Iran's Assassination Plot and U.S. Homeland Security Response
This paper examines the 2011 Iranian-backed plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States, in which two suspects — Gholam Shakuri and Manssor Arbabsiar — were arrested in New York. The paper analyzes what went right during the investigation, particularly the effective use of the USA PATRIOT Act to monitor financial transactions and record conversations without a warrant. It also identifies what went wrong, notably the failure to intercept Iranian operatives before they entered the country. Areas for improvement in border screening are discussed, along with the federal policies — including the USA PATRIOT Act and the Military Commissions Act of 2006 — that enabled law enforcement to dismantle the cell before the attack occurred.
- Introduction: Context on Iran-West tensions and the 2011 plot
- The Attempted Attack: Arrests, charges, and background of the plot
- What Went Right: PATRIOT Act tools and undercover DEA operation
- What Went Wrong: Iranian operatives entered U.S. undetected
- Areas of Improvement: Border screening gaps and Israeli-style airline checks
- Federal Policies Used to Mitigate the Event: PATRIOT Act and Military Commissions Act applied
- Conclusion: Post-9/11 legal tools were decisive in prevention
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What makes this paper effective
- Uses a concrete, real-world case study — the 2011 Iranian assassination plot — to ground abstract policy analysis in specific events and named actors.
- Organizes the analysis around a clear evaluative framework (what went right, what went wrong, areas of improvement, federal policies), making the argument easy to follow.
- Connects specific legal tools (USA PATRIOT Act, Military Commissions Act of 2006) directly to operational outcomes, demonstrating how policy translates into practice.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates applied policy analysis: it takes a specific homeland security incident and systematically evaluates the institutional and legal response against an explicit rubric. Rather than simply narrating events, it assesses effectiveness and identifies gaps, which is characteristic of security studies and public policy writing at the undergraduate level.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens with context on the broader Iran–West relationship before narrating the 2011 plot. It then moves through four analytical sections — successes, failures, improvements, and governing policies — before a conclusion that ties the legal framework back to the outcome. Each section is self-contained and builds on the preceding one, reinforcing the central argument that post-9/11 legal tools were decisive in preventing the attack.
Introduction
Over the last ten years, Homeland Security has been focused on dealing with a wide variety of terrorist attacks. In most cases, these incidents usually involve some kind of intelligence indicating that a terrorist-related incident was about to occur. One recent example of this happened in October 2011, with a failed assassination attempt on the Saudi Arabian Ambassador. When the news was first announced, this seemed somewhat surreal based on the fact that Iran was behind the plot, with two suspects charged for their involvement. However, the relationship that Iran has with the West during the last few years has been strained, and this is an indication of how the Islamic Republic was lashing out against these nations using one of their primary tools: terrorism (Miller, 2012, pp. 20–30).
To fully understand this event, this paper examines how the attempted terrorist attack unfolded by analyzing what went right, what went wrong, areas of improvement, and the federal policies involved. Together, these elements provide the greatest insights into how this event helped to redefine the way the federal government looked at terrorist-related activities.
The Attempted Attack
On October 11, 2011, U.S. law enforcement officials arrested an Iranian national, Gholam Shakuri, and an Iranian-American holding dual citizenship, Manssor Arbabsiar, in New York. They were charged with the attempted assassination of the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Washington. At the time, the Iranians denied any involvement in the plot. However, prior to and following an intense investigation, their role became obvious. The arrests came after a series of disputes between Iran and the United States regarding Iran's nuclear-related activities (Miller, 2012, pp. 20–30).
Evidence of this context can be seen in observations from Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute. He believes that this action was Iran's way of defying the West by lashing out against it. Had the assassination succeeded, it would have made Iran appear capable of attacking its enemies anywhere in the world. This is significant because the event was designed to create fear and intimidate any nation allied with the United States (Miller, 2012, pp. 20–30).
What Went Right
What went right during the investigation is that law enforcement had increased powers to pursue terrorist-related activities. This was achieved through the tools provided under the USA PATRIOT Act, most notably the monitoring of financial transactions and the reduction of legal barriers. In this particular case, Iran had met with an undercover DEA operative in Mexico in May 2011. The agent was posing as a member of one of Mexico's drug gangs, meeting with the Iranians about conducting an assassination — and possibly future terrorism — on behalf of the Qods Force, an arm of the Iranian military focused on conducting terrorism and assassinations abroad ("Two Men Charged in Alleged Plot," 2011).
At this meeting and others prior to October 2011, it was agreed that a $1.5 million fee would be paid to the undercover agent. This was initiated by wiring a $100,000 down payment to a bank account in the United States. The plan was to kill the Saudi Arabian Ambassador through some kind of explosion in a public place, such as a restaurant. This would assassinate the intended target while also killing American civilians in the process. When pressed about possible civilian casualties during one conversation, Arbabsiar said, "They want that guy [the Ambassador] done [killed], if the hundred go with him, *!# them." There were also concerns about possible unintended casualties involving Senators or Congressional Officials who were known to dine frequently with the Ambassador. Arbabsiar dismissed these concerns as well. After this meeting, law enforcement arrested both men associated with the plot ("Two Men Charged in Alleged Plot," 2011).
In this case, the federal government quickly determined that a potential terrorist attack was about to take place inside the United States. This allowed law enforcement to investigate both an American citizen and an Iranian national without a warrant. The USA PATRIOT Act gave them the power to secretly record conversations and aggressively conduct counterterrorism operations. This led U.S. officials to monitor the activities of the plotters by carefully listening to conversations with undercover operatives. At the same time, they were able to track when payments were made for conducting the assassination. Over the course of several months, this allowed law enforcement to prevent an imminent terrorist attack and arrest those charged before the plot could unfold (Dobbins, 2011, pp. 47–50; Schelepper, 2006, pp. 14–34).
Conclusion
Clearly, the attempted assassination of the Saudi Arabian Ambassador is considered an act of terrorism. Iran was using organizations it supported — terrorist groups — to conduct the operation. The reason this was occurring was to place pressure on the West by demonstrating the capability to conduct such operations in cities such as Washington, D.C. This would have given Iran a sense of geopolitical leverage by successfully carrying out these kinds of attacks.
However, the various tools provided to law enforcement since the September 11th terrorist attacks made the investigation more effective. The USA PATRIOT Act made it easier to listen to and monitor the activities of terrorists, while the Military Commissions Act of 2006 allowed law enforcement to arrest and detain suspects without having to establish probable cause. This prevented the plotters from escaping and allowed law enforcement to question them. Once this occurred, officials were able to completely dismantle the cell's operations and identify others involved in the plot. This prevents terrorists from striking again in the future, thanks in large part to the legal tools with which law enforcement officials were equipped.
References
Burke, R. (2008). International Terrorism. Northampton, MA: Elgar Publishing.
Dobbins, J. (2011). Coping with a nuclear Iran. Survival, 53(6), 47–50.
Hasisi, B. (2011). The impacts of policing terrorism on society. To Protect and Serve, 3(7), 177–202.
Miller, S. (2012). Nuclear weapons 2011. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 68(20), 20–30.
Rahimi, B. (2012). Iran's declining influence. Washington Quarterly, 35(1), 25–40.
Schelepper, B. (2006). USA Patriot Act. New York, NY: Rosen Publishing.
Two men charged in alleged plot to assassinate Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States. (2011). FBI. Retrieved from http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2011/two-men-charged-in-alleged-plot-to-assassinate-saudi-arabian-ambassador-to-the-united-states
Two men charged in alleged plot. (2011). U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/October/11-ag-1339.html
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