This paper examines the philosophical debate surrounding whether some lives are not worth living, centering on Peter Singer's utilitarian defense of infanticide and euthanasia. The analysis presents counterarguments from disability activist Harriet McBryde Johnson, who critiques Singer's assumptions about disability and suffering, and philosopher James Rachels, who distinguishes between infanticide and end-of-life decisions. The paper concludes that decisions about euthanasia should rest with mentally competent individuals and their families rather than be imposed by the state, while acknowledging the need for careful societal safeguards against misuse.
Professor Peter Singer is a well-known utilitarian who advocates the right of parents to commit infanticide based on utilitarian premises. He argues that the resources expended by keeping severely disabled children alive are too great and that it would make more sense to allow families to adopt healthy children with a greater chance at happiness. Singer's framework treats life as valuable primarily insofar as it can generate well-being, and judges resource allocation by whether those resources will produce the greatest good for the greatest number.
Disability activist Harriet McBryde Johnson, who says that she would not be alive if this type of calculus had been employed, directly challenges Singer's assumptions. She writes: "But like the protagonist in a classical drama, Singer has his flaw. It is his unexamined assumption that disabled people are inherently 'worse off,' that we 'suffer,' that we have lesser 'prospects of a happy life'" (Johnson 2003: 12).
Johnson argues against assisted suicide entirely, even with the consent of the person who feels that his or her life is no longer worth living. Instead, she advocates for a society where care is more readily available to those who need it. "As a society, we should pay workers to provide that care, in the home," she proposes, suggesting that many perceived quality-of-life deficits stem from inadequate social support rather than inherent to disability itself (Johnson 2003: 9).
"Distinguishing infanticide from end-of-life decisions"
"Individual autonomy within protective safeguards"
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