actors, but within them, have widened.” All of this means that Sudan is not on solid ground and does not offer much in the way of relations with Israel. The deal got Sudan off the terror list of the US—but what does Israel gain from the deal? With the UAE, Israel gains quite a bit, but with Sudan, as with Morocco and Bahrain, it is unclear how the formalizing of relations serves as a win-win for all countries involved.

Why the UAE is Different

The UAE is in a much different position from Sudan, Morocco or Bahrain. For one thing, it has firm control over the populace and popular opinion appears to support the deal. As Batrawy (2021) notes, “among the general Emirati public, there was little to no visible pushback from citizens when their government announced ties with Israel. Fiery nationalistic figures on Twitter with tens of thousands of followers aggressively cheered the pact, and throughout the current conflict have both defended ties with Israel and made posts mocking Palestinian protesters.” This popular support stems from two facts: first, many people in the UAE see it as a win-win situation; the country can export more oil for profits, and it will receive technology, tourism, and innovative agricultural solutions that meet its domestic needs; second, the UAE does not allow oppositional voices to have free reign in the public as “political parties are banned and political expression is heavily suppressed” (Batrawy, 2021). Therefore, the problems that plague the countries of Sudan, Morocco and Bahrain are not issues in the UAE, as the government has much more control and favorability is strong for its actions. The other countries are divided and are weakened by the fact that they have little to do with benefiting Israel, other than in terms of sharing security intelligence. The UAE offers a great deal for Israel and expects much in return. It is a relationship that is mutually-beneficial and this constitutes its warmth.

In the other countries, Islamic groups have a great deal of sway, but in the UAE, the leaders have focused on developing a spirit of nationalism which rises above Islamic differences. The goal in the UAE is to establish a new more modern culture that sees peace and prosperity as achievable through collaborative objectives and achievements. That is why its deal with Israel makes more sense for itself. It was also not under any Western pressure to make this deal, unlike was the case with Sudan, Bahrain and Morocco. The UAE saw this opportunity as good for itself and took the initiative. It does not face much backlash among its citizens because it has established a framework and foundation for accepting this deal at the cultural level. The people there also see the economic benefits that the deal will have for them. They see that they will be able to travel to Israel for tourism and will be able to accept tourists from Israel in return. They may still support the Palestinian people, but their support takes a different form from the other countries. The UAE is not insisting on the Oslo peace solution; it wants to see Palestine and Israel work out a win-win situation based on mutual respect and appreciation. It insists that the way to move forward is to move past ancient hostilities and grudges and accept one another as neighbors. It views Hamas as a terrorist organization and for this reason refuses to support it. It also refuses to support current Palestinian leaders, whom it sees as robbing the Palestinian people and doing nothing to support their cause.

The other states do not have this same perspective on the matter. They are also in a much weaker position when it comes to dictating terms both in their own countries and abroad. They appear to be on the defensive side of change, going along with formalization of ties for reasons other than belief in the warmth of new friendship and the potential for posterity.

The same is true with respect to Egypt and Jordan. Egypt does have a better chance or creating a warmer peace than the other countries seem to have. It is working more closely with Israel on energy matters and diplomacy has never been a major problem in recent years. Jordan, however, has seen its relations with Israel chill in recent years, and there has been no commemoration of its peace agreement even after the 25 year mark passed. The UAE is still in a much stronger position than either country, as its people appear to support the deal, and the country is having very good relations with Israel at the moment on all fronts—diplomatic, security, energy, technology, tourism, and more.

Egypt’s population still views Israel warily, however. As reports indicate, “though cooperation between the two governments is a well-established fact in the region, there is still deep resentment of Israel among the Egyptian people. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research in May 2015, the Egyptian public viewed Israel as the most hostile state (-88 on a scale of -100 to 100) of 26 mentioned in the survey” (TeachMideast, 2020). The public does not approve of Israel, but Egyptian leaders are determined to collaborate more closely with Israel in spite of the public’s distrust of the foreign country. This is due to the fact that the regime leading Egypt is disposed to continue working with Israel on numerous fronts: “The Sisi regime has cooperated with Israel extensively, being called by The Economist ‘the most pro-Israel president Egypt has ever had.’ Sisi has overseen the import of natural gas from Israel and has cooperated on security issues, specifically in the Sinai Peninsula where Egypt faces a growing insurgency involving the Islamic State and other violent extremists. A testament to the strength of the relationship is the fact that Israel easily approved the increased militarization of the Sinai so Egypt could fight its evolving insurgency” (TeachMideast, 2020). However, the resentment of the people of Egypt for Israel does still present a problem for the state. It means it will be more difficult for Israelis and Egyptians to develop the kind of trust and fondness that the people of the UAE and Israel seem to be ready to have for each other. There is more openness and willingness to learn from and help one another among the UAE and Israeli populations. This same sense of openness is not really found in the other states, whether they are Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Sudan, or Morocco. Although all of them have established some kind of ties at the political or security levels, the relationships do not go very deep into the trenches of society.