Crime Control Model vs. Due Process Model Explained
This paper examines and differentiates Herbert Packer's two "ideal type" models of the criminal process: the Crime Control Model and the Due Process Model. The Crime Control Model prioritizes efficient processing of criminal cases through deference to police and prosecutorial judgment, while the Due Process Model emphasizes accuracy and the protection of the innocent through constitutional safeguards. Drawing on Packer (1969), Aviram (2010), and Feeley (2003), the paper traces post-Warren Court jurisprudence as a shift toward crime control values, analyzes the Herring decision and its implications for the exclusionary rule, and considers the emerging role of victims' rights as a competing framework alongside due process protections.
- Introduction to the Two Models: Defining crime control and due process models
- Post-Warren Court Trends and Crime Control: Four post-Warren shifts toward crime control
- The Herring Decision and the Exclusionary Rule: Herring ruling and exclusionary rule debate
- Victims' Rights and the Future of Criminal Justice: Victims' rights as emerging criminal justice framework
- Conclusion: Core epistemological differences between both models
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What makes this paper effective
- It applies a well-established theoretical framework — Packer's two models — as a consistent analytical lens throughout, grounding every argument in recognizable scholarly categories.
- The paper moves logically from theory to historical application (post-Warren Court) to a specific legal case (Herring), demonstrating how abstract models play out in real jurisprudence.
- It concludes by broadening the analysis to contemporary debates about victims' rights, showing awareness that Packer's binary framework may be insufficient for modern criminal justice.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates comparative theoretical analysis: two competing models are placed side by side, their assumptions and mechanisms are contrasted, and then case law and policy outcomes are used to evaluate which model currently dominates practice. This technique — defining ideal types, then testing them against empirical or doctrinal evidence — is a foundational method in law and social science writing.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens with definitions of both models, then narrows to four documented shifts in post-Warren Court doctrine that signal a move toward crime control values. It next focuses on the Herring case as a concrete example of those shifts. The final body section widens the scope again to consider victims' rights and the long-term trajectory of criminal justice policy, before a brief conclusion restates each model's core epistemological commitment.
Introduction to the Two Models
This paper examines and differentiates between two "ideal type" models of the criminal process: the Crime Control Model and the Due Process Model. The Crime Control Model underlines an efficient criminal procedure by means of the early determination of guilt by law enforcement representatives (Aviram, 2010). The model requires considerable deference to police officers and prosecutors — the "torchbearers" of the criminal process (Feeley, 2003) — and, as a consequence, tolerates a degree of patience with their mistakes.
In comparison, the Due Process Model's main goal is safeguarding accuracy and avoiding the conviction of the innocent (Packer, 1969). Under a due process model, law enforcement judgment is seen as potentially biased (Packer, 1969) and is consequently carefully constrained by constitutional review and procedural safeguards acting as a "quality control" mechanism (Aviram, 2010).
Packer's models have been widely critiqued over the years (Feeley, 2003). Among the more compelling critiques is the observation that the models lack a shared epistemological basis — the Due Process Model refers primarily to doctrinal and normative justifications, while the Crime Control Model is by design a pragmatic description of the daily organization of law enforcement (Aviram, 2010).
Post-Warren Court Trends and Crime Control
Scholars today widely recognize that post-Warren Court pronouncements reflect a pendulum swing toward crime management. That shift is evident in four major themes.
First, the post-Warren Court emphasized that the ultimate mission of the criminal justice system is to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent, rather than to establish bright-line rules. The Court placed additional emphasis on the defendant's actual guilt — a practical application of Packer's "assumption of guilt" (Packer, 1969).
Second, the Court moved away from relying on clear standards of conduct and instead permitted an assessment of police behavior through a "totality of the circumstances" test (Feeley, 2003). Third, the post-Warren Court expressed greater deference to police discretion, frequently acknowledging that officers act in good faith under complicated conditions (Feeley, 2003). Fourth, the Court became less interventionist on behalf of defendants on appeal, particularly regarding collateral attacks in state courts (Packer, 1969).
These characteristics of the post-Warren Court are closely connected to a significant feature of the Crime Control Model: an escalating reliance on earlier steps in the criminal process and, especially, broad deference to police discretion. On a daily basis, officers exercise considerable discretion and make on-the-spot decisions about exercising their authority (Aviram, 2010) or refraining from doing so. Courts are well aware of this reality but defer to indistinct standards when evaluating police judgment. Courts do not view police discretion as a "necessary evil" but as a beneficial feature of professionalism (Packer, 1969).
The Herring ruling illustrates this point directly. As the Court stated, keeping in mind our frequent holdings that the deterrent effect of exclusion must be substantial and must outweigh any harm to the justice system, we conclude that when police mistakes result from negligence such as that described here — rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements — any marginal deterrence does not justify the remedy. In such a situation, the criminal must not go free simply because the constable has erred (Packer, 1969).
Conclusion
The Crime Control Model places heavy confidence in the capabilities of investigative and prosecutorial representatives, operating in an informal setting in which their characteristic skills are given full latitude to reconstruct an adequately accurate account of what took place in a supposed criminal incident. The Due Process Model rejects this premise and substitutes for it a vision of formal, adjudicative fact-finding that takes seriously the possibility of error.
References
Aviram, Hadar. (2010). Packer in context: Formalism and fairness in the due process model. Law & Social Inquiry, 35.
Packer, Herbert L. (1969). The limits of the criminal sanction. Indiana Maurer School of Law, Volume 44, Issue 3, Article 7.
Feeley, Malcolm M. (2003). Two models of the criminal justice system: An organizational perspective. Law & Society Review, 7, 407.
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