Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals: FMLA and State Immunity

Introduction

There has always been a fine balance between the constitutional power of Congress and individual state rights. At the heart of constitutional debate—and even the Civil War—was the question: are states sovereign in their dealings with matters of government and culpability, and to what degree does their sovereignty remain intact? Congress has both constitutional and applied power and is expected to evolve with the cultural situation of society in order to protect its constituency and enact fair and reasonable legislation.

One seminal question in this context is whether Congress constitutionally abrogated the states' 11th Amendment immunity when it passed the self-care leave provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). This act required employers of more than 50 individuals to allow up to 12 weeks of leave for varying circumstances of family need. Case law—for instance in Nevada v. Hibbs—held that Congress intended the FMLA to supersede any state protection against legal ramifications if the state failed to uphold the FMLA to the letter of the law. In Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, the Court found that the self-care provision, standing alone, did not abrogate the State of Maryland's immunity from suits or damages. Congress, in fact, appeared to believe that men and women would be taking medical leave in roughly equal numbers. Further, when Congress enacted FMLA, the self-care provision was not a congruent and proportional response to any discriminatory conduct, because that was not the focus of the legislation. Thus, if a state violated anti-discrimination law, it could be sued—however, in a 5-4 decision, the Court found for Maryland because it concluded that the state had not discriminated against anyone within the scope of the FMLA.

The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) is a federal law that requires covered employers to provide employees certain job-protected, unpaid leave rights for qualified medical or family reasons—such as personal or family illness, military leave, pregnancy, adoption, or foster care. This Act was a major part of President Bill Clinton's legislative agenda and is administered by the United States Department of Labor (United States Department of Labor, 2012). The purpose of the Act was to provide more equitable and comprehensive coverage so that individual employers would have clearer guidelines and individual employees would have more structure when needing time off from work. Prior to the FMLA, leave could be denied for any reason at the employer's discretion, and employees could even be fired for taking leave. By 2007, the U.S. Department of Labor estimated that approximately 80% of American workers employed at FMLA-covered worksites were eligible for FMLA-approved leave. These benefits allow for up to 12 weeks of unpaid, but job-protected leave for the care of a new child or family member, recuperation from illness, or to address qualifying emergencies. Once the employee returns to work, his or her job—or a comparable position—is guaranteed, as are benefits and their reinstatement upon return. Some states have enacted their own family leave thresholds, but in general, federal FMLA applies only to employers with more than 50 employees (Galinsky et al., 2008).

The practical application of the FMLA is at the heart of the legal suit Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland. In March 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that states cannot be sued for denying workers sick leave. This ruling arose from a case involving Daniel Coleman, an employee of the Maryland state courts, who sued the state of Maryland for monetary damages after being terminated from his job for requesting time off to care for his own health. Typically, states cannot be sued for damages due to their governmental nature. However, there are exceptions based on unconstitutional treatment, including discrimination. The Supreme Court, however, ruled on the basis of state sovereignty rather than discrimination or individual rights (Mollmann, 2012).

Background and Legal Precedent

One of the foundational issues in Coleman is whether Congress implicitly repealed the sovereign immunity of states. In the United States, the federal government possesses sovereign immunity and cannot be sued unless it has waived that immunity or consented to the suit. As far back as 1890, in Hans v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that the 11th Amendment affirms that states possess sovereign immunity. This was reaffirmed in 1991 in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, in which the Court held that:

"…we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms; that the States entered the Federal system with their sovereignty intact; that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty, and that a State will therefore not be subject to suit in Federal Court unless it has consented to suit…" (Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 1991).

States, therefore, have immunity, but cities, towns, and other municipalities do not. Exceptions are based on discrimination, arbitration, suits brought by the federal government or another state, suits filed against state officials who have acted illegally, or suits in which Congress has abrogated 11th Amendment immunity. In Coleman, the legal question centered on how the FMLA was worded and whether that wording effectively stripped states of sovereignty when dealing with family leave issues.

The FMLA allows an employee to take up to 12 work weeks of unpaid leave per year under certain circumstances. It also creates a private right of action for relief and damages in any federal or state court. Coleman filed suit alleging that the Maryland Court of Appeals—his employer—violated the FMLA by denying his self-care leave, even as an instrument of the state. The Federal District Court dismissed the action on grounds of sovereign immunity. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the self-care provision was not directed at a pattern of gender-based discrimination and was neither congruent nor proportional to a visible pattern of sex-based discrimination. Coleman argued that the self-care provision addresses both sex discrimination and stereotyping. However, the Court found that when the FMLA was enacted, there was no evidence of discrimination in leave or sick-leave policies. Instead, Congress was concerned about the fiscal and economic burdens imposed by illness-related job loss on families, and about discrimination based on medical conditions—not gender (Coleman v. Court of Appeals Maryland, 2012).

Much of the overall analysis in Coleman revolves around the 2003 case Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs. That case more narrowly targeted the issue of sex-based discrimination within the structure of the FMLA. Congress, in enacting the FMLA, invoked two constitutional powers: regulation of private employers under the Commerce Clause, and regulation of public employees under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment. One of the provisions relevant to both cases is the Equal Protection Clause, which prohibits states from denying equal protection to citizens within their jurisdiction (U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment).

In Hibbs, the petitioner William Hibbs worked for the Nevada State Department of Human Resources Welfare Division. He requested leave under the FMLA to care for his wife, who had been injured in a car accident. The Department granted the request and provided Hibbs with the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave between May and December of 1997. Hibbs used leave until August 5, 1997, after which he did not return to work. The Nevada Welfare Department contacted Hibbs in October and requested that he return by November 12, 1997, as he had exhausted his FMLA leave. Hibbs sued for violations of the FMLA, seeking damages and other relief. The district court granted summary judgment to the Welfare Department, holding that Hibbs' FMLA claim was barred by the 11th Amendment. Hibbs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court's ruling, concluding that the FMLA was a valid exercise of congressional power. The Supreme Court ultimately found that the FMLA validly abrogated state sovereign immunity. The Court further acknowledged that in enacting the FMLA, Congress intended to ensure the workplace was free from gender discrimination and to protect working people—particularly women, who bear primary responsibility for family care—by preserving their right to retain jobs and benefits. The Court concluded that the FMLA's primary remedy "is congruent and proportional to its remedial object, and can be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior" (Nevada v. Hibbs, 2003). The central question thus became whether an individual can sue a state for monetary damages in federal court, or whether doing so would violate the FMLA Act of 1993. In Hibbs, the Court answered affirmatively, finding that Congress clearly intended to allow states to be sued if they failed to comply with the FMLA.

References

Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 89-1782 (U.S. Supreme Court 501, June 24, 1991).

Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 10-1016 (U.S. Supreme Court 566, March 20, 2012).

Nevada Department of Human Resources v. William Hibbs, 01-1368 (U.S. Supreme Court 538, May 27, 2003).

Family and Medical Leave Act. (2012). United States Department of Labor — Wage and Hour Division. Retrieved from http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/index.htm

Overview of Employment and Anti-Discrimination Laws. (2011). Find Law. Retrieved from http://employment.findlaw.com/employment-discrimination/overview-of-employment-and-anti-discrimination-laws.html

United States Constitution. 14th Amendment. Retrieved from

Galinsky, E., et al. (2008). National Study of Employers. Families and Work Institute. Retrieved from

Migdal, A. (January 11, 2012). Protection for women workers at stake in Coleman. ACLU. Retrieved from http://www.aclu.org/blog/defending-targets-discrimination/protection-women-workers-stake-coleman

Mollmann, M. (2012). Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland: A warning to women. Huffington Post. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marianne-mollmann/supreme-court-sick-leave_b_1378742.html

United States Department of Labor. (2012, January). Family and Medical Leave Act. Retrieved from http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/index.htm