The Rise of Progressive Iranian Youth and Social Change

Introduction: Iran's Youth Majority

Approximately sixty percent of the Iranian population is under 30 years of age. This simple demographic fact has enormous implications for the theocratic and orthodox leadership of the country. According to many commentators, this demographic also implies a possible future change in the conservative policies of the present regime and the introduction of a new progressive outlook originating with the youth. As one commentator states: "Nearly three quarters of Iran's population is under the age of 30, and this new generation has a new way of doing things." (Youth shapes Iran's economy)

Coupled with this is the fact that there are growing indications of Western influence among young Iranians, which is leading to increased questioning of social norms and rising dissent, producing a more progressive and urbanized youth culture. Factors such as the Internet are introducing concepts, fashions, and lifestyle images that are often diametrically opposed to the conservative ideology of the Iranian government and aspects of traditional culture. "Increased use of the internet is helping many young Iranians to connect to the outside world." (Youth shapes Iran's economy)

As a result, many political and social commentators argue that urban youth in particular are creating a challenge for the government and Islamic traditionalists, as they "call for greater economic and political reform." (Youth shapes Iran's economy)

These views are supported by increased signs of rebellion and dissent among Iranian youth in recent years. In 2006, "Iranian young people staged anti-government protests in Tehran and other cities across the country, using the annual Persian 'fire festival' celebration to burn effigies and pictures of the country's leaders and set cars ablaze belonging to the State Security Forces." (Report: Iranian youth defy ayatollah)

There are also many studies and reports indicating that Iran is undergoing a "new revolution" and that there is a significant and growing reaction against the conservative and theocratic leadership in the country. This incipient — and often tangible — rebellion against various shades of Islamic fundamentalism is clearly expressed in the following account:

It is Friday prayers at Tehran University. A wizened, elderly mullah is preaching to thousands about the need for Muslim unity. Beside him is a Kalashnikov rifle and in front, in Farsi and English, are the slogans of the revolution. Then in unison the faithful begin to chant: "Death to America! Death to America!" But these are the slogans of a bygone age, of an ossified revolution that is almost a quarter of a century old. Now, almost unnoticed by the rest of the world, Iran has lurched into the throes of a new revolution. (Judah T.)

There are many commentaries and studies in agreement with these views. However, care must be taken not to paint an oversimplistic picture of the situation in Iran. There are many conflicting views and numerous variables influencing this complex society that must be taken into consideration before accepting these reports at face value. The following sections therefore explore the "new revolution" among Iranian youth in order to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the reality of the Iranian situation.

The Historical Evolution of Islamic Rule in Iran

The battle between orthodoxy and progressives has a long and convoluted history in Iran. The Iranian revolution that installed Islamic orthodoxy was the result of a number of political factors, including the defeat by Israel in the 1967 war. This defeat had "shaken the ruling classes in the Arab world. More importantly, this defeat greatly discredited the ideology of Arab nationalism promoted by Jamal Abdel Nasser." (Asghar A.)

Nasser had achieved a position of considerable standing in Arab culture due to his opposition to what was seen as Western imperialism. However, the 1967 defeat eradicated the cultural and political prestige Nasser had accumulated and opened the way for more hardline and conservative figures — most notably Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran.

As a consequence, the "ideology of Arab nationalism gave way to Islamic revival." (Asghar A.) Various events subsequently strengthened the conservative and theocratic Islamic revival in Iran and the Middle East more broadly. One of these was the partial Arab victory against Israel in the 1973 war. These events, combined with growing opposition to Western influence in the region and Western support for Israel, resulted in the use of oil as a political weapon. This led to a world oil crisis when "Arab nations decided to use the oil weapon for the first time to challenge the domination of the west." (Asghar A.) Many Arab leaders and governments were discredited during this period, and Anwar Sadat, the then-President of Egypt, was assassinated by those who wished to restore a more conservative and revivalist form of Islam.

These events had a deeply negative effect on the status and position of the Shah of Iran, who was both pro-Western and a supporter of Israel. "The Shah, in his enthusiasm to follow a pro-Western policy, not only ignored the sensibilities of the Iranian people but also antagonized the powerful class of Shi'ah ulama." (Asghar A.) The Shi'ah class in Iran is extremely powerful, and their "beliefs, leadership, and institutions have played an important role in Iranian politics and society. Shiism has been interpreted and utilized to safeguard national identity and independence and to mobilize popular support." (Asghar A.)

Khomeini therefore became the center of popular support and national authenticity in Iran. "Khomeini could mobilize Iranian masses as no leader of the Muslim world could. He appealed not only to Shi'as but also to Sunnis in the Islamic world, as he made Muslims proud of their Islamic identity." (Asghar A.) The regime that followed was theocratically based and religiously conservative.

However, the changing tone and direction of Iranian politics became evident with the election of Mohammad Khatami on May 23, 1997. He was reelected in 2001 and "captured almost 70% of the vote, humiliating the conservative candidate." (Profile: Mohammad Khatami) His presidency is widely seen as the beginning of the reform movement in the country. Notably, his election was driven largely by youth and female voters — two segments of society that had suffered greatly under hardline Islamic orthodoxy. "Mr. Khatami promised Iranians change, and women and the young came to vote for him with an enthusiasm not seen in previous elections. Unlike the dour, unsmiling ayatollahs Iranians had become accustomed to, here was an Islamic leader of a very different kind." (Profile: Mohammad Khatami)

Khatami's popular success did not sit well with conservatives, who pushed back through their control of key institutions. (Asghar A.) Conservatives recaptured two-thirds of parliament in February 2004. This victory was achieved in large part through the intervention of the unelected Guardian Council, which rejected the candidacy of 2,400 reformist candidates. "The 'Tehran spring' — when Iranians and international observers hoped that reformists could bring about peaceful, democratic transformation of the Islamic Republic — has faded." (Saghafi M.)

This is roughly the position in which progressive youth in Iran find themselves today. The reform element in the country is blocked on many fronts, and those who would voice dissent against conservative policies face repression. The leaders of conservative orthodoxy include the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, successor to Ayatollah Khomeini.

The New Revolution and Progressive Iranian Youth

It is somewhat ironic that the initial Iranian revolution — strongly supported by the youth of that era — has produced a second and counter social revolution also driven primarily by youthful ideals and aspirations. As one commentator states, "The hardliners can always launch another temporary crackdown. But in the end, the 1970s Islamic revolution seems certain to be undone by its own children." (Iran's Youth Push Islamic Limits)

An important political dimension of the new social revolt is the position and power of the Shi'ite elite. However, "this empowerment of ulama is under challenge today in Iran. The challenge has come both from moderate ulama and from liberal middle classes. The youth and students are also in the forefront of the battle for reforms." (Asghar A.)

The reason for the present progressive stance among younger Iranians is essentially the same reason that drove revolt against the Shah — the desire for freedom from a repressive regime. The youth is again "fighting repressive measures of conservative clergy in Iran today." (Asghar A.) In a sense, the majority of young people feel suffocated by the authoritarian and conservative approach of the ruling clergy. As a result, there is a "hunger for reforms, for more freedom and accommodation with the west." (Asghar A.)

This movement — encompassing progressive youth as well as other segments of society, particularly women — was clearly visible in the 1999 unrest in Iran, when more than 20,000 university students took to the streets of Tehran to express their dissatisfaction with the orthodox regime, resulting in a slight reduction in conservatism from the government.

The present state of affairs in Iran reveals several issues at the forefront of the demand for progressive reform. These include freedom of thought and expression and a reduction of the strict censorship that characterizes government policy. International relations are also central to the progressive agenda, with a broad consensus among young Iranians that the current hard-line and confrontational stance adopted by the authorities is not conducive to future peace. Women's rights have similarly come to the forefront of public debate in recent years.

Conclusion

At present, this is a social revolution that has only begun to show its nature and full extent. The progressive youth of Iran face formidable institutional obstacles — from the Guardian Council to the Supreme Leader — yet demographic momentum, the spread of information technology, rising education levels, and deepening cultural dissatisfaction continue to sustain the push for reform. Whether this pressure will ultimately transform the Islamic Republic from within remains an open question, but the evidence surveyed here suggests that the forces of change, concentrated in Iran's young majority, are neither fleeting nor easily suppressed.