Three Gorges Dam: Reservoir Refugees and Human Costs

Introduction: The Three Gorges Dam Project

The Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River is the largest project of its kind ever undertaken in human history. It has also been the costliest in more ways than simply the amount of money spent to build it — approximately 80 billion U.S. dollars. The dam can generate 18,000 megawatts of electricity. The intent of former Premier Li Peng, the driving force behind the dam in the early 1990s, was to rebuild his own political legacy after the disastrous events at Tiananmen Square in 1989. He claimed the dam would "inspire people but also demonstrate the greatness of the achievement of China's development" (Thai News Service, 2009).

Socio-Economic Impacts

Beyond the financial cost, the dam's other costs are equally staggering. During construction, 1,350 villages were submerged and 1.3 million people were displaced. Damming the river changed the ecology of the Yangtze to such a significant degree that certain species of sturgeon and dolphin are now virtually extinct. Commercial fisheries — not only on the Yangtze, but also in the East China Sea — have declined considerably. Fresh water supplies have been polluted, and there has been an increased risk from both landslides and earthquakes (Thai News Service, 2009).

Resettlement Issues

Other estimates of the number of people needing to be resettled push the 1.3 million figure up to between 1.6 million and 1.9 million. This number is evenly split between urban and rural residents, making new farmland and urban employment significant resettlement challenges (HRIC, n.d., p. 2).

The first shovelful of dirt was lifted in 1994, and almost immediately, problems with resettlement became apparent. Though official government sources insisted that things were going smoothly, they were not. Mismanagement, corruption, inadequate compensation, and shortages of farmland and urban jobs were among the most significant issues.

On the part of the residents being resettled, there was widespread resentment and resistance — a crisis of major proportions that portended serious trouble as the project continued (HRIC, n.d.). Additionally, there appears to have been severe repression of those who had the audacity to complain about being swindled or mistreated after being relocated to inadequate areas with barren hillsides, poor farming soil, and insufficient water supplies.

The problems of resettlement had become so pervasive that in mid-2006, the Chinese government announced a program to subsidize resettled farmers 600 yuan ($74 U.S.) per year for 20 years. It was hoped this would put a lid on the ever-bubbling discontent. Each farmer who had moved prior to July 1, 2006 received the supplement. For those still in the process of moving at the time, the subsidy began after resettlement (Haggart & Lan, 2006).

Journalist Dai Qing, a long-standing vocal critic of the Three Gorges Dam, argues, "In my view, the new subsidy will discourage people affected by dams from coming forward to voice their problems and to vehemently defend their rights" (Haggart & Lan, 2006), suggesting that the Chinese government is effectively buying silence.

This history of problems with the Chinese government resettling its population for water projects is nothing new. Since the late 1940s, approximately ten million people have been relocated, often resulting in significant confrontation between those being moved and those doing the moving.

A 1998 investigation conducted by a noted Chinese sociologist with broad experience researching water project resettlements identified several additional problems with the Three Gorges Dam resettlement. These included systematic corruption and misuse of resettlement funds — such that significant amounts of subsidy yuan never reached resettled people — as well as discrimination against rural residents in the allocation of resources. The investigation also found a failure to provide coordinated, adequate information to migrant families, and almost no consultation with the populations to be resettled (Three Gorges Dam — the human cost, n.d.).

The Chinese government even went so far as to present "model resettlers" (yimin dianxin) to the press and visiting dignitaries as typical examples of happy, satisfied families. Some had even opened small shops in addition to enjoying new homes, well-paid jobs, and adequate compensation. However, each model resettler cost the central government almost four times the amount available for the average household relocation. One must wonder what will happen to future resettlers, given that the total resettlement budget is fixed while millions remain to be relocated (HRIC, n.d., p. 3).

In just one more example of the drastic attempts at deception: when Premier Li Peng visited a town about to be resettled, many residents were upset over inadequate compensation and had organized petition drives. While Li Peng was in the area, those residents were banned from attending a meeting with the Premier, and "substitutes" were brought in to pose as satisfied resettlers (HRIC, n.d., p. 3).

In early 2007, the government announced a further resettlement plan for some of the farmers previously resettled, in a further attempt to address discord and "cure poverty, unemployment and environmental hazards in the area" (Reuters, 2009). The plan included a statement on the central government's website acknowledging that previous plans had "fallen short" and left some displaced residents jobless and "exposed to dangerous geological jolts."

"Problems left over from migration and resettlement must be dealt with in detail, helping migrants to solve the real hardships and problems in their work and lives," the statement continued, "and building a harmonious and stable dam area" (Reuters, 2009).

This was a surprisingly complete refutation of their earlier statements, though it was couched in ecological terms, suggesting that some portion of the migrants were being removed to solve erosion and pollution issues. The statement did not address the enormous costs involved in this "re-resettlement."

Human Rights and Economic Issues

The "socio" in "socio-economic" impacts also encompasses human rights. Violations in this area have been rampant. According to Human Rights Watch (1995), any and all opposition to the Three Gorges Dam has been met with responses ranging from the firing of government officials to the arrest of activists and demonstrators. In some cases, China's penal labor camps have been brought into the equation, raising even more serious concerns.

Since information reaching the public is minimal and distorted, it is assumed that the failure of the resettlement program will be significant. This assumption is based on what little data is available and on the failed history of the Chinese government in resettling populations from previous construction projects. In previous attempts, compensation has been known to be minimal and, in some cases, completely absent. People from these earlier resettlements have ended up in "refugee camp" environments — far less than the government promises of happy, prosperous new beginnings (Hsu, n.d.).

"In western China, the one-sided pursuit of economic benefits from hydropower has come at the expense of relocated people, the environment, and the land and its cultural heritage," says Fan Xiao, a Sichuan Province geologist and critic of the Three Gorges project (Yardley, 2007). Dams in China are popular and part of big business and a booming economy. Profit-seeking is one of the major reasons so many dams exist and why there is such a tremendous push behind hydropower. Though energy self-sufficiency plays a role from a national perspective, there is no question that the large utility companies building these dams are saturated with both government and private investment money (Yardley, 2007, p. 3).

Three Gorges Dam is only the centerpiece of a unified system of up to a dozen large dams on the Yangtze River. Central Chinese officials indicate that more than 100 hydropower stations could be built within the next 20 years. Thirteen more dams are planned along the Nu River, as well as many more along other tributaries.

One economic consideration is that, as with Three Gorges, the development of hydropower does not necessarily improve social and economic conditions. One report states that though the dams are as modern as any in Europe, "the residents will become as poor as people in Africa" (Yardley, 2007, p. 4).

Fifty-six square miles of China's best agricultural land has been submerged. In order to compensate for this loss of production, farmers in other areas must increase output from already depleted and overused land — meaning the population will likely face food shortages. Towns where millions of resettled villagers and farmers have been relocated have no choice but to accept already overcrowded conditions, as well as job and housing shortages.

Because of the many dams, farmlands located near estuaries will be rendered useless due to lower than usual river flow. During dry seasons, salt water will intrude, ruining the land for crops (Hsu, n.d.).

Sedimentation will affect fisheries downstream from Three Gorges Dam, while the reservoir will harm those in the middle stretches of the Yangtze by slowing water flow, altering fish habitats, and reducing fishing productivity. The dam will also trap 75% of the nutrient-rich sediments normally used as fertilizer for fisheries and agriculture, resulting in additional losses to fishing and food production.

Even tourism will suffer. Rich in scenery and archaeological sites, the area is estimated to contain numerous temples, historical sites, and evidence of human habitation dating back to the Paleolithic Age, along with 800 cultural relic sites — all of which will be submerged and lost. The negative impact on local tourism and the income local residents might have gained from it is significant (Hsu, n.d.).

Numerous factories will also be lost. No one can state with certainty how significant the loss will be to China's economic growth. Relocation of those factories would be very costly to the government. Many coal and metal mines located in the reservoir area, worth millions of dollars, will be submerged, along with numerous transportation routes such as highways and roadways — all of which would have to be rebuilt if the factories are relocated.

Finally, though profit-making is among the stated reasons for the push for hydropower in China, the total benefits from the Three Gorges Dam will not compensate for the $80 billion construction cost for a very long time. Economic sustainability at this scale cannot be maintained. The profit is out of the project (Min, n.d.).

Conclusion

Peter Bosshard, Policy Director of International Rivers — an environmental organization with presence on four continents — has watched the Three Gorges Dam construction project since the mid-1990s. He has spoken with government officials, local citizens affected by the dam, and environmental experts. The following is a partial summary of his conclusions, published in the November 2009 issue of the Asia-Pacific Journal:

The dam, completed ahead of schedule, substitutes for burning at least 30 million tons of coal per year. However, the energy efficiency of the Chinese economy declined during the period 2001–2005. It would have been "cheaper, cleaner, and more productive to have invested in energy efficiency" rather than in new power plants.

According to local residents, almost none of the government's promises concerning housing, compensation, or employment have been fulfilled. Citizens who protested against the diversion of their compensation payments by local officials were "beaten up."

Pollution from the project is causing toxic algae blooms. Important fish species are nearly extinct and the fishing industry is nearly failed. More than 150 "dangerous geological events" occurred within months after the reservoir was filled. Seawater intrusion and pollution are occurring. The project has increased Shanghai's exposure to typhoons by eroding the coastline and creates seismic risks in the Yangtze Valley.

Now that the Three Gorges project has been completed, the government should commission a thorough, independent evaluation of its costs and benefits. If irreversible ecological damage is found to be occurring, alternatives should be sought. The full human toll of this project — measured in displacement, illness, poverty, and loss of cultural heritage — demands nothing less.