The Gulf War: Military Victory or Political Failure?

Introduction

Nominally, the United States achieved victory in the first Gulf War. However, the decades of fighting in the Middle East — punctuated by the second Gulf War — demonstrate that the United States was not truly victorious. Equally clear, though, is the fact that Iraq was not victorious either. This paper examines the politics behind the Gulf War, including deterrence, diplomacy, power struggles, and military and political implications, to argue that there was no true victor in the Gulf War.

In August of 1990, Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, ordered an invasion of Kuwait (A&E, 2013). This action alarmed neighboring countries, which called for intervention from other states and from the United Nations. The UN Security Council responded by ordering Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The United States, working with and through the United Nations, attempted to use deterrence and diplomacy to force Iraq to abandon Kuwait. However, those efforts were unsuccessful, resulting in a power struggle that left both sides more entrenched in their positions. Iraq ultimately ignored the demands to withdraw from Kuwait. This response had political and military consequences, and in January 1991 a United Nations force led by United States troops began an attack on Iraq (A&E, 2013). The attack came to be known as Operation Desert Storm. The war itself was of relatively short duration. On February 28, 1991, after only 42 days of attacks, President Bush — the nominal leader of UN forces — declared a cease-fire (A&E, 2013). The UN and the United States then engaged in negotiated talks with Hussein intended to ensure Kuwait's safety and, theoretically, the safety of other neighboring oil-rich countries, while still permitting Hussein to remain in power. Some would say that the United States was triumphant in the Gulf War, but a closer examination reveals that the United States' victory in the Persian Gulf War was neither a triumph nor a failure, but instead a symbol of political mismanagement.

Deterrence

Deterrence theory suggests that international conflicts can sometimes be avoided through a sufficient show of strength by one of the parties. "Deterrence is an old practice. For instance, classic balance of power systems were based on deterrence, applied by actors not just to prevent wars but via wars" (Morgan, 2012). It is important to recognize that the use of power does not always signify a failure of deterrence, because deterrence can also refer to the use of power to avoid a greater degree of violence. Deterrence generally refers to "power accumulated by actors singly or collectively (usually in alliances) to threaten serious harmful consequences so as to ward off attacks or other noxious behaviour or, when used, to demonstrate those harmful consequences for the edification of potential opponents" (Morgan, 2012). When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United Nations demonstrated that it had the capability of calling upon coalition forces — led and powered by the U.S. military — to bring against Iraq if necessary. The threat was clear: if Iraq did not pull out of Kuwait, the UN would use force to eject it. However, after years of relatively ineffective UN punishments, the threats must have seemed hollow, because Iraq did not appear concerned about facing a military force it would not have the power to defeat.

Diplomacy

The diplomatic efforts in the Persian Gulf had been largely unsuccessful in the lead-up to the war. It is critical to understand that, prior to the Persian Gulf War, Iraq and Iran had been engaged in a long-running conflict. The United Nations had managed to broker a cease-fire between the parties in August 1988, but a permanent peace agreement had never been reached. In July 1990, Hussein appeared willing to return occupied territories to Iran. However, he quickly shifted his focus to Kuwait, alleging that Kuwait was "siphoning crude oil from the Ar-Rumaylah oil fields located along their common border" (A&E, 2013). Iraq's allegations served a diplomatic goal: Hussein wanted Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to erase Iraq's foreign debt.

Attempts at diplomacy between the United States and Iraq proved unsuccessful, but the U.S. was not the only significant power involved. Even as the United States and its coalition partners were preparing for a ground assault, the Soviet Union attempted to negotiate a peace settlement. Mikhail Gorbachev engaged in talks with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz. He believed that Iraq would agree to withdraw its forces from Kuwait without tying that action to other Middle Eastern issues, but President Bush rejected the compromise because it would not involve reparations to Kuwait for damages incurred during the Iraqi occupation, and because it failed to address Iraq's biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons programs (Wise et al., 2011).

Meanwhile, Iraq was working its diplomatic channels more effectively than the United States. For example, though Iraq and Iran had been unable to broker a peace treaty for years after their cease-fire, Iraq concluded a peace treaty with Iran in the days immediately before the Persian Gulf War, enabling it to redeploy troops from the Iranian front to Kuwait (A&E, 2013).

Conclusion

Some might suggest that the United States was triumphant in the Gulf War, but a closer look reveals that the United States' victory in the Persian Gulf War was neither a triumph nor a failure, but instead a symbol of political mismanagement. The Persian Gulf War was a military victory for the United States, but the evidence suggests that it may have been unnecessary. Diplomatic efforts, spearheaded by the Soviet Union, appeared capable of resulting in Iraq's voluntary withdrawal from Kuwait. Furthermore, when the United States insisted on holding Iraq to the timetable established by the United Nations, it achieved a swift military victory over Iraqi forces. However, it failed to capitalize on that victory — leaving Hussein in power left the United States vulnerable to ongoing instability in the Middle East, and ultimately set the conditions for a second, far more costly conflict.

References

A&E Television Networks. (2013). Persian Gulf War. Retrieved May 5, 2013, from History.com website: http://www.history.com/topics/persian-gulf-war

Morgan, P. (2012). The state of deterrence in international politics today. Retrieved May 5, 2013, from Contemporary Security Policy website: http://www.contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/assets/CSP-33-1%20Morgan.pdf

PBS. (2010). The Persian Gulf War. Retrieved May 5, 2013, from American Experience website:

Wise, Z., Goodridge, E., Gordon, M., & Fisher, R. (2011, January 19). The eve of war: Four days of diplomacy. Retrieved May 5, 2013, from The New York Times website: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/01/20/world/middleeast/20110120-archive.html

Wood, M. (2002). Deterrence key in Iraq, experts say. Retrieved May 5, 2013, from University of Virginia School of Law website: http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2002_fall/war_iraq.htm