Does the DHS Need Terrorism to Justify Its Existence?

Introduction

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) arose from the ashes of the Twin Towers on 9/11 as the federal government's response to the threat of terror. That threat has been represented in a number of incarnations: the Saudi hijackers, Al-Qaeda, Saddam Hussein, Gaddafi, Assad, ISIS, and so on. Today, with ISIS being acknowledged as largely defeated in the Middle East, the new security threat that the U.S. faces is unclear (Cronin, 2015), and the old security threats — the specter of terrorism that continues to rear its head both abroad and domestically — appear to have shifted into new forms. In an ironic twist, Americans themselves appear to be more like homegrown terrorists in their attacks on fellow citizens, whether these attacks are conducted at schools or at social venues where crowds gather for enjoyment. Terrorism and mass killing appears to be the new chosen method of expressing one's own personal jihad on a culture, a group of people, or on a time and place.

The hypothesis of this paper is: If the threat of terrorism goes away, does the need for the Department of Homeland Security also go away, or is the DHS now to be viewed as a permanent feature of the American government? The thesis is: In a nation where "inverted totalitarianism" has been used to describe the governmental system (Atkinson, 2005), Homeland Security needs a foil like terrorism to justify its own existence, and therefore the threat of terrorism must always be acknowledged. This has ramifications for the nature of security management both in the U.S. and abroad, as well as for the culture of today.

Background: The Post-9/11 Security Landscape

A generation raised in the shadow of terrorism is now reaching adulthood, with nearly two decades having passed since 9/11 reshaped the geopolitical orientation of the world. As Bush (2001) declared, "You are either with us, or you are with the terrorists." America's response to 9/11 divided the world into black and white, with leaders having to choose whether they would support America in its war against terrorism or withhold support and be labeled an enemy. Americans were told that the attack had been perpetrated by Al-Qaeda, masterminded by Osama Bin Laden, supported by Hussein in Iraq, and ultimately aided by other leaders of the Arab world — from Gaddafi in Libya to Assad in Syria, Iran, and now Russia — though the intelligence has invariably been wrongfooted in almost every case (Coletta, 2018).

In the midst of this was the DHS, with its own intelligence enterprise "largely 'on the outside of the Intelligence Community with its nose pressed against the glass'" looking in (Murray, 2008). What did it bring to the table that the roughly two dozen other U.S. intelligence agencies lacked? What role could it play in the new war against terrorism? If the CIA, FBI, and various other apparatuses had failed to secure the U.S. on 9/11, how would the DHS — which was essentially cut from the same cloth as the others, just made up of newer members — respond to the challenges when it barely had an invitation to the big table? In order to justify its existence, it would have to demonstrate something in the way of contributing to the war.

Analysis: The Counterterrorism Industry and DHS

Brittain (2016) explains that the counterterrorism industry is less about preventing terrorism than it is about perpetuating the idea of an existential threat — in much the same way the military-industrial complex thrives on the specter of war, and the way the prison-industrial complex thrives on the perpetuation of the criminalization of acts that two centuries ago would have been deemed legal. The DHS has facilitated the spending of billions — more than $50 billion since its inception — with much of that going to defense contractors so prominent within the military-industrial complex, from Boeing to Lockheed Martin (Department of Homeland Security, 2018). To aid in the psychological preparation for this funneling of cash to the security industry, the DHS focused on formulating a new National Threat Advisory System. This system used color-coded levels to express the state of threats to the country, from "green" (low threat) to "red" (severe). The responsibilities of many DHS offices were to prepare for future terrorist attacks in order to minimize the impact of such assaults (Department of Homeland Security, 2018).

The National Threat Advisory System was used to raise awareness among the populace about the current possibility of a terror attack. Travelers were especially prone to threat advisory announcements, such as at airports where they were already being subjected to additional scrutiny under the watchful eyes of the newly created TSA. As Ganderton, Brookshire, and Bernknopf (2004) state, the biggest problem with the advisory system is that "the threat is poorly specified, such that even if responsive actions are indicated, agencies, businesses and the public will not take any action because they do not know exactly what threat they are reacting to" (p. 137). As such, the public is simply acclimated to a climate of fear and paranoia, told repeatedly from transit PA systems that they should report on their neighbors — people who, prior to 9/11, were viewed kindly, and who now, in the shadow of the war on terrorism, were to be viewed with mistrust and suspicion.

Ganderton et al. (2004) argue that the purpose of the DHS threat advisory system is "to create not a nation in perpetual fear, but one that is vigilant, aware and responsive" — but this has hardly been the case (p. 138). Instead, a culture of suspicion and angst has arisen, with more and more counter-culture groups forming and asserting violent screeds that call for the overthrow of oppressive systems. These groups have emerged as a kind of homegrown blowback to the oversight and cultivation of a climate of fear under the DHS. One would be forgiven for thinking that this had been the aim of the DHS all along, as it now served to keep the military-industrial security complex well oiled with taxpayer dollars for the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

With ISIS defeated and the radical Islamic terrorist threat seemingly on the wane, a new form of domestic or homegrown terrorism appears to be emerging — one rooted in a Romantic struggle against the oppression of the totalitarianism represented by the federal government, according to Mantri (2011). While this may be so, the nature of the terrorism — the perpetrators' ethnic background or specific ideological venom — is somewhat beside the point. The important thing for the DHS is that there is a threat, and that means the security state can continue and the flow of funds from taxpayers to the employers of some of Washington's busiest lobbyists will continue unabated.

As Gunlock (2009) states, the DHS, in order to justify its existence, needs to do more than point out the public threat level color: it needs to use the funding supplied to it in a way that is effective and meaningful. It needs to provide more accountability and transparency to the public, which has entrusted it with assisting in securing America's borders, identifying terrorist threats, and neutralizing them. While it is unlikely that the war on terror will ever be declared over — at least in the foreseeable future — the question of whether the DHS needs to continue in its current form is one that can fairly be asked. The specter of 9/11 still hovers over the U.S., but nearly two decades have passed since that attack, and one wonders whether America's interventions in the Middle East are making the U.S. more or less safe.

References

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