UK Parliamentary Supremacy: Relevant Doctrine or Legal Remnant?

Introduction

Parliamentary supremacy — the doctrine explicitly outlined by A.V. Dicey as lying at the foundation of the implicit British Constitution — has long been assumed to be a fundamental and essential aspect of British law and constitutionality. The doctrine insists that the Parliament of the United Kingdom retains ultimate sovereignty and is ultimately answerable to no other body, domestic or international. Whether or not this is actually the case in real-world applications, or indeed whether it has ever been entirely true, is a matter of heavy debate. Even at the time of Dicey's first explicit construction of this concept, there were perhaps significant limits on the principle, and the modern world contains many further examples of limitations and controls placed on parliamentary supremacy.

There are several factors and institutions that can be seen as limiting parliamentary supremacy and establishing bodies of law that stand perhaps even higher than the British Constitution. Because this Constitution is unwritten, at least in specific and explicit form, it is difficult if not impossible to ascertain precisely where supreme power lies. The growing importance of international bodies such as the European Union and other international legal frameworks serve as further restrictions on parliamentary supremacy. These quite explicit elements, along with other less codified practical realities, limit the degree to which Parliament acts as the truly supreme governmental entity, making Dicey's construct ultimately irrelevant.

Dicey's Doctrine of Parliamentary Supremacy

Dicey's proposed doctrine of parliamentary supremacy — or parliamentary sovereignty — means, quite simply, that no other body can limit the powers of a sitting Parliament in the United Kingdom, and that no Parliament is bound by any legal restrictions created by any other body, even previous Parliaments (Alder, 2007). Parliament, in other words, is supreme not only in terms of the current entities that comprise the government of the United Kingdom, but in terms of all laws, practices, and judicial decisions (Alder, 2007). This premise means that Parliament could enact a law or take an action that would otherwise be considered unconstitutional — the very idea of an unconstitutional act of Parliament becomes an impossible paradox if Dicey's premise is accepted, since Parliament is the very foundation of the Constitution and the power vested therein (Alder, 2007; Allan, 2011). The implications of this would be quite far-reaching if it could be demonstrated that the construct of parliamentary supremacy existed in practice.

The idea that a Parliament would be able to perform actions and enact laws completely contrary to those of any previous Parliament — and indeed contrary to standard and accepted constitutional practices — would render legal practice in the United Kingdom all but impossible (Allan, 2011). Understanding of the full implications of Dicey's doctrine appears to be quite lacking in public applications of the law as well (Murken, 2009). The constitution itself is a subject of poor understanding, according to many legal scholars (Walker, 2000).

Practical Limitations on Parliamentary Sovereignty

From even a brief analysis of Dicey's doctrine, it is clear that the concept of parliamentary supremacy has never been practically implemented to its logical conclusion, and it is all but inconceivable that it ever would be. In addition to the sheer logical absurdity of a Parliament answerable to absolutely no one, the modern era has provided many concrete, explicit, and practical impediments to true parliamentary sovereignty. Some of these impediments have been domestic in nature and could thus be considered untested if practically apparent; others are international in nature and can be seen as constituting a conscious, willing, and explicit reduction of parliamentary supremacy.

Domestically, there have been a series of judicial decisions that appear to limit parliamentary supremacy, insisting that judicial review is necessary in cases involving certain legal formations and applications (Allan, 2011). Others have noted that the fundamentals of federalism — which are responsible for dispensing authority within the United Kingdom and for keeping the nation together as a political unit — are simply incompatible with the existence of any unitary or supreme authority, parliamentary or otherwise. This makes Dicey's doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty a false premise for any federalist nation (Walker, 2000). Legal practice has continued to demonstrate that the application of British law does not recognize a true sovereignty as existing in Parliament; though this is the highest legal entity in the United Kingdom, it appears more bound by practice than formative of it (Murken, 2009).

Conclusion

It is clear from even a basic analysis that the concept of parliamentary supremacy is not applicable in the modern era, and was ultimately incorrect when the doctrine was first advanced. While Parliament holds supremacy in the sense that it is the highest body within the government of the United Kingdom, in practice it is limited by certain codified and uncodified laws and principles. Understanding this is essential to properly understanding UK constitutionality.