The Persian Gulf War: U.S. Strategy and Coalition Victory

Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait and the U.S. Response

During the final eighteen months of the Cold War, the United States and members of a United Nations coalition were engaged in a large-scale regional war. The United States deployed over 500,000 soldiers, sailors, and air force personnel — the largest such deployment since the Vietnam War. The enemy was not the U.S.S.R. but Iraq, which in the summer of 1990 possessed the fourth largest military in the world. On August 2, 1990, the combined armed forces of Iraq, under the direct leadership of Saddam Hussein — some 140,000 soldiers — invaded the neighboring, oil-rich kingdom of Kuwait. Many Western countries feared the Iraqi dictator would push his forces further south into the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with its vast oil reserves. On August 3, 1990, President George Bush and his administration prepared to respond to the invasion through economic, diplomatic, and military measures. Iraq's invasion meant that Hussein would control 20% of the world's oil supply, a situation deemed unacceptable — particularly if he could drive his armies into Saudi Arabia and capture its capital within three days.

President Bush resolved early in the crisis to defend Saudi Arabia and thwart any further advances by the Iraqi armed forces. U.S. Army General Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander in chief of Central Command — which oversees U.S. military operations in the region — stated that "two tiers of responses were possible....the first...could be single retaliatory strikes...carried out by U.S. naval aircraft based on carriers in the region. Possible targets included the Iraqi Army in Kuwait...targets in Iraq itself....Such attacks could not be sustained very long and probably would not accomplish much....Tier Two...was the execution of Operations Plan 90-1002 for the defense of the Saudi Peninsula. That would take months and involve 100,000 to 200,000 military personnel from all the services" (Woodward, 228). Tier Two would include the deployment of four divisions from the Army and Marine Corps — including heavy armor units — three aircraft carriers, each with seventy-five attack and support aircraft, plus Air Force transports, bombers, and all support personnel.

Traditionally, the U.S. would have first chosen the Tier One option: a limited number of assets deployed on a short mission, gambling that the other side would back down. But analysis of Iraqi culture and military capability revealed a formidable opponent in Kuwait whose position threatened U.S. interests. Two days after the invasion, the U.S. opted for Tier Two: defend Saudi Arabia. Full deployment would take seventeen weeks. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney explored with General Powell and General Schwarzkopf the size of force needed to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait — a third option now on the table. Schwarzkopf stated that "it would take 8 to 12 months to put in place the U.S. force needed to kick Saddam out of Kuwait" (Woodward, 248). The Iraqi army at the time of the invasion was formidable, with 900,000 men organized into sixty-three divisions, "including the eight elite Republican Guard forces....[the] arsenal included...Soviet T-72 tanks, South African 155-mm heavy artillery...multiple rocket launchers...anti-ship missiles...fighters...and fighter-bombers....[Iraq's] weaknesses...primarily feeble logistics and a centralized system of command and control in which important decisions...could be made only by Saddam personally" (Schwarzkopf, 300).

References

Rubin, Barry. Cauldron of Turmoil: America in the Middle East. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1992.

Speakman, Jay. The Persian Gulf War: Weapons of War. San Diego: Lucent Books, Inc., 2001.

Summers, Harry G., Jr. On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. New York: Dell Publishing, 1992.

Schwarzkopf, Norman. It Doesn't Take a Hero. New York: Bantam Books, 1992.

Woodward, Bob. The Commanders. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991.