The Persian Gulf War: U.S. Strategy and Coalition Victory

Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait and the U.S. Response

During the final eighteen months of the Cold War, the United States and members of a United Nations coalition were engaged in a large-scale regional war. The United States deployed over 500,000 soldiers, sailors, and air force personnel — the largest such deployment since the Vietnam War. The enemy was not the U.S.S.R. but Iraq, which in the summer of 1990 possessed the fourth largest military in the world. On August 2, 1990, the combined armed forces of Iraq, under the direct leadership of Saddam Hussein — some 140,000 soldiers — invaded the neighboring, oil-rich kingdom of Kuwait. Many Western countries feared the Iraqi dictator would push his forces further south into the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with its vast oil reserves. On August 3, 1990, President George Bush and his administration prepared to respond to the invasion through economic, diplomatic, and military measures. Iraq's invasion meant that Hussein would control 20% of the world's oil supply, a situation deemed unacceptable — particularly if he could drive his armies into Saudi Arabia and capture its capital within three days.

President Bush resolved early in the crisis to defend Saudi Arabia and thwart any further advances by the Iraqi armed forces. U.S. Army General Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander in chief of Central Command — which oversees U.S. military operations in the region — stated that "two tiers of responses were possible....the first...could be single retaliatory strikes...carried out by U.S. naval aircraft based on carriers in the region. Possible targets included the Iraqi Army in Kuwait...targets in Iraq itself....Such attacks could not be sustained very long and probably would not accomplish much....Tier Two...was the execution of Operations Plan 90-1002 for the defense of the Saudi Peninsula. That would take months and involve 100,000 to 200,000 military personnel from all the services" (Woodward, 228). Tier Two would include the deployment of four divisions from the Army and Marine Corps — including heavy armor units — three aircraft carriers, each with seventy-five attack and support aircraft, plus Air Force transports, bombers, and all support personnel.

Traditionally, the U.S. would have first chosen the Tier One option: a limited number of assets deployed on a short mission, gambling that the other side would back down. But analysis of Iraqi culture and military capability revealed a formidable opponent in Kuwait whose position threatened U.S. interests. Two days after the invasion, the U.S. opted for Tier Two: defend Saudi Arabia. Full deployment would take seventeen weeks. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney explored with General Powell and General Schwarzkopf the size of force needed to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait — a third option now on the table. Schwarzkopf stated that "it would take 8 to 12 months to put in place the U.S. force needed to kick Saddam out of Kuwait" (Woodward, 248). The Iraqi army at the time of the invasion was formidable, with 900,000 men organized into sixty-three divisions, "including the eight elite Republican Guard forces....[the] arsenal included...Soviet T-72 tanks, South African 155-mm heavy artillery...multiple rocket launchers...anti-ship missiles...fighters...and fighter-bombers....[Iraq's] weaknesses...primarily feeble logistics and a centralized system of command and control in which important decisions...could be made only by Saddam personally" (Schwarzkopf, 300).

Operation Desert Shield: Buildup and Deployment

With the Saudi Royal Family's permission, elements of the United States armed forces were deployed to that kingdom on August 7, 1990. En route were two naval carrier battle groups, units of the Army's 82nd Airborne Division, and elements of the Air Force's tactical wings. Schwarzkopf noted that the "President had already been warned that deploying troops was not an instant solution....the...crisis only three days old, three months seemed almost an eternity....I wanted to make absolutely certain...how powerful an enemy we would face" (Schwarzkopf, 301). On August 8, 1990, President Bush addressed the nation to state his policy toward Iraq: "First, we seek the immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime. And third, my administration...is committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. And fourth, I am determined to protect the lives of American citizens abroad" (Summers, 173). While military deployment orders were issued, economic embargoes were erected against Iraq to isolate and strangle the country's ability to conduct commerce.

Operation Desert Shield was initiated. America's first deployed troops were lightly armed and vulnerable to Iraqi forces if they decided to sweep into Saudi Arabia; it would "be weeks before the first American armored and mechanized forces...would finally arrive in-country....the majority of the American military in the Gulf were on the strategic, operational, and tactical defense" (Summers, 181). By early October, most elements of the deter-and-defend mission were in place in and around Saudi Arabia — some 200,000 U.S. military personnel. The next phase of strategic thinking concerned the offensive campaign: expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait. During the buildup of U.N. coalition forces under Operation Desert Shield, Iraq moved to reinforce and consolidate its positions. Schwarzkopf realized by mid-September 1990 that "Iraq was abandoning the idea of invading Saudi Arabia and assuming a defensive posture" (Schwarzkopf, 346).

Iraqi Defensive Strategy and Fortifications

Hussein "did not wish for a war....He knew that Iraq could not defeat the United States, but he hoped that the prospect of a tough fight would deter U.S. officials....Hussein believed that the United States did not have the stomach for a long, bloody war" (Speakman, 20). Hussein correctly anticipated that any war initiated by the U.S.-led coalition would begin with an extensive bombing campaign. To counter such action, Iraq "fortified its air defense in both Kuwait and Iraq. With a very dense and overlapping system of early-warning radars, antiaircraft missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, other aircraft guns and flak, and interceptor jet fighters....the Iraqis could hope to deter or absorb U.S. air strikes, minimizing damage to its forces....In Kuwait, the Iraqis laid thousands of mines....dug trenches, built tank traps, created concrete bunkers, and large sand berms" (Speakman, 20–21).

Frontline foot soldiers were installed in forward positions, with thousands of tanks, personnel carriers, and other mechanized units placed in a second-tier defensive line. The elite Republican Guard was held in the rear "waiting for the opportunity to launch a punishing counterattack if coalition forces stalled" (Speakman, 21).

References

Rubin, Barry. Cauldron of Turmoil: America in the Middle East. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1992.

Speakman, Jay. The Persian Gulf War: Weapons of War. San Diego: Lucent Books, Inc., 2001.

Summers, Harry G., Jr. On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. New York: Dell Publishing, 1992.

Schwarzkopf, Norman. It Doesn't Take a Hero. New York: Bantam Books, 1992.

Woodward, Bob. The Commanders. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991.