Workplace Violence: The Henry Pratt Co. Warehouse Shooting

Introduction

In 2019, Gary Martin opened fire at the Henry Pratt Co. Warehouse after being informed of his termination for failing to follow safety protocol. Martin had anticipated that he was about to be fired, which is why he brought a gun into the workplace that day. He had told coworkers that if he lost his job he would kill everyone at the facility. When he was brought into the manager's office and told he was dismissed, he shot everyone in the room and then went looking for other coworkers with whom he wanted to settle a grievance (ABC 7, 2019). In total, Martin killed five people and injured several more, including police officers. He died on the scene hours later after exchanging gunfire with responding officers.

Basic Issues in the Case

The basic issues in the Henry Pratt Co. Warehouse shooting were that employee Gary Martin had a history of violence, had been incarcerated, and should not have been legally permitted to possess a firearm under federal law. He harbored a grievance with management over workplace safety requirements and was likely to be terminated for not wearing safety goggles. He also had an ongoing grievance with at least one coworker. The warehouse had no administrative or engineering controls in place to address the risk of workplace violence, such as a shooting.

These issues are interconnected. Martin was a worker with a documented history of violence — a clear red flag that should have been caught during the hiring process. Coworkers were evidently troubled by his behavior, as they had reported him for not following safety protocols. Martin, in turn, was frustrated with those coworkers. Lacking self-restraint, he turned to violence to settle perceived scores once it became clear that management was moving to end his employment.

Possible Administrative Controls for Prevention

According to Chapter 13 (n.d.), "Administrative controls consist of management practices that can reduce the risk of workplace violence. These practices include establishing policies, conducting background checks, and providing training for employees" (p. 292). Several administrative controls could have been implemented at Henry Pratt to reduce the risk of this tragedy.

First and most critically, a thorough background check before hiring Martin would have revealed his history of violence and prior incarceration, signaling that he posed a potential risk in the workplace. Second, a no-guns-on-premises policy — extending to employee vehicles in the parking lot — could have provided a basis to act on prior knowledge that Martin kept a gun in his car at work. Had such a policy existed, that information alone would have been grounds to bar his entry or to involve law enforcement well before the shooting occurred.

Whether general workplace safety training would have helped is less clear. Some safety training was likely already in place, but Martin appeared resistant to correction and unwilling to follow rules regardless. The question of whether active shooter preparedness training might have spared lives is similarly uncertain. As Wallace (2020) notes, such training can increase a sense of self-efficacy among workers; however, Martin opened fire on his supervisors without warning, so no training could have saved those who were his first victims. Those who were able to flee did so, while Martin sought out the specific coworker with whom he had a long-standing grievance.

That said, it does not appear that any active shooter preparedness program existed at the facility. Had such a strategy been in place, more employees might have escaped, and Martin might have had access to fewer victims. Management should therefore establish a formal training program outlining what employees should do if an active shooter situation arises.

A further and significant failure involved law enforcement. Martin should have been prohibited from purchasing a firearm, yet he had managed to obtain an Illinois Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) Card, which allowed him to make a legal purchase. Authorities later discovered he should never have been in the FOID system, but police did not pursue the matter (CBS, 2022). This underscores the importance of conducting background checks in coordination with law enforcement to ensure that dangerous individuals are not slipping through systemic cracks.

Conclusion

With greater attention given to administrative and engineering controls, the disaster at Henry Pratt Co. Warehouse could possibly have been prevented. On the administrative side, more thorough background checks, improved workplace training, a formal system for reporting threatening behavior, an active shooter response program, and a no-guns-on-premises policy each represented missed opportunities to mitigate the risk. On the engineering side, weapon detection at building entrances and a more robust surveillance system could have created meaningful barriers between employees and harm. Together, these measures form the foundation of an effective workplace violence prevention strategy — one that the Henry Pratt shooting demonstrated was urgently needed.

References

ABC 7. (2019). Aurora shooting: 5 dead, multiple wounded including officers at Henry Pratt Company; gunman also dead. Retrieved from https://abc7chicago.com/aurora-illinois-shooting-il/5140701/

CBS. (2022). 3 years after Henry Pratt Company shooting, officials are pleased with progress in closing FOID card system loopholes. Retrieved from https://chicago.cbslocal.com/video/6200573-3-years-after-henry-pratt-company-shooting-officials-are-pleased-with-progress-in-closing-foid-card-system-loopholes/

Chapter 13. (n.d.). Violence in the workplace. PDF.

Grinberg, E. (2019). The Illinois plant shooter threatened to kill everyone if he got fired, but his co-worker didn't believe him. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/29/us/aurora-illinois-shooting-threats/index.html

Wallace, L. N. (2020). Pennsylvania workplace safety: Employee perceptions of active shooter preparedness. Violence and Victims, 35(6), 920–939.