This paper applies logic and critical thinking to evaluate the arguments presented in "The Terror Next Time," a 2001 Economist article published shortly after the September 11 attacks. The paper examines the article's central assumption — that terrorists would inevitably use weapons of mass destruction if they obtained them — and systematically assesses the three premises offered: the difficulty of acquiring raw materials, the challenge of manufacturing functional weapons, and the problem of effective delivery. The analysis identifies logical weaknesses in each premise, particularly the author's reliance on the Tokyo subway attack as evidence and the deterrence argument based on state behavior. The paper concludes with a dissent from the article's overall finding.
The paper demonstrates premise-by-premise argumentation analysis, a core technique in formal critical thinking. Rather than evaluating the article's conclusion in isolation, the writer isolates each claim, assesses its evidentiary support, and identifies where unsupported assumptions do the work that evidence should do. This approach shows how a conclusion can be logically invalid even when individual sub-arguments seem plausible on the surface.
The paper opens by establishing the article's publication context and audience, then identifies the foundational assumption before moving through each of the three premises in order: acquisition, manufacture, and delivery. Each section notes what the author argues, what evidence is provided, and where the reasoning is weak. The paper closes with the writer's personal assessment, grounded in the logical critique developed throughout.
In "The Terror Next Time," the author examines the idea of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction. The author concludes that there are three obstacles facing terrorists who want to use such weapons: finding a supply, turning that supply into a weapon, and delivering the weapon to the target. After investigating these obstacles, the author concludes that the threat of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction is not currently very large. Given that the United States was engaged in a war that began over the suspected presence of weapons of mass destruction in a terrorist-friendly country, this conclusion is significant. Even more notable is the author's caution that as availability increases, so does the threat that terrorists will be able to use weapons of mass destruction against the United States.
"The Terror Next Time" was first published on October 4, 2001, less than one month after the September 11 attacks. As a result, the intended audience differed considerably from a contemporary audience and from the audience of September 10, 2001. While most Americans have since moved past the absolute terror that gripped the country in the first weeks following 9/11, it is not difficult to recall the anxiety of those days. People were purchasing duct tape and rolls of plastic sheeting, preparing to barricade themselves in their homes in the event that terrorists deployed weapons of mass destruction against the United States. The audience for the article was therefore composed of people with a very elevated — though understandable — concern about terrorist use of such weapons. The author acknowledges those fears and attempts to allay them by demonstrating that terrorists did not then have the capability to effectively use weapons of mass destruction.
One of the most interesting elements of the article is that it is based largely upon an unstated and unsupported assumption. That assumption is that "were terrorists with so little calculation of restraint to get their hands on weapons of mass destruction — whether chemical, biological, or even nuclear — they would surely use them" ("The Terror Next Time"). While the assumption is stated explicitly, there does not appear to be any evidentiary support for it.
If one removes that assumption, then there is far less reason to determine whether or not terrorists possess weapons of mass destruction, and far more reason to determine whether or not terrorists would be willing to use them. This distinction is central to evaluating the article's overall argument, and it will be revisited throughout this analysis.
In order to address fears about weapons of mass destruction, the author systematically examines the three elements that terrorists would need to successfully deploy such weapons: access to materials or components, the ability to manufacture functional weapons, and the ability to deliver those weapons effectively. Because each premise is supported by its own sub-arguments, each will be investigated in turn to determine whether the author has provided adequate support for his claims.
First, the author states that "it's harder than you think" for terrorists to obtain weapons of mass destruction ("The Terror Next Time"). He points out that acquiring raw supplies is not sufficient; terrorists would also "have to acquire or manufacture sufficient quantities of the lethal agent." The author includes the assumption that chemical weapons are easier to acquire than biological weapons, which are in turn easier to acquire than nuclear weapons. He then provides some support for this by noting that the ingredients for chemical weapons are widely available, while biological and nuclear agents are more difficult to obtain.
The author goes on to discuss difficulties in developing or acquiring sufficient quantities of each weapon type. For example, he states that it is difficult to make chemical agents sufficiently pure, and cites the relatively unsuccessful sarin attack on the Tokyo subway as supporting evidence. The argument that it would be difficult for terrorists to develop the raw materials for a weapon of mass destruction is reasonably strong. However, in supporting it, the author relies on one unsuccessful attack carried out by a non-terrorist cult group, rather than providing evidence about what actual terrorist organizations possess or what specific difficulties they face. By assuming that a cult group — even a well-funded one — is comparable in zeal, expertise, or resources to a dedicated terrorist organization, the author exposes a flaw in his reasoning.
The author also cautions that terrorists may not need to develop their own supplies. Instead, they could rely on existing stockpiles — for example, those remaining from the former Soviet Union, which contain significant quantities of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and expertise. A terrorist group could potentially hire former Soviet weapons experts or purchase weapons outright. The author assures readers that police and customs officers have not seized nuclear devices of the type that could constitute a weapon of mass destruction. However, this is a weak assurance: the absence of seizures does not mean that such materials have not been smuggled. In fact, the author himself acknowledges earlier in the article that there are intelligence reports suggesting Soviet nuclear devices have reached terrorist-friendly countries such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.
As a result, the conclusion that terrorists do not possess a weapon of mass destruction is faulty. It rests on the implicit belief that if terrorists had such weapons, the world would know about it — which circles back to the original assumption that terrorists would immediately use any weapon of mass destruction they obtained. This ignores the fact that the attacks of September 11 required years of careful planning. Terrorists could conceivably possess weapons of mass destruction while still determining the most effective means of deploying them. The author does not address this possibility.
I disagree with the author's conclusion that terrorists do not currently possess weapons of mass destruction. One of the reasons for this disagreement is that I also reject the author's foundational assumption that terrorists would use such weapons immediately upon acquiring them. The evidence does not support that conclusion: the attacks carried out by Al Qaeda, both in the United States and abroad, have consistently demonstrated extensive advance planning.
Furthermore, the author has not adequately supported the other premises in his argument. While he discusses the difficulty of obtaining raw materials for weapons of mass destruction, he focuses primarily on the obstacles related to nuclear devices. Yet his own article acknowledges that it is relatively easy to obtain the supplies needed for chemical and biological weapons. Additionally, the author's reliance on the failed Tokyo subway attack to address distribution difficulties is insufficient. The use of chemicals as weapons of mass destruction has a long history dating back to World War I, and the methods of dispersal are well documented. For these reasons, I disagree with the author's conclusion that terrorists lack the ability to effectively use weapons of mass destruction.
"The Terror Next Time." Economist.com. 2001. The Economist. 23 Apr. 2005. http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=806202.
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