Hurricane Katrina Emergency Management: Lessons Learned

In late August 2005, Hurricane Katrina became the eleventh named storm of the Atlantic hurricane season and was its most deadly and destructive. The federal and state governments' responses to this natural disaster were heavily criticized in the mainstream media as well as by the hundreds of thousands of victims in the years that followed. Although it is far too late for those victims, some valuable lessons were learned from the disaster that have been used to help formulate improved responses in the future. This paper provides a review of relevant peer-reviewed and scholarly literature concerning the emergency management of Hurricane Katrina, followed by an assessment of the various lessons that were learned. A summary of the research and important findings is provided in the conclusion.

On August 29, 2005, the coast of the Gulf of Mexico was struck by Hurricane Katrina, devastating the city of New Orleans and the Louisiana parishes surrounding it, as well as numerous towns along the Gulf Coast in Mississippi (Cahoon & Herz, 2006). Although the devastation caused by the storm was far-reaching and long-lasting, the effects were especially pronounced in New Orleans itself. Cahill (2010) reports that, "In 2005, when natural disaster hit New Orleans, Louisiana, in the form of Hurricane Katrina, life came to a standstill. No aspect of city life was left untouched by the hurricane. It destroyed not only neighborhoods but also the city's infrastructure" (p. 278). The impact of the massive storm on New Orleans and surrounding parishes overwhelmed and quickly exhausted available emergency management resources. In addition, Hurricane Katrina's widespread effects and long-lasting devastation resulted in billions of dollars in losses as well as massive relocations of citizens (Cahoon & Herz, 2006).

Although a great deal of criticism has been directed at the emergency management of Hurricane Katrina, there were still countless episodes of heroism in the face of adversity that characterized the response. Moreover, the citizens of New Orleans were given ample warning of the imminent approach of the storm, but many chose to ride it out as they had in the past. Nevertheless, it quickly became apparent that the federal and state responses to this disaster were inadequate. According to Bitto (2007), "The events surrounding Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and other catastrophes called forth heroic responses that demonstrate the need for genuine collaboration within communities and among environmental health professionals, public health agencies, multidisciplinary first responders, and other organizations" (p. 28). A February 2006 audit of emergency operations placed the death toll from Hurricane Katrina at 1,330; it was also noted that 2,096 remained missing (Monmonier, 2008). By the end of 2005, approximately half a million of the 1.1 million persons evacuated had not returned (Monmonier, 2008). Notwithstanding the heroism repeatedly demonstrated during the immediate aftermath of the storm by emergency responders and ordinary citizens alike, the emergency management response was deemed wholly inadequate by most observers and analysts.

The purpose of emergency management planning for many cities involves formulating plans that clearly define appropriate emergency response and preparedness measures (Edgington, 2011). Notwithstanding the obvious need for this type of planning in New Orleans, some critics charged that city officials chose to ignore these issues in favor of other development initiatives, leaving planning and emergency management to state and federal governments (Edgington, 2011). This point is also made by Birkland (2006), who suggests there was a lack of executive oversight and preparedness at many levels of government, and who also notes that the September 11, 2001 attacks were still fresh in the minds of Homeland Security authorities who appeared to have trouble even keeping up with terrorist alert levels. As Birkland notes, "The shift of FEMA's emphasis to response to terrorist attacks should not be overstated" (p. 137). The complacency that can erode even the most thoughtful emergency preparations was also cited among the lessons learned from Katrina. Birkland reports:

[FEMA] continues to support state and local responses to natural disasters, and during the 2004 hurricane season its performance was viewed as relatively good. FEMA did, however, respond to a series of storms that, even in the aggregate, were far less catastrophic than Hurricane Katrina, and a series of storms that primarily struck Florida, which had learned from Hurricane Andrew and had taken effective steps to prepare for, respond to, and mitigate natural disasters. (p. 137)

The racial and class issues identified by critics resonate with criticism leveled at emergency management authorities in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Although there have been marked improvements in emergency management in the post-Katrina era, a key lesson here is that the resources devoted to restoring and preventing recurrences of devastation in other regions appeared to outweigh the needs of the overwhelmingly Black and often impoverished citizens of New Orleans. As Birkland concludes, "This was not the case in Louisiana, which was demonstrably unprepared for a storm of the size and scale of Katrina, regardless of FEMA's failures" (p. 137).

Despite the lessons learned from these events, Birkland argues that the Bush administration failed to follow up on many of the recommendations that emerged from cross-disciplinary analyses. Moreover, Edgington suggests that there has been a basic lack of long-term planning for hurricane aftermath — a frightening but recurring part of the city's history. Edgington emphasizes that, "Planners, however, give little attention to the likelihood of a major disaster, and even less is given by all professionals to longer-term recovery and reconstruction issues" (p. 4).

Given the repeated series of hurricanes that have devastated New Orleans time and again, city officials should by now be seasoned experts in emergency management planning. There are lessons to be learned from every disaster if the effort is made to identify them, and after several such devastating events, it is reasonable to expect that those tasked with emergency management would have gained enough expertise to formulate timely, coordinated, cross-disciplinary responses — even to the most extreme storms. As Edgington concludes, "The desired outcome is for communities to emerge from post-disaster recovery and long-term reconstruction safer and less vulnerable to future calamities" (p. 5). Nevertheless, even the harshest critics concede the massiveness of the storm. While Hurricane Katrina was not entirely unprecedented, the density of human population and investments in infrastructure — especially oil and gas resources — made this an especially "wicked" storm. According to Getha-Taylor (2007), "Hurricane Katrina has been described as a 'wicked problem' where the time to react was short, no single organization had all the answers, and the cost of failure was enormous" (p. 7).

Hindsight is 20/20, but the sluggish response of federal and state authorities was apparent in the immediate aftermath of the storm, causing some observers to suggest that a racial element may have been involved. From this perspective, the poor Black residents who were stranded on rooftops and forced to seek shelter in an overcrowded Superdome with no food or water were seen as receiving a less robust emergency response compared to other affected populations. Patsdaughter (2005) points out that, "Journalists and human rights advocates have raised questions about the role of race and class in the grossly inadequate preparatory and emergency responses of government officials to residents and hurricane evacuees in New Orleans" (p. 75).

In truth, the enormous scope of the disaster challenged governmental responses at all levels. Getha-Taylor (2007) advises that, "The response to Hurricane Katrina involved government authorities on the local, state, and federal levels, and the response required the coordination of at least ninety-three disaster relief organizations, as listed by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, and countless private-sector companies to deliver services to the public in the wake of the hurricane" (p. 7). Because every disaster represents an opportunity to learn how to respond better in the future, it is important to identify the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina.

One of the fundamental lessons learned is that complacency can erode the effectiveness of existing emergency management planning and responses, and that contingency plans for disasters of all scopes must be formulated. Complacency appears to have adversely affected the federal government's ability to respond effectively to Hurricane Katrina. According to Birkland (2006), "The successful federal response to the 2004 hurricane season may have lulled FEMA into a belief that it could effectively handle Hurricane Katrina, which it manifestly did not do" (p. 146). Likewise, Sylves (2008) emphasizes that, "In the wake of the poor government response to the 2005 Hurricane Katrina disaster, many questions have been asked about why the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), along with a host of other federal, state, and local emergency management agencies, performed so ineffectively" (p. 68).

While it is frequently easier to identify what went wrong than what went right, it is less easy to assign blame or accountability to any single individual or group, despite the efforts of many Americans to do so. Rather, there was plenty of blame to go around at every level of state and federal government, as well as in the private sector that chose to rely on aging infrastructure despite the clear need for electricity in post-disaster relief operations and human survival. Henderson (2009) reports that, "Hurricane Katrina taught federal, state, and local public managers extensive lessons about the criticality of electricity reliability in a disaster" (p. 55). The White House also conceded a lack of prior planning for disasters of this scale. The White House report "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned" also emphasized the criticality of electricity in post-disaster settings. According to Henderson, the report agreed that, "Hurricane Katrina had a significant impact on many sectors of the region's 'critical infrastructure,' especially the energy sector" (quoted in Henderson, p. 55).

The sometimes long-lasting destruction of the electrical grid throughout the Gulf Coast made the need for planning beyond the scope of typical disasters all the more urgent. Henderson emphasizes that, "The importance of the electrical grid became abundantly apparent when 2.5 million customers suffered power outages across a 90,000 square mile area in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama" (p. 55). In a world driven by electricity, there is also a need to identify ways to deliver emergency electrical power to first responders and emergency management teams for post-disaster recovery efforts. The need for alternative sources of electricity represents an important lesson for state and federal agencies tasked with emergency planning. Henderson emphasizes that, "Homes, businesses, and federal, state, and local agencies had intermittent or no electricity. There was no light at night; no air conditioning; no refrigeration of food, essential medical supplies, and equipment; and no computers, radios, televisions, or other communication devices powered by electricity" (p. 56).

The damage caused by Hurricane Katrina to the electrical grid challenged energy companies despite their best efforts, and it required a month or more to restore power to many affected communities. Henderson reports that, "By October 2005, an estimated 2.2 million people had registered for FEMA aid, and 416,852 people were still without power in Louisiana, Texas, and parts of Mississippi" (p. 56). People without power naturally want it restored, and when it is not, they are forced to leave — and many may never return. The effects of Katrina in this regard were not only pronounced, but could reasonably have been anticipated given the regularity of coastal destruction. Henderson pointedly notes that, "The irony was that energy-producing states were without energy or power for nearly six weeks" (p. 56).

Besides electricity, there is also a glaring need for the provision of basic human necessities. An after-action report by Frank (2006) found that, "We quickly learned that in addition to the food and water quality concerns that resulted from hurricane damage, there were also health and sanitation issues at shelters for victims and responders that were not being adequately addressed" (p. 29). The potential for the spread of disease in post-disaster situations is well documented, so it should have been apparent that many victims and emergency responders were exposed to unsanitary and even toxic environments. Frank notes that, "Inspection of mass shelter facilities quickly became a critical environmental health function. The high volunteer turnover rate in mass shelters and the overflowing volume of victims created big problems for New Orleans and rural Louisiana" (p. 29).