US-UK Relations During the Falklands War, 1982

Introduction

On April 2, 1982, the Argentine government sent soldiers to take over the disputed Falkland Islands. The reason was that the South American country regarded the island group as part of its territory. However, the British, who already occupied the islands, also regarded the Falklands as their own. Over the following month, both countries made serious attempts to prevent the conflict from escalating. Alexander Haig, who was then the United States Secretary of State, was at the center of the diplomatic negotiations. He and his team traveled frantically between London and Buenos Aires to meet and negotiate with the leaders of the two countries — Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom and President Leopoldo Galtieri of Argentina. Nevertheless, the countless hours of negotiations and the frantic efforts of Haig and his team failed to prevent the conflict from escalating.

The British responded to the deployment of Argentine troops in the Falkland Islands by sending their own forces. The resulting confrontation saw the deaths of over one thousand men ("Crisis in the South Atlantic," n.d.). The purpose of this research paper is to investigate American diplomatic relations with the British during the war and in the immediate post-war period.

Background of the Falklands War

The Falkland Islands are located approximately 300 miles to the east of the Argentine coast. They are geographically closer to the South American country than to Britain. Argentina had long regarded the islands as part of its territory. However, in 1833, Britain — then a far more powerful state than Argentina — claimed the islands and occupied them. Despite Argentina's diplomatic opposition to the British occupation and administration of the islands, Britain refused to surrender them.

In early 1982, the Argentine government decided to take the islands by force. The government was led by a military junta that believed a forcible recovery of the islands would unite the country behind it, since the regime faced a significant decline in popularity due to human rights abuses and economic mismanagement. For this reason, the government sent over 1,000 troops to the Falkland Islands on April 2, 1982 ("Crisis in the South Atlantic," n.d.).

As the military government expected, many in Argentina reacted positively to the news of the recovery mission. Large, jubilant crowds gathered in the capital to show political support for the junta's operation. The British, however, saw the mission as an act of aggression. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared the Falklands a war zone and ordered British forces to prepare a military response to recover the islands. Given Britain's power and international stature, many European countries showed open support for the United Kingdom, and several moved to withdraw support from the Argentine military forces ("Crisis in the South Atlantic," n.d.). Most South American governments, by contrast, supported Argentina; the only open opposition came from Chile, which had its own territorial dispute with Argentina over another island group.

The failure of British, Argentine, American, and international diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the situation led to a military response by Britain. The British naval forces responded effectively and were able to recover the islands, compelling Argentine forces to surrender on June 14, 1982.

US-UK Relations During and After the War

The United States has long maintained a special relationship with the United Kingdom. This continued during the Falklands conflict, as the United States responded to Argentine aggression by imposing economic sanctions and embargoes on Argentina. There was also considerable private support provided to Britain. Nevertheless, the US did not wish to display too much public support, since it also sought to maintain strong relationships with the South American countries that backed Argentina. It further did not want to act against its longstanding Monroe Doctrine, which opposed European colonization of any part of the Americas. For these reasons, the Americans chose not to intervene militarily or deploy troops to help Britain retake the islands.

Even though the Americans did not send troops or continually make public declarations of support for the British, the Falklands War is widely regarded as having re-energized the special relationship between the US and the UK. Before the conflict broke out, the US and the UK were already closer than they had been in some time, owing to the shared ideological outlook of their respective leaders. Both Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher were committed economic and political liberals who believed in removing barriers to free markets and free societies. They were both strongly opposed to the Soviet Union and to communism. Although Britain retained considerable international clout and the special relationship with the US was continuing to grow, that relationship was still dominated by the US, even during the war ("Crisis in the South Atlantic," n.d.; "Message from British Prime Minister," May 5, 1982).

The Special Relationship During the War

The conflict between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands broke out at a time when the United States was working hard to build and sustain its relationships across Latin America. Many American diplomats argued that there was no need for the US to step into the situation more heavily on Britain's side, since such a move would damage American interests in the region (Bartlett, 1992, p. 154). However, while diplomats urged caution, others in the Reagan administration wanted to give the UK full support. These allies of Britain — including the Secretary of Defense — allowed British warships to use the US Navy base on Ascension Island, expedited British government purchases of missiles from American companies, and gave the UK access to important intelligence ("Memorandum from Secretary of State," n.d.). All of this military assistance was provided before the American government officially declared its support for Britain.

Toward the end of April — a couple of weeks after Argentina sent troops to the Falklands — the American government officially took a stand in favor of Britain by condemning the military junta in Argentina and announcing economic sanctions against the country. By this response, it is apparent that the Americans had weighed the situation and concluded that the value of Britain as an ally far outweighed any potential damage to American interests in South America ("Message from British Prime Minister," May 5, 1982). America's ultimate decision to support Britain is thought to have been influenced by Britain's allies within the US government and by the intense diplomatic efforts of British diplomats.

Initially, the Reagan administration was neutral and volunteered to act as mediator. The government sent the Secretary of State to negotiate with both sides in an effort to de-escalate the situation. However, neither side was willing to back down, and the issue remained unresolved. Britain's primary demand before any negotiations could begin was that Argentine troops vacate the Falklands immediately. The British also insisted that the wishes of the islanders be taken into account — counting on the fact that most islanders were of British descent and would therefore prefer to remain under British sovereignty in any referendum. The Argentines, on the other hand, had one principal demand: they would withdraw from the islands only if the negotiators and the British agreed that sovereignty over the islands would ultimately pass to Argentina ("Message from British Prime Minister," May 5, 1982). It was therefore extremely difficult for the Secretary of State to make progress, as no basis for compromise could be found. Yet while the American diplomat struggled to break the deadlock, British diplomacy was working intensively to bring the Reagan administration into open support of Britain.

One of Britain's foremost diplomats at the time was Sir Anthony Parsons, officially the British Ambassador to the United Nations. His first major success was to convince the UN Security Council to condemn Argentina's actions and call for the withdrawal of Argentine soldiers from the disputed islands while negotiations continued ("Message from British Prime Minister," November 4, 1982). Sir Parsons achieved this barely 24 hours after news of the invasion reached the rest of the world — an important diplomatic victory that gave Britain the moral high ground and the backing of the international community, while somewhat isolating Argentina. Another leading British diplomat was Sir Nicholas Henderson, UK Ambassador to the United States. He worked to sway American public and government opinion by appearing on multiple American television programs to defend the British case. Across Europe, British diplomacy went into overdrive, securing economic sanctions against Argentina from many European nations.

Prime Minister Thatcher herself also played a key role in shaping international opinion in Britain's favor. She did so by declining to reject any of the proposals for peaceful resolution put forward by the negotiators — not because she agreed with them, but because she expected Argentina to reject them first and, in doing so, appear unreasonable in the eyes of the world. This strategy paid off consistently, and she maintained the appearance of being the more conciliatory leader throughout the conflict.

Upon securing the support of the international community, British naval forces set off to recapture the islands as Argentina continued to refuse to vacate them. As the superior military power, Britain was able to quickly dislodge the Argentine garrison at South Georgia Island. Although South Georgia is located more than 1,600 kilometers from the Falklands, its recapture triggered the US to officially declare total support for the United Kingdom ("Message from British Prime Minister," November 4, 1982). This first military action was a clear signal that diplomacy had failed. The US government then did what it could to preserve the special relationship by ensuring that its ally would not lose. From this sequence of events, one can conclude that although the special relationship was important to British decision-making, it was not held in equally high regard by American decision-makers — it was only when conflict became inevitable that total US support was declared.

Conclusion

The US and the UK have always had a special relationship. The relationship has seen the two countries cooperate extensively on political, defense, trade, security, and many other fronts. However, there have been multiple instances in which British and American interests have diverged, straining that relationship. The Falklands War was one such instance. The war began when the Argentine junta sent its military to seize the Falkland Islands in a bid to regain political support at home. The resulting conflict forced US diplomacy to attempt the difficult balancing act of preserving its special relationship with the UK while maintaining sufficient goodwill with Argentina to prevent the spread of communism there.

While the US attempted to maintain a neutral stance, British diplomacy scored important victories that brought the international community to Britain's side. Once the UK went on the offensive and retook South Georgia militarily, the United States was compelled to declare its support for Britain. This in turn required American diplomacy to work intensively to prevent any further deterioration of US relations with Latin America. The war ended within ten weeks. The brevity of the conflict, and the way in which the US ultimately stood by its closest ally despite the political costs, illustrates the enduring influence of the special diplomatic relationship on the decision-making of both countries.

References

"Crisis in the South Atlantic: The Reagan Administration and the Anglo-Argentine War of 1982" in Milestones: 1981–1988. (n.d.). Office of the Historian.

"Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan" in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984. (n.d.). Office of the Historian.

"Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President Reagan" in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984. (May 5, 1982). Office of the Historian.

"Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President Reagan" in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984. (November 4, 1982). Office of the Historian.

"Note From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan" in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984. (May 5, 1982). Office of the Historian.

"Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State" in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984. (April 27, 1982). Office of the Historian.