Hurricane Katrina Emergency Management: Lessons Learned

In late August 2005, Hurricane Katrina became the eleventh named storm of the Atlantic hurricane season and was its most deadly and destructive. The federal and state governments' responses to this natural disaster were heavily criticized in the mainstream media as well as by the hundreds of thousands of victims in the years that followed. Although it is far too late for those victims, some valuable lessons were learned from the disaster that have been used to help formulate improved responses in the future. This paper provides a review of relevant peer-reviewed and scholarly literature concerning the emergency management of Hurricane Katrina, followed by an assessment of the various lessons that were learned. A summary of the research and important findings is provided in the conclusion.

On August 29, 2005, the coast of the Gulf of Mexico was struck by Hurricane Katrina, devastating the city of New Orleans and the Louisiana parishes surrounding it, as well as numerous towns along the Gulf Coast in Mississippi (Cahoon & Herz, 2006). Although the devastation caused by the storm was far-reaching and long-lasting, the effects were especially pronounced in New Orleans itself. Cahill (2010) reports that, "In 2005, when natural disaster hit New Orleans, Louisiana, in the form of Hurricane Katrina, life came to a standstill. No aspect of city life was left untouched by the hurricane. It destroyed not only neighborhoods but also the city's infrastructure" (p. 278). The impact of the massive storm on New Orleans and surrounding parishes overwhelmed and quickly exhausted available emergency management resources. In addition, Hurricane Katrina's widespread effects and long-lasting devastation resulted in billions of dollars in losses as well as massive relocations of citizens (Cahoon & Herz, 2006).

Although a great deal of criticism has been directed at the emergency management of Hurricane Katrina, there were still countless episodes of heroism in the face of adversity that characterized the response. Moreover, the citizens of New Orleans were given ample warning of the imminent approach of the storm, but many chose to ride it out as they had in the past. Nevertheless, it quickly became apparent that the federal and state responses to this disaster were inadequate. According to Bitto (2007), "The events surrounding Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and other catastrophes called forth heroic responses that demonstrate the need for genuine collaboration within communities and among environmental health professionals, public health agencies, multidisciplinary first responders, and other organizations" (p. 28). A February 2006 audit of emergency operations placed the death toll from Hurricane Katrina at 1,330; it was also noted that 2,096 remained missing (Monmonier, 2008). By the end of 2005, approximately half a million of the 1.1 million persons evacuated had not returned (Monmonier, 2008). Notwithstanding the heroism repeatedly demonstrated during the immediate aftermath of the storm by emergency responders and ordinary citizens alike, the emergency management response was deemed wholly inadequate by most observers and analysts.

The purpose of emergency management planning for many cities involves formulating plans that clearly define appropriate emergency response and preparedness measures (Edgington, 2011). Notwithstanding the obvious need for this type of planning in New Orleans, some critics charged that city officials chose to ignore these issues in favor of other development initiatives, leaving planning and emergency management to state and federal governments (Edgington, 2011). This point is also made by Birkland (2006), who suggests there was a lack of executive oversight and preparedness at many levels of government, and who also notes that the September 11, 2001 attacks were still fresh in the minds of Homeland Security authorities who appeared to have trouble even keeping up with terrorist alert levels. As Birkland notes, "The shift of FEMA's emphasis to response to terrorist attacks should not be overstated" (p. 137). The complacency that can erode even the most thoughtful emergency preparations was also cited among the lessons learned from Katrina. Birkland reports:

[FEMA] continues to support state and local responses to natural disasters, and during the 2004 hurricane season its performance was viewed as relatively good. FEMA did, however, respond to a series of storms that, even in the aggregate, were far less catastrophic than Hurricane Katrina, and a series of storms that primarily struck Florida, which had learned from Hurricane Andrew and had taken effective steps to prepare for, respond to, and mitigate natural disasters. (p. 137)

The racial and class issues identified by critics resonate with criticism leveled at emergency management authorities in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Although there have been marked improvements in emergency management in the post-Katrina era, a key lesson here is that the resources devoted to restoring and preventing recurrences of devastation in other regions appeared to outweigh the needs of the overwhelmingly Black and often impoverished citizens of New Orleans. As Birkland concludes, "This was not the case in Louisiana, which was demonstrably unprepared for a storm of the size and scale of Katrina, regardless of FEMA's failures" (p. 137).

Despite the lessons learned from these events, Birkland argues that the Bush administration failed to follow up on many of the recommendations that emerged from cross-disciplinary analyses. Moreover, Edgington suggests that there has been a basic lack of long-term planning for hurricane aftermath — a frightening but recurring part of the city's history. Edgington emphasizes that, "Planners, however, give little attention to the likelihood of a major disaster, and even less is given by all professionals to longer-term recovery and reconstruction issues" (p. 4).