Limited vs. Total War: Factors That Shape Modern Conflict

Introduction

A brief look at military history reveals that some wars fought in the 20th century can be regarded as "total" in every aspect, the most notable being the Second World War. However, the majority of wars fought in the last century were limited, with those limitations manifesting in transparent ways. The superpowers have fought more than 300 wars since the end of World War II; yet all of these were limited, primarily aimed at avoiding direct clashes due to the dangers associated with escalation to nuclear conflict and the resultant mutual assured destruction (MAD).

Proxy wars fought by superpowers in developing countries have become a common phenomenon, even as other countries have sought alternative ways of breaking out of these limitations. Among these alternatives, the use of cross-border terrorism is the most frequently employed method. Terrorism has grown in both scope and impact; as Clausewitz observed, it is war fought by other means. The effects of terrorism have expanded so dramatically that senior military officers in the Pakistani Army have pointed to a doctrinal basis in the Quran for the use of terror as a means of fighting a "total" war (Singh, n.d.).

This paper argues that states will escalate a limited war to total warfare only in cases where they lack certain constraints. The discussion that follows covers the definitions of limited and total war, the Korean War as a case study of superpower proxy conflict, nuclear weapons as a military imperative, and the four main factors that limit war in the modern world.

Limited War and the Korean War

War is defined here in the context of a nation's regular military fighting against the regular military of an enemy state. The line that differentiates limited war from a total one — particularly in developing countries — is the goal and the extent to which conventional military units are utilized against those of another country (Singh, n.d.). The notion of limited war can be understood by examining the scope that opposing countries have set for the conflict. On this basis, the Korean War can be defined as a limited war, since the opposing nations were constrained by economic and political conditions, as well as by the limitations imposed by their respective backers.

The limited nature of the Korean War becomes clearer when examined across three dimensions: military commitment, economic and political objectives, and overall resolve. While the Soviet Union supported the North and might nominally have been committed to waging total war against the U.S.-backed South, it could not claim an equivalent degree of commitment from its supporters. The Soviet leadership supported the North's invasion of the South only under several conditions, one of which was the guarantee of Chinese support (Conway, 2013).

The U.S. commitment was similarly constrained. America had significantly reduced its available combat forces following the Second World War. Although the U.S. appeared to have a stronger military commitment based on the number of troops deployed on the ground, President Truman demonstrated clearly that he was unwilling to escalate the conflict by expanding it into China — most notably when he dismissed General Douglas MacArthur from his command. This decision alone provides strong evidence that America's strategy was not to wage war against communist Asia as a whole, but rather to focus on "containing" the conflict to the Korean peninsula (Conway, 2013).

Total War: Definition and Historical Context

In the long history of warfare, the period from approximately 1860 to 1945 is generally referred to as the era of total war. The concept of "total war" is a subject of debate among economists, social scientists, and historians. The 1861–1865 American Civil War and the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War are widely regarded as the two initial conflicts that historians and social scientists classified as total wars. It is somewhat surprising that other conflicts — such as the 1919–1922 Greek-Turkish War, the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars, the 1904 Russo-Japanese War, and the 1877 Russo-Ottoman War — have not attracted comparable academic attention in this context. Nevertheless, there is general consensus that World War I (1914–1918) and World War II (1939–1945) represent the fullest embodiments of total warfare (Salavrakos, 2014).

With regard to the Korean War, neither the North nor the South was willing to endure the demands of total warfare. From the Soviet perspective, the Korean War was intended to serve as a diversion that would curtail American influence in the Pacific region. However, the Soviet Union could not afford a prolonged engagement at the expense of controlling its European satellite states or rebuilding its own nation. The United States, meanwhile, faced a political dilemma at home. Few Americans believed that the spread of communism in Korea posed an immediate threat, others drew uncomfortable parallels to the war with Japan, and the majority of the public was exhausted by war. The country was simultaneously experiencing domestic unrest with the emergence of the civil rights movement. Most people felt that preserving South Korea's independence was a worthwhile mission, but total war was not a viable option. For both the Americans and the Soviets, the Korean War was most useful as a proxy conflict that would work to limit the ambitions of the other side (Conway, 2013).

China, too, barely had the capacity to fight a total war against the Americans in the region. While China had the geographic advantage of proximity to the Korean peninsula, it lacked the military and economic capability to drive American forces out of Japan. The commitment of significant numbers of ground troops amounted largely to political rhetoric and conferred no meaningful economic or strategic advantage on the country.

Conclusion

It can be argued that any war fought in the 21st century would remain limited unless one of the states consciously expanded it into total warfare. The most crucial task for policymakers is to assess the factors that limit war so that their true nature and impact can be factored into defense policy. As this paper has shown, political goals, international reaction, economic capacity, and human resources each play a decisive role in constraining modern conflict. The Korean War remains an instructive case: neither superpower had the political will, economic capacity, or domestic support to pursue total war, and the result was a limited proxy conflict that shaped Cold War strategy for decades. Understanding these limiting factors remains as relevant to defense planning today as it was in the mid-20th century.

References

Conway, M. (2013). Limited vs. total war. Retrieved September 16, 2015, from

Salavrakos, I.-D. (2014). The defence economics of total war 1870–1918: A literature review. Global Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences, 2(1), 23–45.

Singh, J. (n.d.). Dynamics of limited war. Retrieved September 16, 2015, from