Emergency Management Lessons from Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina

Introduction

Although prevention serves an important role in minimizing the severity of emergencies, it is not a guarantee that emergencies won't be severe. For this reason, emergency management has been the topic of a great deal of debate in recent years. The emergency responses to Hurricane Andrew and, more recently, Hurricane Katrina exposed many problems with the emergency response system in America ("Katrina Compounded"). These problems greatly hindered response efforts, and thousands of American citizens suffered in the aftermath of those natural disasters. The purpose of this discussion is to analyze some of the lessons learned and changes implemented in the field of emergency management as a result of Hurricane Andrew's impact on Florida and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita's impact on the Gulf Coast.

Lessons Learned from Major Hurricane Disasters

There are three main levels of governmental emergency management: local, state, and federal. In general, the state has more resources available than local government, and the federal government has more resources than the state. With this in mind, emergency management plans at each level of government bear a responsibility to do whatever is needed to ensure the safety of citizens during and after an emergency.

Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, it became obvious that every level of government had failed to properly prepare for and respond to a catastrophic emergency. At the local level, the government failed to exhaust all efforts to evacuate citizens and failed to provide a safe location for those who could not evacuate. At the state level, the government failed to activate and strategically position National Guard troops so that they could properly respond to the tragedy. At the federal level, the response to what was occurring on the Gulf Coast was far too slow, particularly when it became obvious that the efforts of local and state governments were failing.

An article in the journal Policy Review explains that one of the most serious problems with FEMA is the poor relationship it has with local and state agencies. During and after the hurricanes, this poor relationship impeded the ability of these entities to communicate effectively. The article points out that the events following these serious natural disasters called into question federal participation in natural hazard protection (Roberts 2006). Even before Hurricane Katrina, it had been asserted that "Emergency management suffers from… a lack of clear measurable objectives, adequate resources, public concern, or official commitments…. Currently, FEMA is like a patient in triage. The president and Congress must decide whether to treat it or to let it die (National Academy of Public Administration)."

According to Roberts (2006), this observation actually came after the federal government's feeble response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Following Hurricane Andrew, Congress confronted FEMA with an ultimatum: the agency would have to undergo significant improvements or it would be dismantled. In response, FEMA undertook a transformation with the assistance of James Lee Witt. Five years later, the agency had made substantial changes, and many experts believed it had become extremely efficient (Roberts 2006).

However, by the time Hurricanes Rita and Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, it had become evident that FEMA had once again become a broken organization. The agency's response to these two disasters demonstrated its inability to respond effectively in the aftermath of a major catastrophe. This failure was especially troubling because it came after the September 11 attacks, following which the government had supposedly improved its emergency management systems (Renner & Chafe). Experts and citizens alike were dismayed by the delayed responses to an event the government knew in advance was coming (Renner & Chafe). It caused many to question how the government would respond to a terrorist attack or some other unexpected disaster.

Several key lessons emerged from the poor response to these disasters. One of the main lessons was the need to have supplies and manpower positioned in strategic locations so that the response can be quick and effective (Prugh). The responsibility for this lies at all levels of government: local, state, and federal. This became particularly evident following Hurricane Katrina, when responders at all levels of government failed to enter affected areas without delay to deliver supplies to survivors (Prugh; Mcclay).

Emergency Housing and Social Services

Another lesson learned has been the importance of aftercare. Aftercare encompasses such factors as housing, employment, and social services. When Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck the Gulf Coast, many homes and businesses were destroyed ("Katrina Compounded"). This created a situation in which people no longer had houses or jobs. In some areas, the damage was so severe that people could not return to rebuild their lives. In New Orleans alone, for instance, 80% of the city was flooded (Tucker, 2005).

As it relates to housing, Tucker (2005) explains that in the aftermath of hurricanes and other natural disasters, the Federal Emergency Management Agency supplies survivors with trailers. These trailers are designed to provide temporary housing for displaced individuals and are most commonly placed on the property of the displaced families. However, in the case of Hurricane Katrina, the flooding and pollution were so severe that trailer cities had to be erected in other cities, far from the communities where people had lived prior to the storm.

Tucker (2005) asserts that the inability of many of these communities to rebuild is tied to the inability of residents to return to their neighborhoods. The article states:

"Thousands of residents still haven't been able to return to New Orleans, much less their old neighborhoods or homes, a situation that has further slowed rebuilding efforts. The lessons to be learned from this still-unfolding tragedy are numerous. Obviously, plans for emergency housing must be an integral part of any plan for emergency response. Another, more-subtle lesson is this: Communities recover better from disasters when they're allowed to recover as communities (Tucker)."

Indeed, if the issue of emergency housing had been properly considered, some of the problems that occurred in the aftermath of these disasters could have been averted. In the future, emergency management plans must incorporate more effective approaches to emergency housing.

In addition to housing, issues associated with emergency monetary assistance, employment, and social services became clearly apparent in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (Clayton & Spletzer; Brown et al. 2006). Because so many people were displaced, surrounding cities such as Houston, Baton Rouge, and Dallas had to absorb large numbers of evacuees. For the most part these cities did an exceptional job, but FEMA was of little assistance in these areas (Whittle, 2005). FEMA gave survivors emergency funds via debit cards; however, some months later it was discovered that many recipients had not actually been affected by the hurricane. As a result, thousands of taxpayer dollars ended up in the wrong hands — a prime example of the lack of oversight that existed in the organization at that time.

Conclusion

The purpose of this discussion was to analyze some of the lessons learned and changes implemented in the field of emergency management as a result of the impact of Hurricane Andrew on Florida and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the Gulf Coast. The research found that emergency management systems at the local, state, and federal levels failed during these disasters. The lessons learned include the strategic positioning of emergency resources, the necessity of proper emergency housing planning, and the need for greater accountability. It remains unclear whether the proposed changes will be fully implemented or will succeed in improving the functionality of emergency management at the federal level.

References

Brown, Sharon P., Sandra L. Mason, and Richard B. Tiller. "The Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Employment and Unemployment." Monthly Labor Review 129.8 (2006): 52+.

Clayton, Richard L., and James R. Spletzer. "Worker Mobility before and after Hurricane Katrina." Monthly Labor Review 129.8 (2006): 11+.

Hsu, Spencer S. "Experts Question Proposed FEMA Changes." Washington Post, 15 February 2006, p. A04.

"Katrina Compounded." The Progressive, Oct. 2005: 8+.

Mcclay, Wilfred M. "The Storm over Katrina." Commentary, Dec. 2005: 34+.

National Academy of Public Administration. Coping with Catastrophe. Washington, D.C., February 1993.

Prugh, Thomas. "Katrina: The Failures of Success." World Watch, Sept.–Oct. 2006: 7.

Renner, Michael, and Zoe Chafe. "Hurricane Katrina in a Human Security Perspective." World Watch, Sept.–Oct. 2006: 18+.

Roberts, Patrick S. "FEMA after Katrina." Policy Review (2006): 15+.

Tucker, Patrick. "Rethinking Emergency Housing." The Futurist, Nov.–Dec. 2006: 68+.

Whittle, P. "Housing Elusive for Storm Victims." Sarasota Herald Tribune, 20 March 2005, p. BCE1.