This paper examines the range of security threats facing Turkey over both a near-term (five-year) and long-term (ten-to-twenty-year) horizon. It begins with the immediate threat posed by the Islamic State (ISIS) and the resulting refugee crisis, before turning to longer-term economic vulnerabilities tied to competing pipeline projects — including the BTC, Nabucco-West, and the Iran-Iraq-Syria Friendship Pipeline. The paper also addresses Turkey's complex political relationships with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, and the United States, as well as the nuclear safety risk posed by the Metsamor reactor in Armenia. Throughout, the analysis highlights Turkey's precarious position as a NATO member caught between Western alliances and an increasingly assertive Russia.
The paper demonstrates effective use of synthesizing evidence from diverse source types — news reporting, congressional research reports, and commentary — to build a multi-dimensional argument. Rather than treating each threat in isolation, the author consistently traces relationships between threats, showing how economic, political, and military factors interact. This integrative approach is a hallmark of strong policy analysis writing at the undergraduate level.
The paper opens with a geographic and contextual overview of Turkey's position, then moves chronologically from the most immediate threat (ISIS) outward to longer-term structural concerns (pipeline economics, Russia-NATO rivalry, regional diplomacy). Supporting paragraphs use direct quotations to anchor claims, and the conclusion effectively recaps both threat categories while gesturing toward the strategic choices Turkey must make. The reference list follows a recognizable APA format.
Turkey faces several economic, social, and political threats in both the near (five-year) and long (ten-to-twenty-year) term. Its geopolitical situation in the Middle East makes it particularly sensitive not only to local contexts but to global ones as well. Bordering Georgia to the north, Armenia and Iran to the east, and Syria and Iraq to the south, Turkey has been a neighbor to some of the most controversial courses of action in recent history. It is only natural that its own security should be affected by that of its neighbors, as well as by superpower interests in the region. This paper analyzes the security threats facing Turkey in both the near term and the long term.
The most immediate near-term security threat is the rise of ISIS — the Islamic State — whose self-appointed caliphate declared a religious war against Shia Muslims in the Iraq and Syria region. An offshoot of Al-Qaeda, these Sunni extremists pose a direct threat to Turkish citizens, a quarter of whom are Shia Muslims. If ISIS were to gain a stronghold in northern Iraq or in Syria, it could also threaten Turkish airspace, which provides over-flight access for the United States for strategic missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Because Turkey maintains good relations with the United States and provides a form of sanctuary for establishing regional allies for the Western power, Turkey may face additional pressure given that ISIS has explicitly included the West among its targets. Men, women, and children have been killed by the terrorist group, which had already invaded Mosul in northern Iraq. "There is a park in Mosul," reported Catholic Online (2014), "where they actually beheaded children and put their heads on a stick and have them in the park." Hundreds of thousands of Christians and Muslims fled their homes as the terrorist group entrenched itself in the region. This constitutes a near-term threat to Turkey's security — one that could potentially be addressed in the near term with the assistance of U.S. military power.
President Obama dispatched bombers to the region to eliminate ISIS capabilities. Obama stated, "We do have a strategic interest in pushing back" ISIS. "We're not going to let them create some caliphate… but we can only do that if we know that we've got partners on the ground who are capable of filling the void" (Frizell, 2014). Turkey's role in confronting ISIS would begin with its president, whether that was Erdogan or a successor. Refugees were expected to pour into Turkey, which had already accepted over a million Syrian refugees fleeing the civil war. This tremendous influx would inevitably affect Turkish politics.
Already, Erdogan had denounced the United States' role in Syria and its detached stance toward the violence in Gaza — which Erdogan likened to a new Holocaust, with Israel acting as a new Nazi state (Seibert, 2014). Turkey's position in the region was therefore a delicate one. Considering that "50 Turkish diplomats and civilians have been held hostage by ISIS" in Mosul since June 2014, the terrorist group's threats were tangible (Seibert, 2014). U.S. aid could be of help, but Turkey's situation was made more complex by the fact that it had placed its relations with Israel on hold following the latter's 2010 attack on a Turkish ship bound for Gaza. Since Israel is a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid, Turkey found itself caught: on one hand, it could not afford to isolate itself from U.S. assistance in the fight against ISIS; on the other, it could not endorse what Erdogan called the rise of a "new Hitler" in Israel (Seibert, 2014).
A significant long-term threat Turkey faces is economic in nature, centered on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which runs from the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan and Georgia into Turkey, terminating at Ceyhan on the Mediterranean coast. This pipeline represents an important source of revenue for Turkey. However, it has been threatened by Syrian economic initiatives: "Syria signed off on a $10 billion pipeline deal that breaks the BTC monopoly" (Dawson, 2012). The deal also threatens the Nabucco-West pipeline. A competing pipeline that bypasses both the BTC and the Nabucco-West would undercut Turkey's financial prospects and undermine its national economy.
The Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline — also called the Friendship Pipeline by those countries, or the Islamic Gas Pipeline — is one such example of this economic threat. The Syrian civil war had thus far disrupted plans for laying the Friendship Pipeline, but if Assad remained in power, plans were likely to continue. The Nabucco-West was not expected to be operational until 2017. Its interested parties were Western, in contrast to the Friendship Pipeline, which had Russian backing. The geopolitical relationship between Russia, Syria, and Iran also warrants consideration when assessing Turkey's long-term economic stability, since Russia was pivoting toward China and strengthening its relationship with Syria throughout the civil war. Russia maintains a port on Syrian soil along the Mediterranean coast, which makes its relationship with Syria all the more strategically important — and the pipeline deal all the more significant, as Russia is one of the world's top exporters of natural gas.
Russia's South Stream pipeline is also a competitor to the Nabucco-West. Gazprom stands to supply the European Union with most of its natural gas if the Nabucco-West fails. Turkey must therefore consider which superpower will prove more economically stable in the coming years — the United States or Russia. Turkey's alliance with the United States has been satisfactory, but as a NATO member, and with Russia firmly opposing NATO build-up in Ukraine and its port in Crimea under threat, a Russia-NATO conflict could emerge. Russia did, after all, support South Ossetia when Georgia moved into the territory (Nichol, 2011). Turkey has tried to maintain strong ties with Georgia and Azerbaijan while strengthening ties with the United States, but the balance of power may be shifting in Russia's favor.
The BRICS nations are developing a fund to counter the IMF, and the dollar's status as the global reserve currency may come under increasing pressure. Will it be in Turkey's best interest to maintain strict allegiance with the United States given these developments? How might diplomacy with Syria and Russia better serve Turkey's economic interests twenty years down the road? The Friendship Pipeline may be of interest to Turkey if the Nabucco-West fails, and the BTC may ultimately lose its monopoly. Turkey must weigh its economic security in light of these developments — especially given that "virtually all current geopolitical developments are energy-related" (Escobar, 2011).
Turkey's social and political position in the region also generates near- and long-term threats. Its poor relationship with Armenia has made it susceptible to Kurdish pressure. Armenia's Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan has been a persistent source of tension, and while the United States maintains a working relationship with Armenia, Turkey does not.
The United States seeks stability in the region given its investments there — in pipelines, governments, and related infrastructure. Turkey remains a major player in establishing that stability, but this role carries certain risks. An immediate risk can be found in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey has influence with the latter, and it may be in Turkey's best interest to use diplomacy to bring about a lasting peace between the two countries. As Russia seeks to maintain significant influence in the area, it may also serve Turkey's interests to open diplomatic channels with Moscow. Turkey has already voiced opposition to Israel and broken ranks, in a sense, with other NATO members. Ignoring Russian influence in the region could prove to be a long-term threat to Turkey's social, political, and economic security.
Another near-term threat is the nuclear reactor at Metsamor, Armenia, which may be leaking dangerously high levels of radiation. The Turkish government has been working to address this situation. Since Armenia is dependent on Russian support, this issue could present an opportunity for Turkey to work with Russia on the reactor cleanup — potentially opening the Turkey-Armenia border as a result, which could stimulate the economy and benefit both societies.
The looming long-term threat, however, remains the prospect of war between Russia and the West. With Russia pivoting toward China and the United States and NATO stepping up military involvement in Ukraine, the risk of escalation is real. This would constitute a significant near-term threat in itself, but the long-term consequences should not be ignored: a new alignment of powers may be forming, even as old alliances appear to be reaffirmed. The balance of power is ever-shifting and much depends on the completion of competing pipelines. The Western-backed BTC is being challenged by the Russian-backed Friendship Pipeline, which bypasses Turkey entirely. It is no longer clearly in Turkey's best interest to remain wholly aligned with NATO and the United States. Turkey must engage with the nations backing the Friendship Pipeline.
Nichol, J. (2011). Russian political, economic, and security issues and U.S. interests. CRS Report for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
Seibert, T. (2014). Erdogan may win the Turkish presidency, but he'll face the ISIS crisis. The Daily Beast. Retrieved from http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/09/erdogan-may-re-win-the-turkish-presidency-but-he-ll-face-the-isis-crisis.html
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