Operation Desert Storm: Human Behavior, Ethics, and Media

Introduction

In early 1991, the United States launched Operation Desert Storm in response to Saddam Hussein's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, while the American public held its collective breath to see whether Hussein's threat to wage "the mother of all battles" — including threats to use chemical weapons of mass destruction — would come to fruition. Although the Iraqi military was never able to live up to their leader's claims, the political and social fallout from the successful prosecution of this regional war had long-term implications for American political and military leaders alike. This topic is important to analyze today because the Middle East remains a global hotspot with the very real potential to erupt in other conflicts with Western powers in general and the United States in particular.

To determine the facts, the overarching purpose of this paper is to review the relevant literature and provide an analysis of the humanities involved in the lead-up and aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, a critical analysis of the situation, and salient post-conflict recommendations. Finally, a summary of the key findings that emerged from the research is presented in the conclusion, followed by a personal reflection on the author's participation in Operation Desert Storm and its effect on the American consciousness.

Analysis of Humanities

On January 16, 1991, President George H. W. Bush launched the military intervention known as Operation Desert Storm in an effort to force occupying Iraqi troops out of Kuwait and restore that nation's democratic institutions (Taylor, 2016). Like many other military engagements, Operation Desert Storm involved extensive planning and the coordination of hundreds of thousands of American and coalition troops massed along the Saudi-Iraqi border, awaiting the order from military leaders to advance. When the United Nations' deadline for Iraqi withdrawal — set for January 15, 1991 — expired with no response from Iraq's political or military leadership, the U.S.-led coalition initiated a five-week bombing campaign targeting Iraqi command and control centers in an effort to degrade their war-fighting capabilities (Taylor, 2015).

Following the cessation of the bombing campaign, and despite concerns that Saddam Hussein might unleash chemical weapons, coalition forces initiated a ground invasion in February 1991. That invasion successfully and quickly drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. Coalition forces then advanced into Iraq itself but agreed to a cease-fire within 100 hours, leaving Hussein in power — an outcome that was highly controversial both then and now (Taylor, 2015).

Against the backdrop of other military conflicts prosecuted by the United States, the approximately 300 casualties (see Appendix A) that resulted from this "100-hour war" were remarkably minimal, but the corresponding human behaviors that resulted from the war were not. As noted in the introduction, some of the behavioral responses to this conflict included an initial "rally 'round the flag" reaction that swept the nation — a response that is commonplace during times of perceived threats to national security. Throughout its history, Americans have been taught from an early age that their country is the greatest nation in the world and that it is their patriotic duty to unite in times of crisis, especially when the United States is at war. The American public's response to Operation Desert Storm was no exception, at least during the early phases of the conflict and immediately thereafter. In this regard, Lindsey and Smith (2003) report that "the Iraq War validated a basic rule of American politics: the American public closes ranks in times of national crisis" (p. 21).

Indeed, the same reaction has been experienced to some extent in response to the global coronavirus pandemic, when the American public rewarded President Trump with a modest bump in his popularity ratings. One historian notes that "Bush, remembering the lessons of Vietnam, sought public support. Although there were scant opponents of the conflict, the vast majority of Americans and a narrow majority of the Congress supported the President's actions" (Operation Desert Storm, 2020, para. 3). The intensity of the burst of national patriotism in response to Operation Desert Storm, however, was relatively brief, due in large part to the brevity of the conflict and the minimal casualties it produced. Moreover, there were no public celebrations in the streets or ticker tape parades — just an overwhelming sense of relief at the quick outcome and few American casualties, alongside a growing appreciation for the war-fighting capability of the American military.

This positive reaction was in sharp contrast to the American public's views about becoming further embroiled in the Middle East prior to Operation Desert Storm. According to Lindsey and Smith (2003), "In the prolonged march to war, the public was divided and ambivalent about the wisdom of invading Iraq rather than relying on continued United Nations weapons inspections" (p. 21). Despite these reservations, the Bush administration's public relations campaign in support of military intervention in Iraq was highly effective in positively influencing public opinion, especially after the successful outcome at minimal cost became apparent.

The positive response to America's intervention in Iraq extended beyond the Oval Office to include other democratic institutions. Lindsey and Smith (2003) conclude that "most of those doubts evaporated once the bombs began falling [and] the surge of patriotism not only boosted public support for President Bush, but extended beyond the White House to raise optimism about the country's institutions and American society as a whole" (p. 22). In sum, the United States went to war with Iraq, came out on top, and this outcome was widely viewed by the American public as a job well done by those trained for the purpose.

Notwithstanding the successful outcome of Operation Desert Storm, there were profound ethical questions that emerged both before and after its conclusion that continue to be debated today (Khan, 2011). In some cases, critics argued that America's interventions in the Middle East — including in Iraq — were fueled by its interests in the region's oil reserves, a view illustrated at the time by editorial cartoonists such as the creators of the Doonesbury comic strip. Taken together, it is clear that whenever a country goes to war, serious ramifications follow, some of which — such as casualty counts — are readily discernible. In other cases, however, the impact of waging war may be less obvious due to the manner in which the conflict is managed by the U.S. government.

Critical Analysis and Recommendations

The widespread relief in the United States over the minimal loss of American lives largely ignored the other human costs caused by this military intervention. According to Stilwell (2015), "More Americans died from HIV infection in 1991 than in Operation Desert Storm. An estimated 100,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed in the conflict, while the United States had only 383 fatalities in the region" (para. 4). These grim statistics were available to the American public if sought out, but the record shows that public opinion was carefully managed in the days leading up to the intervention and in the months following its end. One military analyst emphasizes that "the [U.S.] public was manipulated as surreptitiously as is practiced by most authoritarian regimes. The U.S. Secretary of Defense and his instrument, the U.S. Army, in effect censored every media outlet, U.S. and foreign" (Klotzer, 2002, p. 34).

Even more troubling from an ethical perspective was the fact that the censorship of media coverage during Operation Desert Storm was directed by the nation's commander in chief. As Klotzer (2002) points out, "Control over news was absolute. The directive came directly from former President George H. W. Bush. The President was horrified at the possibility that millions could view the war wounded and dead, Allied or Iraqi" (p. 34). There was, however, some rationale behind this seemingly restrictive communication strategy, rooted in the president's own experiences. Klotzer adds:

As a war veteran, [Bush] remembered the agony of the wounded. He also remembered the split television screen during the Panama invasion, when he was wisecracking with reporters on one half, while the other half of the screen showed arrival ceremonies of the American soldiers killed in Panama. As of then, news coverage of honor guard ceremonies was banned. President Bill Clinton continued the ban. (2002, p. 35)

In other words, the president and like-minded political and military leaders believed that the harsh realities of actual war were too difficult for the American public to absorb, and they sought to avoid a negative public reaction to the maximum extent possible in a democratic republic. This lack of transparency has special relevance for contemporary issues, including the U.S. government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the precedents these actions set for the future of American democracy.

The government's actions during Operation Desert Storm also have significant implications for future military engagements that might place U.S. troops in harm's way. According to Curtis (2015), "The phenomenal success of U.S. 'shock and awe' bombing persuaded American planners thereafter to expect more from air power than it has since proven capable of delivering, to our considerable frustration since 9/11" (p. 25). Likewise, Tilford (1993) argues that America's one-sided victory in Operation Desert Storm persuaded military leaders that technological solutions could partially or even entirely replace soldiers on the battlefield. As Tilford (1993) observes, "Many writers proclaimed not only the American military's total recovery from the Vietnam War but also contended that Desert Storm heralded the advent of a military technological revolution" (p. 327).

Just as Allied military tacticians learned in World War II, however, waging war effectively requires more than massive bombing campaigns — it demands boots on the ground to ensure a successful outcome. Unfortunately, this lesson was not absorbed deeply enough to prevent U.S. policymakers from believing they could wage wars without suffering the enormous American casualty counts that characterized previous conflicts (Curtis, 2015). This view became more nuanced in the months that followed as analysts questioned the rationale behind waging a war with limited objectives that precluded removing the very source of the problem that started it (Tilford, 1993).

While the decision to cease hostilities just 100 hours after Operation Desert Storm began was applauded by many Americans back home — since it meant fewer casualties — Saddam Hussein remained in power, requiring even greater U.S. involvement in the region thereafter. In other words, when it comes to war, half-measures can be worse than total war in achieving a nation's objectives, irrespective of the initial human toll. As noted above, the United States has been reluctant to wage total war using tactical nuclear weapons for fear of igniting a global conflagration or suffering lasting backlash from the international community. The net effect of this military doctrine has been to create conditions in which new and increasingly dangerous actors arise, presenting the United States with novel threats that demand some form of response. As Curtis puts it, "Beginning with World War I, the U.S. has been content to watch or abet the destruction or mauling of major powers across the globe, only to wonder why those who remained suddenly seemed so much more dangerous" (2015, p. 25).

Based on the foregoing analysis, recommendations for future consideration and study include determining when — and whether — it is ever ethically appropriate to engage in military interventions in response to international events such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Although it is impossible to predict with precision what types of events might unfold in the future, it is reasonable to posit that U.S. policymakers will be confronted with similar circumstances, inevitably accompanied by further efforts to manage mainstream media coverage in order to ensure public support. Developing contingency plans grounded in historical realities and recognizing the need for media transparency therefore represents a timely and valuable enterprise.

References

Curtis, J. (2015, November). Reflecting on strategic results of Operation Desert Storm. Army, 65(11), 24–27.

Khan, H. (2011, July 1). An unbiased estimate of present American competitiveness from deontological and teleological perspectives of utilitarianism. Competition Forum, 9(2), 348–352.

Klotzer, C. L. (2002, October). A lesson for Americans: Desert Storm operation reports were full of lies and distortions. St. Louis Journalism Review, 32(250), 34–39.

Lindsey, J. M., & Smith, C. (2003, Summer). Rally 'round the flag: Opinion in the United States before and after the Iraq War. Brookings Review, 21(3), 20–24.

Operation Desert Storm. (2020). U.S. History. Retrieved from https://www.ushistory.org/us/60a.asp

Stilwell, B. (2015, September 12). 21 facts about the first Gulf War. Military.com. Retrieved from https://www.military.com/undertheradar/2015/09/21-facts-about-the-first-gulf-war

Taylor, A. (2016, January 14). Operation Desert Storm: 25 years since the first Gulf War. The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/01/operation-desert-storm-25-years-since-the-first-gulf-war/424191/

Tilford, K. H., Jr. (1993, Summer). Review: The meaning of victory in Operation Desert Storm: A review essay. Political Science Quarterly, 108(2), 327–331.

Appendix A

U.S. Military Casualties — Persian Gulf War Casualty Summary: Desert Storm (as of April 10, 2020)

Killed in Action: 143 total (Army 96, Air Force 20, Marines 22, Navy 5)
Died of Wounds: 4 total (Army 2, Air Force 0, Marines 2, Navy 0)
Missing in Action — Declared Dead: 0
Captured — Declared Dead: 0
Total Hostile Deaths: 147 (Army 98, Air Force 20, Marines 24, Navy 5)

Missing — Presumed Dead: 3 (Army 2, Air Force 0, Marines 0, Navy 1)
Other Deaths (Non-Hostile): 148 (Army 105, Air Force 4, Marines 26, Navy 13)
Total Non-Hostile Deaths: 151 (Army 105, Air Force 6, Marines 26, Navy 14)

Total In-Theater Deaths: 298 (Army 203, Air Force 26, Marines 50, Navy 19)

Source: Defense Casualty Analysis System (2020), https://dcas.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_gulf_storm.xhtml