This paper examines two interrelated dimensions of modern counterterrorism. The first section outlines the defining features of "new terrorism" — its religious rather than political motivations, fluid transnational networks, and technology-enabled coordination — and identifies the law enforcement resources most essential to addressing these threats, including intelligence sharing and cultural competency. The second section analyzes the "failure of imagination" documented in the 9/11 Commission Report, exploring how Cold War thinking and institutional silos between the FBI, CIA, and local agencies prevented threat recognition. The paper concludes with concrete recommendations for expanding institutional imagination through cultural hiring and interagency communication reform.
In contrast to the terrorists of the past, the most aggressive forms of modern terrorism have been religious rather than political in nature (Morgan, 2007, p. 32). Historically, as horrific as their actions may have been, earlier terrorist groups at least had defined political objectives they sought to attain through violence and public attention. Modern terrorists, by contrast, tend to view themselves as engaged in an unending and relatively vague "war with the West" and Western values. They draw no distinction in this conflict between civilian and government targets.
Several additional factors make new terrorism more violent than its predecessors. "First, the saturation of the media with images of terrorist atrocity has raised the bar on the level of destruction that will attract headline attention. Second, terrorists have realized that civilian soft targets involve lower risk to themselves" (Morgan, 2007, p. 31). Coupled with the "shift from the politically-minded terrorist to the vengeful and hard-line fanatic," this combination has proven deadly (Morgan, 2007, p. 31).
Given the strong cultural components of modern terrorism, understanding the factions that pose the greatest threats is essential for law enforcement. Terrorists can no longer be easily understood by analyzing schematic global conflicts, such as the IRA versus the British government or Israelis versus Palestinians. Modern terrorist networks defy state borders, and alliances between groups can be extremely fluid. This reality makes the accumulation of sound intelligence essential.
Although some states do clearly sponsor terrorism, "one of the major consequences of globalization has been a deterioration of the power of the state" (Morgan, 2004, p. 37). Law enforcement agencies at every level within the United States must improve their information-sharing, from the CIA down to local police departments. It is equally important that the United States keep open channels of dialogue with other nations when pooling intelligence resources is mutually advantageous.
The tools terrorists can use are also in a constant state of flux. "In addition to the cultural and religious motivations of terrorists and the political and organizational enabling factors, technology has evolved in ways that provide unprecedented opportunities for terrorists," including the ability to connect and coordinate online (Morgan, 2004, p. 39). Counterterrorism efforts must be sophisticated in assessing the potential for the Internet to cause harm, and law enforcement agencies must become fluent in how it enables terrorists to advance their aims.
The failure of the intelligence community to predict the September 11 attacks has often been characterized as a "failure of imagination" — not simply a failure to respond adequately with military force. "Neither Bush nor his predecessor Bill Clinton understood the gravity of the threats posed by terrorists because the leaders could not imagine such attacks" (King & Quijano, 2004). A common criticism is that today's leaders are always fighting the last war, and until 9/11 the prevailing "war mentality" was a Cold War framework that presumed state actors were the dominant threat with relatively rational, coherent agendas.
To fight terrorism effectively today, leaders must enter the minds of terrorists and understand their psychological and cultural motivations — motivations that are not always rational. The 9/11 Commission Report made clear that this imaginative failure was systemic, rooted in assumptions about the nature of threats that no longer reflected reality.
"FBI-CIA silos and missed operational opportunities"
"Cultural hiring and undercover capacity as solutions"
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