Robert Kennedy's Case for a Cuba Blockade, 1962

Introduction: The Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba

In October 1962, a confrontation with the Soviet Union developed over the deployment of ballistic missiles in Cuba (Cuban missile crisis, 2000). This confrontation carries the unfortunate potential to escalate into a major conflict between U.S. and Soviet forces — perhaps even to the point where thermonuclear war becomes inevitable. This action on the part of the Soviets took the administration somewhat by surprise (McNamara, 2002). Nonetheless, when considered in light of the recent events surrounding the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, it almost seems inevitable that the Soviets would exploit Cuba's geographic position and its antagonism toward the United States and its interests.

This antagonism by the Soviets should be taken quite seriously — it can be considered a prelude to full-scale thermonuclear war. The decisions made regarding the current events in Cuba may well be judged by history as the first battle in the last war of the modern age (Worsthorne, 2002). In dealing with this situation, the United States must find a strategy that will appropriately balance its short-term need to save face in international politics with the long-term possibility of massive nuclear destruction affecting much of the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States must make it clear to the Soviets that while we do not desire nuclear war, we will not back down from active aggression only ninety miles from our own shoreline (McComas, 1987; Cuban missile crisis, 2000).

Blockade and Negotiation: An Appropriate Strategic Response

The most advisable strategy in this situation is to immediately begin an active blockade of Cuba to prevent the import of any offensive weaponry — particularly nuclear weapons — into the island nation. This move by the Soviets is largely political and psychological; nuclear missile sites in Cuba have little to no strategic value (Manning, 1997). From that perspective, the U.S. could theoretically ignore the missiles with no sacrifice in overall national security. However, the political audacity of positioning ballistic missiles so close to U.S. national borders cannot be ignored. A blockade provides the middle ground that helps the U.S. preserve its political standing without committing to action over strategically unimportant targets.

With a strong blockade in place, the burden of action will be shifted to the Soviets. They will be forced to decide whether a few missile bases in communist Cuba are worth the potential nuclear destruction of their regime. With a blockade of this nature in place, it will be possible to buy U.S. negotiators time to work out a more amicable resolution to the crisis that is fast developing in Cuba.

The Prevailing Options: Full-Scale Military Assault or Quarantine

Though the Cuban Missile Crisis has developed quite rapidly, two distinct camps have emerged as to the more appropriate course of action (McNamara, 2003; McNamara, 2002). No one advocates doing nothing. Such a course would be inappropriate given the standing conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, and given the importance of retaining an air of political certitude even in the face of outside threats. Since action over these events is all but inevitable, it is simply a matter of determining the best course from among two very polarized positions within the administration.

The first, and perhaps most obvious, reaction to the presence of nuclear missile sites in Cuba is to launch a massive military assault against Cuba. There is significant pressure within the administration in favor of this course of action (Sorenson, 1997). This may be motivated in part by the unfortunate blow that the President received during the abortive attempt to overthrow the Cuban government at the Bay of Pigs. It may also be motivated by the sense that the United States, in order to retain its political legitimacy in the fight against communism, must respond to threats in kind. If the Soviets have placed ballistic missile sites in Cuba, the argument goes, then we must use the full extent of our military might to destroy those sites.

Works Cited

Alterman, E. (1997, November 10). Profile in courage? The Nation, 265(15), pp. 6–7.

Cuban missile crisis. (2000). The Columbia Encyclopedia (6th ed., p. 9980). Columbia University Press.

Manning, R. (1997, October 20). How close to the brink. Newsweek, 130(16), p. 18.

McComas, D. (1987, November 20). When the other guy blinked. Scholastic Update, 120(6), pp. 27–29.

McNamara, R. S. (2002, November). Forty years after 13 days. Arms Control Today, 32(9), pp. 4–8.

McNamara, R. S. (2003, March 31). Oct. 27, 1962: Averting the apocalypse. Time, 161(13), p. A45.

Pious, R. M. (2001, Spring). The Cuban missile crisis and the limits of crisis management. Political Science Quarterly, 116(1), pp. 81–105.

Roazen, P. (1998, Summer). So close to the edge. Queen's Quarterly, 105(2), pp. 186–193.

Sorenson, T. C. (1997, November). From the eye of the storm: The key moments of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Washington Monthly, 29(11), pp. 25–29.

Weisenmiller, M. (2002, October). Florida: Front-line state in 1962. History Today, 52(10), pp. 38–39.

Worsthorne, P. (2002, October 19). Kennedy's finest hour. Spectator, 290(9089), pp. 22–23.