Robert Kennedy's Case for a Cuba Blockade, 1962
This paper presents an argument from the perspective of Robert Kennedy, Chair of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, in support of a naval blockade of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. The paper examines the two principal options debated within the Kennedy administration — a full-scale military assault versus a naval quarantine — and argues that a blockade represents the most strategically sound and diplomatically responsible response. It evaluates the dangers of direct military action, including the risk of Soviet retaliation and nuclear escalation, and makes the case that a blockade shifts the burden of action to the Soviets while preserving American political credibility and opening space for negotiated resolution.
- Introduction: The Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba: Context and stakes of Soviet missiles in Cuba
- Blockade and Negotiation: An Appropriate Strategic Response: Argument for blockade as measured middle ground
- The Prevailing Options: Full-Scale Military Assault or Quarantine: Two competing camps within the administration
- Dangers of Direct Military Action: Risks of assault including Soviet nuclear retaliation
- The Strategic Case for a Naval Blockade: Why blockade outperforms direct military force
- Instituting a Cuban Blockade: Resources Required: Military resources and diplomatic steps needed
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What makes this paper effective
- The paper adopts a clear and historically grounded persona — Robert Kennedy arguing before the Executive Committee — which gives the argument a focused rhetorical purpose and a coherent point of view throughout.
- It acknowledges the strongest counterargument (direct military assault) fairly before systematically dismantling it, demonstrating balanced analytical thinking rather than one-sided advocacy.
- The use of period-specific secondary sources, including contemporaneous accounts from McNamara, Sorenson, and others, grounds the argument in documented historical evidence rather than speculation.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates comparative policy analysis: it presents two competing strategic options side by side, evaluates the costs and risks of each against a defined set of criteria (political credibility, risk of escalation, military feasibility), and arrives at a reasoned recommendation. This structure is common in policy briefs and national security writing and shows how to move from problem identification to option evaluation to conclusion.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens by establishing the crisis context and its stakes. It then states the recommended course of action early, before detailing the competing options. The bulk of the argument compares direct assault against blockade on several dimensions — strategic value, risk of retaliation, diplomatic flexibility — before closing with a brief practical section on resources. This front-loaded thesis structure, followed by evidence and rebuttal, is characteristic of persuasive policy writing.
Introduction: The Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba
In October 1962, a confrontation with the Soviet Union developed over the deployment of ballistic missiles in Cuba (Cuban missile crisis, 2000). This confrontation carries the unfortunate potential to escalate into a major conflict between U.S. and Soviet forces — perhaps even to the point where thermonuclear war becomes inevitable. This action on the part of the Soviets took the administration somewhat by surprise (McNamara, 2002). Nonetheless, when considered in light of the recent events surrounding the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, it almost seems inevitable that the Soviets would exploit Cuba's geographic position and its antagonism toward the United States and its interests.
This antagonism by the Soviets should be taken quite seriously — it can be considered a prelude to full-scale thermonuclear war. The decisions made regarding the current events in Cuba may well be judged by history as the first battle in the last war of the modern age (Worsthorne, 2002). In dealing with this situation, the United States must find a strategy that will appropriately balance its short-term need to save face in international politics with the long-term possibility of massive nuclear destruction affecting much of the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States must make it clear to the Soviets that while we do not desire nuclear war, we will not back down from active aggression only ninety miles from our own shoreline (McComas, 1987; Cuban missile crisis, 2000).
Works Cited
Alterman, E. (1997, November 10). Profile in courage? The Nation, 265(15), pp. 6–7.
Cuban missile crisis. (2000). The Columbia Encyclopedia (6th ed., p. 9980). Columbia University Press.
Manning, R. (1997, October 20). How close to the brink. Newsweek, 130(16), p. 18.
McComas, D. (1987, November 20). When the other guy blinked. Scholastic Update, 120(6), pp. 27–29.
McNamara, R. S. (2002, November). Forty years after 13 days. Arms Control Today, 32(9), pp. 4–8.
McNamara, R. S. (2003, March 31). Oct. 27, 1962: Averting the apocalypse. Time, 161(13), p. A45.
Pious, R. M. (2001, Spring). The Cuban missile crisis and the limits of crisis management. Political Science Quarterly, 116(1), pp. 81–105.
Roazen, P. (1998, Summer). So close to the edge. Queen's Quarterly, 105(2), pp. 186–193.
Sorenson, T. C. (1997, November). From the eye of the storm: The key moments of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Washington Monthly, 29(11), pp. 25–29.
Weisenmiller, M. (2002, October). Florida: Front-line state in 1962. History Today, 52(10), pp. 38–39.
Worsthorne, P. (2002, October 19). Kennedy's finest hour. Spectator, 290(9089), pp. 22–23.
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