Lying in Public Life: Bok's Ethics of Deception Examined

Introduction: Conflict and Deception in Public Administration

The role of a public administrator is often beset by conflicts. These conflicts, as in all organizations, stem from the vested interests of various individuals pursuing personal objectives while working within a public institution. In private companies, performance is driven by imperatives to meet fiscal objectives — generating revenue and maintaining the ability to borrow money to finance new projects. No such natural restraint exists in the public sector, where monetary success can elevate one leader while destroying another. One method of getting ahead, in any situation, is to tell outright lies about others. This is the central subject of Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life by Sissela Bok.

Lying is sometimes considered appropriate in one's role as a public administrator. The life of a public institution — as well as its funding — depends on political patronage. It is always critical that public administrators maintain the appearance of institutional viability, lest they jeopardize their positions. This creates a kind of prisoner's dilemma: because lies exist, they must be considered as an option, even if mutual honesty is preferable to the possibility of mutual deceit.

When Lying May Be Morally Justified

According to Bok, ruling out all lying is ludicrous. He offers the following example: "A captain of a ship transporting fugitives from Nazi Germany, if asked by a patrolling vessel whether there were any Jews on board would, for Kant's critics, have been justified in answering No." (p. 40) Here we see an instance where lying is not merely permissible but a moral obligation — one that protects human lives. Bok extends this reasoning: "If to use force in self-defense or in defending those at risk of murder is right, why then should a lie in self-defense be ruled out?" (p. 41)

Sometimes such lies become institutionalized due to the nature of the law, particularly when laws are obscure, culturally antiquated, or indefensible. For example, in the state of Pennsylvania it is — or has been — illegal for two or more people to engage in oral sex. One would nonetheless expect a law enforcement officer to refrain from acting on overheard accounts that such acts had occurred. In cases like these, the gap between legal obligation and practical moral judgment creates space in which a measure of deliberate non-disclosure becomes socially tolerated.

Bok also reviews reasons that public officials might lie independently of self-preservation. He recounts the example of Plato's noble lie — the myth of class distinctions used to maintain social order. He notes that the rule of law has often been underscored by a ruler's willingness to deceive: "Rulers, both temporal and spiritual, have seen their deceits in the benign light of such social purposes [as the noble lie]. They have propagated and maintained myths, played on the gullibility of the ignorant and sought stability in shared beliefs." (p. 168)

The Noble Lie and Political Deception

Bok is quick to point out, however, that many public officials who lie in the name of noble ends ultimately serve only themselves. He cautions that "we cannot take for granted either the altruism or the good judgment of those who lie to us, no matter how much they intend to benefit us." (p. 169) He further warns that if exceptions to honesty are allowed without a specified process, government leaders "will have free rein to manipulate and distort the facts and thus escape accountability to the public." A contemporary illustration of this can be found in the lead-up to the Iraq War. The government lacked conclusive evidence that weapons of mass destruction existed in Iraq, yet used that claim as a justification for invasion — a decision that produced a brief market recovery while severely damaging the United States' relationships with its continental European allies.

Bok notes the plight of the civil servant who simultaneously wants to retain his job and to implement effective changes. "Civil servants may lie to members of Congress in order to protect programs they judge important, or to guard secrets they have been ordered not to divulge." (p. 174) The text offers a pointed example: a mayor who plans to remove rent controls after his election but knows his constituency will not support such a move. Here a public servant acts according to free-market ideological interests while concealing his intentions from voters.

This is not an uncommon pattern in American history. Some historians have argued that both the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment — which formally freed the slaves — were not properly ratified. To publicly acknowledge either of these as procedurally flawed would be to undermine the very foundation of American law. In such cases, institutional deception becomes so deeply embedded that exposing it would cause more harm than the original deception itself.

Conclusion: Lying as a Last Resort

Although lies are sometimes an inevitable card that one can play in order to preserve one's position in a public organization, it goes without saying that such a thing should be a last resort. A liar has more options available as a decision-maker in the short term; however, if he or she wishes to retain a position in an organization over time, it is imperative that the lie not be detected. This is why deception should only be undertaken when the livelihood of the imperiled civil servant is in grave peril. Even then, it should be only after considerable reflection that a public administrator chooses to lie — for one's reputation is almost certainly bound to outlast one's tenure.