News Framing: NYT vs. People's Daily on the 2001 Spy Plane Incident

Introduction and Background

On April 1, 2001, in the South China Sea, an unprecedented collision between a Chinese fighter jet and a U.S. spy plane triggered a month-long political and diplomatic standoff between two nations. Both parties paid a price for their mutual misperceptions and misjudgments during an intense process of blame and linguistic diplomacy. One month later, the once-heated debates and patriotic zeal on both sides faded away, leaving only a heroic story with two different versions — but more importantly, a news frame in people's memory. When a country's mainstream media presents such events in a biased manner, the people of that nation are denied the objective news reporting that is required for an informed citizenry in a modern society.

To determine to what extent, if any, the events of April 1, 2001 were reported in a non-objective fashion by the mainstream press in China and the United States, this study examines the coverage provided by the People's Daily and the New York Times according to their respective content. An analysis of the statistical data will be followed by a discussion of the findings, and a summary of the research will be provided in the conclusion.

According to a report from the International Journal on World Peace (2001), "On April 1, during what the U.S. described as a routine surveillance flight through international airspace, a Chinese fighter jet and the American EP-3E Aries II surveillance plane collided with one another, causing serious damage to the American plane and fatal damage to the Chinese fighter jet" (China-U.S. Relations, 2001, p. 99). Not surprisingly, the Chinese and American versions of the events were similar yet differed on key points. In fact, after the incident, the only thing the two sides could agree on initially was that after the collision, the fighter jet and its pilot disappeared into the South China Sea and the American plane and its crew of 24 made a successful emergency landing on the Chinese island of Hainan (China-U.S. Relations, 2001).

From the very beginning of the incident, the mass media on both sides — taking advantage of the lack of direct communication between the two governments — played a major role as vital catalysts, active participants, and sometimes designers of public diplomacy. Whether serving as government watchdog or as the ruling party's mouthpiece, the mass media demonstrated their influential power in international conflict and foreign politics. From this viewpoint, the selection of news events is not merely a reflexive action, but rather a socially determined construction of reality. This perspective suggests that journalistic choices are intentional and not merely the effects of certain causes resulting from inherent news values.

Viewed separately, the mass media on both sides seemed to be describing two different occurrences. Perhaps the Chinese pilot misjudged the distance, perhaps the American pilot rocked his wings, or perhaps air turbulence caused the collision. However, what really happened that morning paled in comparison to crucial questions such as: in what frame did journalists view it, in what frame did editors understand it, and finally, in what frame did the audience interpret it? All in all, the media frame matters.

Hypothesis 1: For the Bush administration, this diplomatic standoff with its newly defined "strategic competitor" provided a crucial test of Bush's widely-doubted ability and experience in handling foreign affairs. The result of his debut on the international stage could shape domestic public opinion and world views in the aftermath of the election controversy.

For China's part, even before the tragic incident, the Chinese people and their leaders had already felt the hostile rhetoric from the newly elected Bush administration and had painfully refreshed their memories of the embassy bombing in Yugoslavia two years earlier. Moreover, such a direct military conflict between two nuclear powers had not occurred since the end of the Cold War.

From a political-importance perspective, the mainstream media on both sides should have focused on one location during that time span — Hainan Island. The New York Times and the People's Daily would likely have arrived at a similar judgment regarding the political importance of every step of this event. As a result, the visual framing strategy utilized by the two newspapers would reflect this tendency.

Hypothesis 2: Contextual framing works through deliberately choosing opinion-loaded words or authoritative sources to define responsibility and moral basis. For example: How should an event be named (accident or incident)? How should the involved action be characterized (spy mission or routine reconnaissance)? How should the actors be treated (spy, detainee, hero, or top gun)? And where should the facts be sought (from one's own government or from the other side)? The answers to all these questions build up not only piles of news discourse, but also judgmental frames for readers. One contextual tool widely manipulated in international events by both sides is language translation and mistranslation. Due to the language barrier between the Chinese and American publics, audiences on each side can only hear the other party's voice through media translations, which are by no means immune to contextual framing.

Given the sensitive timing, location, and nature of this collision, both parties would have adopted all kinds of contextual framing techniques to occupy the moral high ground and accuse the other side of wrongdoing. Since foreign policy reporting in China is strictly controlled by the Communist Party, the news event portrayed by the Chinese media would be more homogenous and one-sided.

H2a: By adopting similar contextual framing techniques, both mainstream newspapers tend to depict their own side as morally superior while portraying the other party as the wrongdoer. As to the degree of such inclination, the Chinese media will outscore their American counterparts. Furthermore, because of the strict control of information gathering and dissemination in China, it is assumed that the Chinese newspaper would publicize only the official government version of the event. As to the relevant foreign policy assessment and outcome evaluation, there would be only one interpretation in the Chinese newspaper. In contrast, the American newspaper would be more likely to quote sources from both sides, though not objectively either.

H2b: Although both sides rely on their own government sources as their prime news sources, the Chinese newspaper is less likely to quote sources from the other side than is the American newspaper.

Hypothesis 3: The blocking of the free flow of information, though weakened by Internet expansion in recent years, has still been carefully and successfully executed in international news coverage — either under direct government pressure or through the influence of certain interest groups. Such intentional omission creates either a time lag or an information lag in people's reasoning. As a result, the audience's logical judgment may be distorted in a preferred direction.

Theoretical Framework: Three Dimensions of Framing

To frame this sensitive international standoff into a certain stereotype and to support this frame with persuasive evidence, the mass media on both sides would emphasize some favorable elements and downplay or neglect unfavorable evidence or developments. Similarly, the order in which events were published by the mass media would differ from the actual chronological order of the events.

H3a: Both sides will deliberately ignore or withhold some unfavorable evidence and alter the actual time order of key elements during their news coverage. Since the Chinese media face more direct pressure from the government and the ruling party to serve established foreign policy, it would be common for them to curtail or distort the existing truth. As for the American side, fierce competition in the information market reduces the possibility of completely withholding certain facts. However, downplaying one side's argument while highlighting the other's was the most frequently utilized tactic.

H3b: With regard to the extent and degree of such maneuvering, Chinese newspapers more frequently withheld unfavorable messages than did their U.S. counterparts.

To facilitate research on print media (especially newspapers), the framing functions were categorized into three dimensions: visual framing, contextual framing, and operational framing.

Visual Framing: According to David D. Perlmutter (1998), the mainstream media provides — or at least serves as a conduit for — the pictures that are associated with a story. "Ascribing metonymy to a news photograph — for example, 'This was the scene that summed up Africa's problems' — is the most potentially powerful visual framing device" (p. 7). Likewise, Gaye Tuchman characterizes the visual frame as reducing the range of possible meanings of any event into industrially acceptable categories: "The [visual] frame organizes everyday reality and the news frame is part and parcel of everyday reality." Visual framing therefore provides a powerful framework in which the media can impose meaning "as well as psychological stimuli for audiences to process" (Perlmutter, 1998, p. 7). The maxim that a picture is worth a thousand words holds true here. The selection of which visual images will or will not appear, and which stories they will accompany, can affect the reader's perception of the event and the principals involved in profound ways.

Contextual Framing: In their book Collective Memory of Political Events: Social Psychological Perspectives (1997), Dario Paez, James W. Pennebaker, and Bernard Rimé note that the majority of major historical events involve a highly complex web of causes, consequences, and corollaries. "Perhaps inevitably," they write, "collective memory will reduce these to fairly simple explanations" (p. 290). Through careful selection of which causal nexus to emphasize, people can perceive an event in a particular context that makes the memory serve the group's self-image. According to Paez et al., "Whatever the motives and intentions of the people who start the distortions, one must also recognize the important role played by the people who listen, accept, and pass along these biased views" (p. 292). Because everyone uses a unique set of views, perceptions, beliefs, values, and preconceptions about the world, people naturally tend to reject what conflicts with their existing paradigms and look for information that reinforces their belief systems. Paez et al. point out that "people want to think well of their social group, and so even if they are equally exposed to truthful and flattering versions of the past, they may find it easier to understand, remember, and repeat the flattering ones" (p. 292). Therefore, the contextual framing of an event will communicate the most flattering aspects for whichever side is making the claim, while the opposition will likely adopt a comparable but diametrically opposite contextual framing.

Operational Framing: According to Mark Allen Peterson, the mandate for journalists today is to "get" the story from sources with diverse, sometimes inimical interests. "Most news stories are negotiated in defined social contexts among many different actors, including sources, journalists, editors and press agents" (Peterson, 2001, p. 201). This level of media coverage should be the goal of all responsible journalism; operational framing would provide a comprehensive and balanced analysis of the event without resorting to jingoism or appeals to emotion. For the purposes of this analysis, articles that included graphics communicating information only (such as maps and graphs of economic data) were excluded from the visual framing indicator.

Framing, as a mass communication paradigm first raised by American scholars and widely examined in American media practices, carries an apparent "made-in-USA" label (Entman, 1991 & 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Goffman, 1974; Rachlin, 1988; Scheufele, 1999 & 2000; Tuchman, 1972). An important question is whether this theory is applicable to a media system with a different cultural background, historical heritage, and political system. Framing research focuses on the professional techniques that influence people's minds in controversial situations. Nothing is more controversial than a dramatically unfolded and dramatically resolved international conflict between two politically and ideologically different countries. The mid-air collision between Chinese and U.S. aircraft ultimately made this comparative media study possible and timely. In fact, the New York Times prefaced its series of articles on this event: "Collision with China: . . ."

In the study of mass communication, gatekeeping refers to the inevitable process of news selection by the media, wherein various news items are either allowed through the gates (i.e., selected) or rejected (i.e., discarded) through an editorial labyrinth. Even when selected, the messages that finally reach the audience are only the final screened, structured, and interpreted products of the media — a symbolic reality in contrast with social reality (White, 1950). Gatekeeping has been defined as the selection of media topics to be presented to different audiences through different types of media.

The gatekeeping function in practice may include reporters, copywriters, sub-editors, editors, and — to a lesser extent — media owners, as well as the government, various pressure groups, political parties, and single-issue groups (Peterson, 2001). While these gatekeepers may have no direct influence over media content, they are able to exert considerable pressure as to who has access to what information (White, 1950). Most larger organizations with public relations departments will inevitably face bad news that must be covered — such as earnings shortfalls, unfulfilled sales goals, or employee layoffs — but it is always important to report such unfavorable news faithfully and accurately.

Literature Review: Media Roles and National Positions

The initial news coverage of the spy plane collision was straightforward and reported the Chinese reaction. According to Elisabeth Rosenthal and David E. Sanger's article in the New York Times (April 2, 2001), "U.S. Plane in China after It Collides with Chinese Jet":

"A United States Navy spy plane on a routine surveillance mission near the Chinese coast collided on Sunday with a Chinese fighter jet that was closely tailing it. The American plane made an emergency landing in China, and the United States said it was seeking the immediate return of the 24 crew members, all said to be in good condition, and of the sophisticated aircraft and all its intelligence equipment" (A3).

The article also reported a sufficient amount of detail to provide readers with the facts about the incident, as well as a quote from a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman who reported that a search was underway for the missing Chinese pilot and that the Chinese government had issued an "angry statement on Sunday night saying that 'the U.S. side has total responsibility for this event'" (Rosenthal & Sanger, 2001, p. A3). According to the editors of the International Journal on World Peace (2001), the initial American position on the spy plane collision was succinct and remained that way throughout the negotiations: "The United States had every right under international law to be in the airspace it was occupying and the fact that it was engaged in intelligence-gathering activities was sanctioned by international law" (p. 99). Furthermore, the Americans maintained that the highly maneuverable Chinese fighter had most likely ventured too close to the slower-maneuvering American plane, thereby causing the collision and the resulting emergency landing.

The United States also insisted that the American plane retained the privileges of American sovereignty, that it was not to be entered by a foreign power, and that both the plane and its crew should be immediately returned. The Chinese government declined this interpretation and consistently demanded that neither the plane nor the crew would be released until an appropriate investigation was concluded. The detention of the crew lasted 11 days and concluded with the Americans offering a statement of regret ("we are very sorry") for their unauthorized intrusion into Chinese airspace without verbal clearance (China-U.S. Relations, 2001).

Although the collision was considered important in its own right, the incident was made significantly more so because it provided an opportunity for a clarification or redefinition of Sino-American relations. The editors of the International Journal on World Peace emphasize that "there is little doubt that the Chinese government perceives American surveillance of its shores and radar installations as a provocative act and that it seized upon the opportunity this incident provided to express its displeasure" (China-U.S. Relations, 2001, p. 100). Despite the need for such assertions, however, there is much at stake for both countries that transcends the collision of two military aircraft, notwithstanding the associated loss of life. China's accession to the World Trade Organization and its increasingly important trade relations with the United States made any such incident seem to pale in comparison, but the fact remained that China felt compelled to respond — even though things had changed in fundamental ways since the Cold War era, when the Communists were clear in their objectives and unambiguous in their military threats.

There were also other factors involved in the Chinese decision about how to frame its response. Both the U.S. and China are nuclear powers, and any response from the Chinese would have to take this into consideration. Relations between the two countries had also been complicated by the issue of "renegade" Taiwan, and there was the pending question of China's bid to secure the next Olympic Games. "Further complicating the issue was the fact that China faced a new, untested American administration that had publicly declared a shift in Sino-American relations from the Clinton policy of treating China as a 'strategic partner' to the Bush policy of 'strategic competitor'" (China-U.S. Relations, 2001, p. 100). Therefore, the spy plane incident served as a testing ground for both American and Chinese policymakers.

The Long March veterans had largely died off, and by the late 1990s the Chinese leadership had been replaced by a younger cadre of Communists who had embraced certain free-market reforms in an effort to bring China into the international community and reap the benefits of increased trade with the U.S. and others. However, the events of the 20th century showed time and again that politicians in the United States simply did not understand their Chinese counterparts, while the Chinese themselves faced the need to balance increasing demands for human rights against the dangers these demands might represent for their own positions in the Communist bureaucracy. "To the United States it soon became clear that within the Chinese government there existed a hard-line faction (the military) that the government could ill afford to ignore, thus making resolution of the crisis that much more difficult" (China-U.S. Relations, 2001, p. 101).

The Long March veterans also had their counterparts in the United States: "The government of the United States was similarly afflicted; the Pentagon and hard-line elements within the Republican party were clearly at odds with the more conciliatory State Department, notwithstanding the fact that the latter was headed by a decorated army general" (China-U.S. Relations, 2001, p. 101). Further complicating things for American policymakers was the existence of business groups that were of a generally conservative persuasion but had a major interest in improving and expanding trade relations with China. "This bewildering array of variables eventually played a role in developing the American response to the Chinese demands and the Chinese decision to accept it" (China-U.S. Relations, 2001, p. 101). All of these factors tended to influence the manner in which the U.S. responded to Chinese rhetoric about the spy plane incident.

From the outset, the Chinese adopted a unilateral view of the events that caused the spy plane collision and stood by it throughout the discourse. The Chinese position was just as succinct as the American one, maintaining that the American plane was responsible for the collision and that its subsequent emergency landing on Chinese soil without permission represented a violation of international law (China-U.S. Relations, 2001).

On April 2, 2001, the People's Daily reported: "It was normal and in accordance with international practice for Chinese military jets to track the U.S. surveillance plane over China's water areas. The direct cause of the damage and crash of the Chinese jet was that the U.S. plane suddenly veered into the Chinese jet, which was against flight rules. Therefore, the U.S. side should bear all the responsibility arising therefrom" (Chinese Fighter Bumped by US Military Surveillance Plane, p. 1). Although the rhetoric intensified as the days passed, there was never any real indication in the People's Daily that this relatively minor event would jeopardize the carefully orchestrated foreign relations forged between China and the U.S. over the previous 30 years.

In fact, most of the saber-rattling assumed the form of debating just how large an apology the United States should offer, and which words would properly communicate these views to the Chinese leadership. According to Giandomenico Picco (2003), "One year after the April 2001 spy plane incident, relations between Beijing and Washington were so improved that any reference to that incident was downplayed" (p. 15). The Chinese position did not vary from its original stance throughout the media coverage presented in the People's Daily, but the level of hostility seemed to taper off following the intensive media blitz surrounding the pilot's birthday on April 8, 2001. There was also a distinct change in the tone of the coverage after Washington made the all-important concession of agreeing to add "very" to its previously offered "sorry."

On April 11, 2001, the People's Daily reported that Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi "said out of humanitarian considerations, the Chinese Government has decided to allow the U.S. crew members to leave China after completing the necessary procedures" (p. 3). The article, "FM Spokesman on Letter From U.S. Saying 'Very Sorry,'" was quick to point out that this humanitarian gesture was not the conclusion to the incident and that both sides would continue negotiations. Sun added that according to international law and the relevant laws of China, the Chinese side had "every right to conduct a comprehensive investigation of this incident. The Chinese side will reserve the right to make further representations with the U.S. side and handle the incident on the basis of results of the investigation" (p. 4). These points, together with the Chinese requirement that the U.S. cease such reconnaissance flights, were consistently and unwaveringly reiterated throughout the Chinese media coverage, usually word-for-word. Nevertheless, it quickly became clear that "in the spy-plane incident, the government tried to use public opinion for its own purposes but soon found it could not control what it had created" (Worf, 2002, p. 7). Since it was apparently obvious to the Chinese leadership that too much was at stake to risk an escalation of rhetoric with Washington, something else had to be done. The Chinese political leadership and press decided to "ride the horse that got them there" and resorted to making a hero out of the Chinese pilot who was killed in the incident.

A consistent theme throughout the Chinese media coverage was the elevation of the Chinese pilot, Wang Wei, to the stature of a national hero. According to Eckholm (April 27, 2001), "After he plunged to oblivion on April 1, his jet fighter splintered in a collision with an American spy plane, Wang Wei was quickly declared a 'martyr of the revolution' and praised as a heroic defender of the motherland" (p. A2). The Chinese government and press did not leave it there. As April 2001 progressed, there were reports of how the search was proceeding and of the ceaseless efforts of heroic search parties who refused to accept defeat. Mid-month, the Chinese press finally admitted that all chances of Wang Wei surviving had been lost and even published an "aeronautical expert's" opinion to that effect. Interviews with the dead pilot's wife, mother, and acquaintances peppered the People's Daily, characterizing him not only as a good husband and provider but as a "brave serviceman, a versatile talent," a "man of fantastic health," and even a "meticulous housekeeper" (Eckholm, p. A2). According to Eckholm, the spy plane incident was just what the Chinese leadership needed: "Some Chinese even joked privately that the military had probably located Mr. Wang soon after the collision over the South China Sea and spirited him away for a change of identity, to permit the creation of a badly needed national hero" (p. A2). Eckholm points out that this was a traditional approach for the Chinese: "The deification of Mr. Wang might appear overdone, even silly, to some urban professionals . . . But depicting heroes in unshaded white — and villains in stark black — is a Chinese tradition and the party leaders may still find it useful to build up a hero like Mr. Wang" (p. A2).

In New Zealand diplomat Bruce Harland's view, the April 1, 2001 collision between an American reconnaissance plane and a Chinese fighter was not as one-sided as either the United States or China would have the world believe. According to Harland, the collision initially seemed to jeopardize the improved atmosphere that had emerged following the visit to Washington of China's top foreign policy official, Qian Qichen. "The eventual release of the American plane's crew reduced the tension, but it rose again with the opening of the negotiations for the return of the aircraft itself" (p. 27). As an objective reflection of how the world views such events, Harland makes the point that these types of incidents are routinely used by power brokers in the U.S. and China to raise the level of unease among the respective publics and to secure their continued positions of high power. By placing the appropriate "spin" on international events, gatekeepers in both countries managed to squeeze out publicity for their own political agendas while simultaneously painting the best possible picture of their respective positions. Harland writes, "As usual, the hawks on either side seized the opportunity to speak out publicly and demand stronger action by their respective governments" (p. 27).

The Chinese reportedly demanded the cessation of reconnaissance flights close to Chinese territory. The Americans insisted on their right to fly anywhere in international airspace. From the outside, it looked as if they were groping toward some understanding on the procedures to be followed to prevent a recurrence of the incident. Such an understanding had evidently existed between the United States and the Soviet Union in the later stages of the Cold War, though it was probably implicit rather than explicit. "Time magazine pointed out in its 16 April issue that on each side there are people who see the two countries as enemies, and are constantly urging tougher action by their governments" (Harland, 2001, p. 27). The Hainan incident gave them an opportunity to push their respective lines, and they did not fail to seize it. The voices of moderation were not as loud, but they were powerful, and so far they seemed to have carried the day.

"With luck, the Hainan incident will pass, and the slow improvement in relations will resume. On both sides, there are strong economic reasons for getting back to business as usual" (Harland, 2001, p. 27). China was bent on maintaining fast economic growth, for which it needed the American market. In the United States, big business saw great opportunities in China which it had no intention of leaving to competitors in Asia and Europe. President Bush needed the continuing support of big business and was unlikely to flout its wishes. Economic considerations, Harland argued, should act as a constraint on the political pressures for confrontation.

"But economic considerations can be overridden in a crisis by emotional appeals to nationalism. It has happened before — notably in 1914. What worries me is the gradual shift in attitudes on both sides during the last few years. When I wrote Collision Course in the early 1990s, some people thought I was going too far. But now people on both sides, and outside, are talking all the time about the growing danger of confrontation and conflict. Many people now think that China and the United States are drifting slowly but surely towards war. I still do not think it is inevitable, and I certainly hope it can be avoided. But the build-up of mutual hostility does worry me" (Harland, 2001, p. 27).

The aforementioned gatekeeping function was in full play during the spy plane coverage in China. According to Richard Worf (2002), "During the spy-plane incident, the state-controlled media presented the loss of the Chinese pilot as an assault on China's dignity. The government took other steps to stoke Chinese nationalism, such as setting up anti-U.S. Internet chat rooms. U.S. President George Bush's initial statement of regret never reached the Chinese people" (p. 7).

Conclusion

The research showed that on April 1, 2001, an otherwise routine surveillance flight by an American EP-3E Aries II surveillance plane through international airspace turned into an international media event. A collision between a Chinese fighter jet and the American plane resulted in serious damage and an emergency landing for the American crew of 24, and resulted in the death of the Chinese pilot. In response, and predictably enough, the Americans and Chinese quickly lined up behind their respective entrenched positions and fired salvo after salvo of increasingly heated rhetoric at each other through their respective news media.