New Terrorism, Police Resources, and Failure of Imagination
This paper examines two interrelated dimensions of modern counterterrorism. The first section outlines the defining features of "new terrorism" — its religious rather than political motivations, fluid transnational networks, and technology-enabled coordination — and identifies the law enforcement resources most essential to addressing these threats, including intelligence sharing and cultural competency. The second section analyzes the "failure of imagination" documented in the 9/11 Commission Report, exploring how Cold War thinking and institutional silos between the FBI, CIA, and local agencies prevented threat recognition. The paper concludes with concrete recommendations for expanding institutional imagination through cultural hiring and interagency communication reform.
- The Defining Features of New Terrorism: Religious motives, soft targets, and vague ideological goals
- Law Enforcement Resources and Critical Gaps: Intelligence sharing, globalization, and technology gaps
- The Failure of Imagination and Its Consequences: Cold War thinking blocked recognition of 9/11 threat
- Organizational Structure as a Barrier to Imagination: FBI-CIA silos and missed operational opportunities
- Building Institutional Imagination in Law Enforcement: Cultural hiring and undercover capacity as solutions
✍️ How to write this paper — guide, tools & examples ▾
What makes this paper effective
- Directly anchors each argument in cited source material, maintaining a clear evidentiary chain from claim to reference throughout both sections.
- Moves logically from diagnosis (what is new terrorism, what failed) to prescription (what agencies should do), giving the essay a coherent problem-solution structure.
- Integrates concrete historical examples — such as the CIA's failure to watchlist Khalid Almihdhar — to ground abstract policy arguments in specific, verifiable incidents.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper effectively uses comparative framing: it contrasts historical terrorism (the IRA, Israeli-Palestinian conflict) with contemporary transnational religious terrorism to sharpen the reader's understanding of what is genuinely "new." This comparative approach allows the writer to define the threat with precision before moving into policy analysis, a technique common in security studies and law enforcement scholarship.
Structure breakdown
The paper is organized in two paired response blocks, each prompted by a set of guiding questions. The first block covers the characteristics of new terrorism and resource needs; the second addresses the failure of imagination and organizational reform. Each block follows a consistent pattern: define the problem with cited evidence, identify institutional obstacles, then propose specific solutions. This structure suits the course-response format and makes the argument easy to follow.
The Defining Features of New Terrorism
In contrast to the terrorists of the past, the most aggressive forms of modern terrorism have been religious rather than political in nature (Morgan, 2007, p. 32). Historically, as horrific as their actions may have been, earlier terrorist groups at least had defined political objectives they sought to attain through violence and public attention. Modern terrorists, by contrast, tend to view themselves as engaged in an unending and relatively vague "war with the West" and Western values. They draw no distinction in this conflict between civilian and government targets.
Several additional factors make new terrorism more violent than its predecessors. "First, the saturation of the media with images of terrorist atrocity has raised the bar on the level of destruction that will attract headline attention. Second, terrorists have realized that civilian soft targets involve lower risk to themselves" (Morgan, 2007, p. 31). Coupled with the "shift from the politically-minded terrorist to the vengeful and hard-line fanatic," this combination has proven deadly (Morgan, 2007, p. 31).
Law Enforcement Resources and Critical Gaps
Given the strong cultural components of modern terrorism, understanding the factions that pose the greatest threats is essential for law enforcement. Terrorists can no longer be easily understood by analyzing schematic global conflicts, such as the IRA versus the British government or Israelis versus Palestinians. Modern terrorist networks defy state borders, and alliances between groups can be extremely fluid. This reality makes the accumulation of sound intelligence essential.
Although some states do clearly sponsor terrorism, "one of the major consequences of globalization has been a deterioration of the power of the state" (Morgan, 2004, p. 37). Law enforcement agencies at every level within the United States must improve their information-sharing, from the CIA down to local police departments. It is equally important that the United States keep open channels of dialogue with other nations when pooling intelligence resources is mutually advantageous.
The tools terrorists can use are also in a constant state of flux. "In addition to the cultural and religious motivations of terrorists and the political and organizational enabling factors, technology has evolved in ways that provide unprecedented opportunities for terrorists," including the ability to connect and coordinate online (Morgan, 2004, p. 39). Counterterrorism efforts must be sophisticated in assessing the potential for the Internet to cause harm, and law enforcement agencies must become fluent in how it enables terrorists to advance their aims.
The Failure of Imagination and Its Consequences
The failure of the intelligence community to predict the September 11 attacks has often been characterized as a "failure of imagination" — not simply a failure to respond adequately with military force. "Neither Bush nor his predecessor Bill Clinton understood the gravity of the threats posed by terrorists because the leaders could not imagine such attacks" (King & Quijano, 2004). A common criticism is that today's leaders are always fighting the last war, and until 9/11 the prevailing "war mentality" was a Cold War framework that presumed state actors were the dominant threat with relatively rational, coherent agendas.
To fight terrorism effectively today, leaders must enter the minds of terrorists and understand their psychological and cultural motivations — motivations that are not always rational. The 9/11 Commission Report made clear that this imaginative failure was systemic, rooted in assumptions about the nature of threats that no longer reflected reality.
References
King, J., & Quijano, E. (2004). 9/11 panel report: 'We must act.' CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/07/22/911.report/
Morgan, M. (2004). The origins of the new terrorism. SSRI. Retrieved from
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. (n.d.). The 9/11 Commission Report. Retrieved from http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report
Always verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.