Diplomacy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Kennedy's Strategy

Introduction

The Cuban Missile Crisis (16 October 1962 to 20 November 1962) began with the discovery by US intelligence of Soviet missile launch facilities in Cuba. The threat of an attack on US soil was made clear to President Kennedy by his Joint Chiefs of Staff, who urged him to take aggressive counter-measures. Kennedy's main concern was that aggressive action on his part could lead to even more aggressive retaliation from the Soviet Union and ultimately to nuclear war. Largely seen as an exercise in coercive diplomacy to avoid a military confrontation, Kennedy's diplomatic efforts during the Crisis have been praised as a defining moment in the Cold War. The reality of the situation, however, is that behind the scenes Kennedy engaged in quid pro quo diplomacy to satisfy Khrushchev and avert a war.

Background and Perspectives

Throughout the latter half of 1962, campaigns for the upcoming Congressional elections left the Democrats open to charges from Republicans that the Democratic President was not taking seriously the threat in Cuba. In the summer of that year, Khrushchev and Castro had met to discuss the building of missile launch facilities off the coast of Florida. Republicans looking to win more seats in Congress contended publicly that Kennedy was not doing enough to counter the Soviet-Cuban alliance. Republican Congressman Kenneth Keating from New York gave a speech on the Senate floor that summer in which he accused the White House Democratic Administration of gross negligence in ignoring the construction of a Soviet military base in Cuba (Congressional Record, 1962). Democrats controlled the Senate 64 seats to the Republicans' 36. Republicans were intent on gaining seats by denouncing the Democrats as ineffective on international matters of grave importance, including national security. Kennedy was thus faced with political pressure at home. From his perspective, the Cuban Missile Crisis represented an existential crisis to his party's control of the Senate. If he acted wrongly, the public could punish Democrats at the voting booths in the upcoming November elections. Kennedy was already distrustful of his military advisors, and so he entrusted diplomacy on this matter to a select few whom he believed could help him achieve a peaceful solution that would satisfy all (Mullins, 2013).

From the Soviet perspective, the erection of missile facilities in Cuba was meant to close the missile gap between the US and the Soviet Union (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). The US had missiles strategically placed in Italy and Turkey that could deliver a nuclear payload to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev wanted a site from which he too could launch a similar kind of strike against the US. He also did not want to risk seeing another US invasion of Cuba, and missiles in Cuba could serve as a deterrent.

There was also another reason Khrushchev sought to have missile facilities in Cuba. He believed he could use this as leverage to gain control of West Berlin from the US and other Western powers (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). From this perspective, the Soviet Union sought to use coercive power to force the US into giving up its influence in the part of Germany that the Soviet Union did not control.

From Cuba's perspective, allowing the erection of missile facilities made sense as a warning to the US to stay out of its affairs. The US had attempted an invasion the prior year and had leveled economic sanctions against Cuba in response to Castro's rise to power in the Cuban Revolution of 1959. The US had also sought to remove Cuba from the Organization of American States (Chang & Kornbluh, 1998). Cuba's further complaint was that it was constantly being harassed by US military forces at Guantanamo Bay (Franklin, 1997).

Diplomatic Challenges and Tensions

The main diplomatic challenge of the Crisis was that the US and the Soviet Union were in the midst of the Cold War and there were no direct lines of communication established between the White House and the Kremlin. Kennedy and Khrushchev were not in direct contact with one another. Whenever a message needed to be sent, it was communicated publicly—through a speech or through some form of military action, such as the establishment of missile facilities near the other country's borders. Without speaking directly to one another, the two states were limited in their ability to negotiate a win-win outcome to any conflict. The US did have an embassy in Moscow, and the Soviets had one in Washington, but the US Ambassador in Moscow, Foy Kohler, did not even know about the brewing conflict until the closing days of October (Mullins, 2013). Nothing passed directly between Kennedy and Khrushchev until Khrushchev sent his first cable to the President in the latter half of October. Moreover, managing public relations was of utmost importance for both sides and their ambassadors, because the court of public opinion held great sway for both Kennedy and Khrushchev, as each sought popular support in his own country. Khrushchev had given his "secret speech" in 1956 in an attempt to drum up support for his party against the Stalinists. Kennedy had won the White House in the 1960 election as the youngest person ever to hold that office. Both believed they needed the public on their side to retain power.

Other diplomatic challenges arose from tensions at home and abroad. Kennedy had to contend with an image of being soft on communism while maintaining a sense of poise and determination in his administration. His critics despised his failure to support the Bay of Pigs invasion with air cover. The invasion, meant to be conducted in relative secrecy, turned into a rout, and Kennedy's embarrassment over the matter prompted him to declare his animosity toward the CIA (Weiner, 2007). Khrushchev had even expressed his own dissatisfaction with what appeared to be a covert attempt at regime change in a Soviet-friendly state (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1963). Although the Democrats controlled the White House and Congress, a loss of seats in the Senate would be seen as a rebuke of Kennedy's Administration. Khrushchev also had to contend with mounting political pressures in the Soviet Union. His speech denouncing Stalin had marked a turn in Soviet politics but had also led to a weakening of Soviet influence in its satellite states. The pressure was on Khrushchev to shore up his power and influence or be deposed from office by his opponents.

Abroad, the effects of the Cold War were felt everywhere as the Soviet Union and the US competed for control or influence in other parts of the world. George Kennan had urged a policy of containment as far back as 1946. Kennedy leaned toward a policy of peaceful coexistence. The Joint Chiefs pushed for pre-emptive strikes whenever they perceived a potential threat. Kennedy had to navigate these competing currents in order to achieve the outcome he desired without losing the support of the public at home or appearing weak abroad.

Conclusion

The significance of the Cuban Missile Crisis for the future management of strategic relations between the two superpowers is that it demonstrated the impact that détente can play in negotiations. In any situation of this type, multiple groups or individuals with varying interests attempt to sway the outcome of a crisis. In this case, there were calls for war from various quarters—including the Joint Chiefs and Castro. Leaders must understand, however, what is ultimately at stake. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev appear to have understood that if war broke out over Cuba, nuclear holocaust would be the end result, benefiting no one. Neither wanted such an outcome, and so they sought a diplomatic solution in private.

The point here is that diplomacy is not always something that can be conducted in public, because other groups seeking to sway outcomes can craft their own narratives and manipulate public opinion whenever diplomatic maneuvers are visible to them. The media is often a tool that groups use to manipulate the public. The Soviet Union used it to craft a narrative about US aggression in Cuba, and the US responded by countering that narrative to show it would be tough and would not negotiate with the Soviets. However, superpowers do have the option of negotiating in secret, and Kennedy and Khrushchev showed that when a negotiation is as direct as possible—with as few intermediaries as possible—it can lead to acceptable outcomes. Understanding what the two leaders on each side actually want is paramount for referent power to work successfully. Coercive power can work to a point, but it does not necessarily lead to a win-win situation, which should be the aim of all strategic relations. Referent power, however, can lead to a win-win situation, at least in theory.

As can be seen in the case of both Kennedy and Khrushchev, apparent win-win situations for the world can still leave other groups dissatisfied, and those groups can retaliate in other ways. This case thus illustrates the limits of diplomacy as much as it does its merits. The merits of diplomacy are that, when used wisely, it can achieve peace between two ideologically opposed superpowers. The limits of diplomacy are that, in any superpower and in the wider world, there are other players and stakeholders who can feel betrayed if left out of negotiations or if they sense they did not achieve a win for themselves. The subsequent demise of both leaders—one by assassination, one by political removal—may well underscore this point.

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