Random Prevention Patrol: Effectiveness at Deterring Crime
This paper examines the effectiveness of random and routine police patrol as crime deterrence strategies in the United States. Drawing on the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (1974), Sherman et al.'s hot-spots research in Minneapolis, and Kessler's San Diego study on patrol car staffing, the paper argues that neither random nor routine patrol reliably reduces crime or increases apprehensions. Evidence shows that crime clusters in predictable geographic hot spots rather than occurring randomly, undermining the rationale for random patrol. The paper further explores conditions under which random patrol may provide limited benefit and evaluates the relative efficiency of one-officer versus two-officer patrol cars, concluding that targeted, preventative patrol strategies represent the most effective approach to modern policing.
- Introduction: The Case Against Random Patrol: Thesis: random patrol rarely deters crime or apprehends offenders
- Crime Is Not Random: The Hot-Spots Evidence: Research shows crime clusters geographically, not randomly
- Limitations of Routine and Random Patrol Strategies: Routine patrols displace crime; random patrols miss it entirely
- When Random Patrol May Have Limited Value: Targeted hot-spot areas where random patrol may help
- Officer Perceptions Versus Research Findings: Officers overestimate patrol value despite contrary evidence
- One-Officer vs. Two-Officer Patrol Cars: San Diego study: one-officer cars safer and more efficient
- Conclusion: Toward Targeted, Modern Policing: Targeted patrols and openness to change are key
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What makes this paper effective
- Grounds every claim in named empirical studies — the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, Sherman et al.'s Minneapolis hot-spots study, and Kessler's San Diego staffing research — giving the argument a solid evidentiary base.
- Acknowledges counterarguments (officer perceptions, situations where random patrol may help) before rebutting them, demonstrating balanced analytical reasoning.
- Extends the analysis beyond the central thesis to a related practical question — optimal patrol car staffing — showing the writer can connect multiple strands of evidence to a unified conclusion.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper uses synthesis of multiple primary studies to build a cumulative argument. Rather than relying on a single source, the writer triangulates across three independent research projects spanning different cities and decades, allowing the conclusion to rest on converging evidence rather than a single data point.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens with a clear thesis statement in the introduction, then moves through evidence against random patrol, limitations of routine patrol, a concessive section acknowledging limited exceptions, a discussion of officer attitudes versus research findings, and a section on patrol-car staffing. The conclusion synthesizes all threads and gestures toward future directions in policing — a standard but effective undergraduate essay structure.
Introduction: The Case Against Random Patrol
This paper introduces and analyzes the topic of criminal justice in America, focusing specifically on random prevention patrol's effectiveness at deterring crime and apprehending offenders. Random patrol may alleviate some crime and give portions of the public a general feeling of greater security, but overall, random patrol has little to no effect on deterring crime or apprehending offenders. As the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment demonstrates, preventative patrol geared to specific high-crime areas and crime types is far more effective at controlling crime and apprehending offenders.
While most police departments heavily utilize random or routine police patrols as part of their crime prevention techniques, several studies indicate that these patrols are actually ineffective in reducing crime and apprehending suspects. The most well-known study in this area is the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, conducted in 1971, with results published in 1974. Authors Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, and Brown note, "This experiment, made possible by Police Foundation funding, employed a methodology which accurately determined that traditional routine preventive patrol had no significant impact either on the level of crime or the public's feeling of security" (Kelling et al. vii). Routine patrol is ineffective — but what about random patrol? Many police officers believe random patrol works because crimes are committed randomly, and therefore random patrols will more often encounter random criminal acts.
Crime Is Not Random: The Hot-Spots Evidence
Another group of researchers notes, "Even many police we know, who acknowledge that some areas are more dangerous than others, often assume a random distribution of crime within areas. For them, the practical question is not whether crime is concentrated in space, but how much" (Sherman et al. 28). However, many studies indicate that crime is not random. A variety of factors influence where crime occurs, including the number of dwellings, the placement of a home or apartment, the appearance of a building or business, and even landscaping. The authors continue, "Some 40 years ago, Henry McKay himself made the unpublished discovery that even within high-crime Chicago neighborhoods entire blocks were free of offenders" (Sherman et al. 29).
Thus, the idea that crimes are committed randomly does not hold merit, and neither does the rationale for random police patrol. A year-long study conducted by Sherman and colleagues in Minneapolis found that the majority of both "inside" and "outside" crimes were committed in concentrated areas of the city rather than random locations, and that once a crime was committed in a certain area, the likelihood of a repeat crime in that same area was actually higher (Sherman et al. 39–41). Research on crime hot spots consistently reinforces this point: routine police patrols are not as effective as most departments would like, and random patrols — by the very nature of their approach — are even less reliable as a means of controlling crime.
Limitations of Routine and Random Patrol Strategies
Both random and routine patrols present additional problems that do not effectively decrease crime in patrol areas. Random patrols are not specific enough to be largely effective, and routine patrols may simply drive persistent criminals to different locations. However, in specific crime areas where certain types of crime — such as prostitution — are concentrated, even random patrols could uncover some activity if it is occurring, while routine patrols would more likely shift the activity to another location. These types of patrols therefore remain problematic and fail to address much of the criminal activity in a community. Routine patrols are too predictable, and random patrols clash with the non-random nature of crime itself, creating patterns so diffuse that a criminal and an officer could conceivably never cross paths.
Conclusion: Toward Targeted, Modern Policing
These studies indicate that random and routine police patrols are not effective strategies for continually managing crime. The Kansas City study demonstrates that routine preventative patrols lack significant impact, while targeted preventative patrols are far more effective in specific crime contexts. Research also indicates that single-officer patrol cars outperform two-officer units in efficiency and response time. Together, these and many other studies suggest that the traditional roles of the police officer are changing — and will continue to change.
Will police patrols disappear in the future? Probably not. Even random patrols can prove effective in some situations, and targeted patrols have demonstrated clear benefits. The scope of police work is ever changing, and departments must remain open to change and new ideas. The most successful departments will hold themselves up as models of change, modernity, and openness to forward-thinking policing methods — rather than relying solely on tried-and-true techniques whose effectiveness research has called into question.
References
Kelling, George L., Tony Pate, Duane Dieckman, and Charles E. Brown. The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Summary Report. Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 1974.
Kessler, David A. "One or Two Officer Cars? A Perspective From Kansas City." Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 13, 1985, pp. 49–64.
Sherman, Lawrence W., Patrick R. Gartin, and Michael E. Buerger. "Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of Place." Criminology, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1989, pp. 27–55.
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