Western Sahara Conflict: Morocco, Algeria, and the Polisario

Introduction: Background and Key Players

In the early years of civilization in the Western Saharan regions, peoples used trade and exchange of services as a means of maintaining peace and meeting the economic and social needs of their expanding societies. Western Sahara was then, and is today, rich in minerals and other resources, not least of which is oil. For the past thirty years there has been no peace in the region, largely because of natural resources worth billions of dollars. Aid sent to assist those caught up in the violence has been embezzled, and that is one of the reasons the region continues to experience conflict and turmoil. Coming together at the center of the war and conflict are three major forces carrying political clout: Morocco, Algeria, and the Polisario Front — as well as the Western countries that surround them. The Polisario Front, as its name suggests, is an opposition force, opposing Moroccan authority, and, in some ways, even Algerian leadership, while pursuing an agenda of its own.

This essay is a study of the region, its resources, the major players and forces, and, finally, the people of the region — all in an effort to understand what has been done to resolve the conflict and bring about a peace settlement that would allow the people of Western Sahara to make permanent homes and focus on the basics of daily life. The citizens of the region who are not in the military, not engaged in the conflict, but whose lives are subjected to the decisions and actions of the primary forces and power elites, live in terror each day. They are the ones who suffer the losses, and their lives and losses seem to be of little relevance to the forces in conflict and in control. An effort is made in this study to understand why the conflict continues, and which groups or individuals are benefiting from the continued unrest and aggression.

The total land area of Western Sahara is approximately 266,000 square kilometers — roughly the size of the United Kingdom. The population is largely of Sahrawi origin, representing the majority of the total population of approximately 340,000 people. Moroccans are also part of the region's population, but, like other nationalities, they are a minority. Where, then, do Algeria and the Polisario fit into the dynamics of the region? The Polisario is an exiled political organization supported by the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Algeria supports and provides financial aid to the exiled Polisario, which came into existence in 1973.

Western Sahara is the product of the transition from Spanish colonialism, and it follows the post-colonial history of European Africa that, following independence, many African countries continue to experience turmoil and civil war. The modern history of the "Spanish Sahara," now known as Western Sahara, begins when its Spanish colonial rulers left the region, which Spain had occupied since 1880. Spain left not because of guerrilla activity and civil war, but at the urging of the United Nations in the mid-1960s. It is at this point that the current dynamics began unfolding, and the modern-day players all planted their stakes in the desert region. At that time Mauritania had made its claim to the Sahara region, but relinquished it in 1973 when, in response to the manipulations of the vying powers, the guerrilla Polisario came into existence as an organization.

There is a need to understand the positions of the forces at play. First, it is necessary to gain a sense of the region — what is the landscape, and who occupies which section of it? From where do their claims on the landscape arise? It is only by analyzing the landscape and the positions of the players that one can begin to make sense of what has gone on, and continues to go on, in Western Sahara. It is unfortunate that the status quo of uncertainty is one that each of the groups is willing to maintain, as it is more favorable to them than the alternative of resolution. As the Executive Summary of 2007, Western Sahara: The Cost of Conflict, points out, the alternative is that one or more parties would walk away from a resolution with nothing. Peace, stability, and the welfare of the citizens — who outnumber those who lead the conflict and make decisions — is not what the parties are willing to prioritize.

The Moroccan Position

Since the Moroccans are among the minority population in Western Sahara yet are major players in the power struggle and decision-making process, it is necessary to consider their position in detail. Looking at a map, the northern tip of Morocco sits across the Mediterranean Sea from Spain. On its own side of the Mediterranean, Morocco is bordered by Algeria, which, like Morocco, is a former French colony. To the south, following the Atlantic coast, beyond Morocco's southernmost border, lies Western Sahara. In 1960 Mauritania annexed the southern third of Western Sahara but relinquished that holding following three years of guerrilla warfare with the Polisario. Mauritania is no longer an active player in the Western Sahara conflict.

During the mid-1960s, when the United Nations convinced Spain to surrender to the region's indigenous peoples the right of self-determination, Morocco became a key figure in the ensuing dynamics. The indigenous Sahrawi people were supported in their goal of self-determination by two United Nations resolutions — one in 1972, and a second passed in 1973. However, Morocco, having achieved its own independence from France and having long held that it had a historic claim to the region then being called Western Sahara, convinced Spain to delay the referendum on the UN resolutions until King Hassan II's case asserting Morocco's claim could be heard in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This constitutes the first element in Morocco's position:

Historic claim to the region referred to as Western Sahara.

Morocco's claims went beyond the assertion of a historic right to land formerly occupied by the Spanish. They included all of Mauritania and parts of Algeria, Mali, and Senegal — lands Morocco held were once part of "Greater Morocco." If the ICJ had ruled in Morocco's favor, it would have turned back the hands of territorial time by some hundred years. This was a second point of the Moroccan position:

A successful claim on Western Sahara would open the door for Morocco to pursue its territorial claims against Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Senegal.

However, the ICJ ruled not in Morocco's favor, but that the Spanish referendums should proceed. By that time, Spain had already begun experiencing guerrilla activity from the Sahrawi, even though they had not yet evolved into the Polisario. Facing a changing world in which colonialism was becoming a condition of the past, Spain had little interest in trying to sort out the ethnic conflicts among the Sahrawi, the Berbers, Arabs, and others who comprised the region's population. Had the ICJ ruled in Morocco's favor, it would have been flooded with claims by other countries regarding lands lost and gained during colonization, and perhaps even claims in European territory disputes.

The ICJ ruled, basing its findings on the lack of proof for the assertion of a claim against the territorial holdings of the former Spanish colonial authority. The court found no substantiation of a claim existing prior to the Spanish colonization of Western Sahara. The court's findings did two things: it resolved the immediate issue of a territorial claim by Morocco, but also, because its findings were based on a lack of evidence, it left the door open for Morocco to reassert its claim should new evidence be submitted for further review. Historians Yahia Zoubir and Daniel Volman describe the situation this way:

"At the same time, they [the judges] are in accord in providing indications of a legal tie of allegiance between the Sultan and some, though only some, of the tribes of the territory, and in providing indications of some display of the Sultan's authority or influence with respect to those tribes."

For the court to have found in Morocco's favor based on "historic" claims would have opened a Pandora's box with no legal solution. A finding in Morocco's favor would have undone the modern world order. Strangely enough, Morocco's King Hassan II interpreted the court's findings in Morocco's favor in accordance with Moroccan law. Had the referendums on the UN resolutions been held, this would have made Morocco's claim effectively moot.

Spain never held the referendums. Zoubir and Volman offer as reasons: first, Spain's own domestic issues, which were preoccupying its political resources. This is a sound reason, because, as they point out, Franco's health was failing and political maneuvering for power would have been an intense focus. Less convincing is their argument that Spain's failure to hold the referendums resulted from global pressure and fear of confrontation with Morocco. Whether or not Spain held the referendums, it was withdrawing from the African continent and would not have been threatened by Morocco afterward.

It is unlikely that Morocco, given the resources it was already directing toward its claim to Western Sahara, would have pursued Spain individually after withdrawal for holding the referendums. Morocco would more likely have been contentious toward whatever entity the referendum transferred power to. Spain's inaction produced the same result that action would have yielded, and it was therefore simply in Spain's long-term interest with Morocco not to take so definitive a step as a formal referendum. Thus Zoubir and Volman's argument that holding a referendum would have led to military conflict between Spain and Morocco is not a strong explanation for Spain's inaction.

Spain effectively divorced itself from the problems in Africa.

Zoubir and Volman base their reasoning partly on the fact that in 1975 Morocco rallied not just its troops but Moroccan civilians as well, in what is known as the Green March. They contend that Spain was intimidated by this show of force. However, their position does not originate from the perspective that Spain had already conceded to the UN's urgings to leave Western Sahara, and that it was only a matter of logistics that Spain was still in the country when Morocco made its show of force. From Morocco's perspective, the show of force while Spain was still present was necessary in order to suggest that Spain was being pressured and that Morocco's forces were a genuine threat.

It is not unlikely that Spain had logic similar to that of the United States when it pulled out of Vietnam — there was no loss, because Spain was a post-World War II power withdrawing from a situation that could have unfolded very differently. Spain had nothing to lose by the March, nor by sitting out the situation as the contending powers vied for control in 1975.

The Executive Summary of 2007 does not provide deep insight into Morocco's position of thirty years ago, but makes important points about Morocco's present-day position. Of all the players, Morocco perhaps has the most to lose economically if it is not awarded Western Sahara under its claim. The summary notes that 85% of the Sahrawi population of Western Sahara live in territory under Moroccan control, which Morocco has largely governed for the past thirty years. The civilians living under its control have prospered economically in many ways — though not necessarily in terms of democratic freedom. The summary credits Morocco for the region's economic progress, while noting that Sahrawis living there are not at liberty to criticize the Moroccan king or government, and that elections cannot be verified as free from fraud. This is, however, consistent with the political climate in Morocco itself; because Morocco regards Western Sahara as historically belonging to the kingdom of Greater Morocco, one should perhaps not expect the political conditions to differ significantly across the border.

The biggest problem that international peacekeeping organizations have with Morocco is documented in the Executive Summary of 2007, which states:

"Rabat [seat of the Moroccan government] violently stifles any claim of independence, frequently resorting to torture and arbitrary arrests, including against human rights activists. It has repeatedly prevented visits by international delegations wishing to observe the situation and has frequently expelled foreign journalists. Through the numerous benefits it grants, Rabat attracts populations from the north of Morocco to Western Sahara with the effect that the Sahrawis will very soon be a minority in that area, giving them a strong sense of dispossession. Moroccans as a whole have also had to bear heavy costs."

Spain encountered problems in 1973 when the Polisario began guerrilla attacks against Spanish troops. By 1975, Spain was pulling out of Western Sahara altogether and ceded control of the region to Morocco and Mauritania. This left Algeria outside the sphere of control, and since that time Algeria has thrown its support and resources behind the Polisario, with Sahrawis seeking refugee protection in Algeria. Morocco is perceived by some human rights organizations as an antagonist to the Sahrawis, partly because Morocco clings to the idea that the Sahrawis will eventually become a minority. This is difficult to grasp at present, given that the Sahrawis are a majority in Western Sahara. One conclusion that might be drawn from Morocco's assumption is a concern about human rights violations, including the possibility of potential genocide. Morocco's 2003 defense budget was $2.3 billion (USD). It maintains a military unit in Morocco and a second unit devoted to Western Sahara. While Algeria supports the Polisario Front (PF), it has not made an aggressive military move of its own forces against Morocco. The PF is estimated at between 3,000 and 6,000 guerrillas, representing an authority in exile.

It has been more than three decades since the Spanish left the Sahara. During that time Morocco has made a large financial and political investment in the region. This is the third element in the Moroccan position:

Extensive financial investment in the region's economic sectors.

Morocco, if it decided to yield to the autonomy of the Sahrawi population, would have to be compensated for its heavy investment in the economy of the area. The Executive Summary of 2007 is vague in describing the extent of this investment, defining it primarily as military. In referring to the southern part of Western Sahara, the summary mentions only "investment" without further definition, leaving its nature open to interpretation. However, the summary goes on to discuss poverty in slum areas, which contributes to support for Salafi Islamists — a problem that has not deterred Morocco from moving forward with its claim of sovereignty over Western Sahara.

In 2003, Morocco made an unprecedented move in asserting its ownership over Western Sahara. Between 2002 and 2003, Morocco entered into offshore drilling agreements with private firms in the United States — a clever maneuver aimed at gaining international recognition of its claim. Morocco capitalized on resources over which it may not have a legal right, but over which it holds present power. If Morocco shares Western Sahara's resources with major world powers and invests them in corporations that benefit those powers, there will predictably come a point at which the super powers and the United Nations will cease to acknowledge the rights of the Sahrawi, in whom the UN originally vested the authority of self-determination more than thirty years ago. This is, unfortunate as it may seem, the way of the global economy, and it represents a strategic move by Morocco in securing its sovereignty. However, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) appealed to the United Nations, which responded:

"The signing of the TotalFinaElf and Kerr-McGee contracts were condemned by many foreign governments and campaign groups, and described as 'provocative' by the president of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), Mohamed Abdelaziz, who appealed for UN intervention. The UN responded that the licences were technically within international law but added that actual exploration and production work would not be legitimate unless the Sahrawis themselves approved the contracts and benefited from them."

What this demonstrates is that the UN and other members of the international community are willing to turn a blind eye to the situation, probably because of the implications of natural resource exploitation. Protests made by foreign governments in the United Nations are often more about putting a protest on the record while acting in a completely different way. To condemn an act does not mean the condemning government will not avail itself of the opportunity to exploit international agreements. For Morocco, the final element of its position is the creation of an image of the "Greater Morocco."

The Algerian Position

Algeria's position is one that somewhat lacks the force needed to make its support of the PF effective in the long term. The Executive Summary of 2007 notes that Algeria has "paid" for the tension and conflict, which has kept areas along its own border in a volatile state. The conflict has created a border zone along Western Sahara, southern Algeria, and the border of northern Mauritania that is highly dangerous because of drug trafficking, civil conflict, and other contraband activity. The summary also reports that the United Nations has lost credibility in the minds of people living in those border regions. Algeria has enjoyed international support in its own right because of the overwhelming post-World War II sentiment in favor of nation-state self-determination — a notion that was to some extent validated by the fall of communism. Having won independence from France, Algeria benefits from that international public goodwill.

However, Algeria has, since its independence, experienced an internal conflict that shows no signs today of dissipating or being resolved. This is contrary to the ideals of the same groups that would otherwise support Algeria's self-determination agenda. The longer Algeria is unable to bring about internal political and military stability, the greater its loss of United Nations and public support in the international community for its backing of the PF. The international community will come to associate Algeria's own dysfunction with the PF through Algeria's support of that organization, and will not support self-determination under PF authority because it will be too closely associated with Algeria's internal instability.

Therefore, as the Executive Summary states, it remains in Algeria's best interest to maintain the status quo. Algeria can continue to offer aid and support to the PF while focusing its military and political resources on its own internal issues. Algeria is confident — and has issued statements to this effect — that the western world would suffer a credibility loss among its own populations if western leaders surrendered Western Sahara to Moroccan rule.

Algeria maintains that the conflict along its border is a threat to its own national goals, and that it must be diligent in protecting its borders from the peripheral threats arising out of the conflict between Morocco and the PF.

Algeria also stands firm that the Moroccan position prevents the fulfillment of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) — the political and spiritual unification of the Arab states and communities. At first glance, many people might not understand how Moroccan policy on Western Sahara prevents the AMU from achieving its goals, but the explanation lies in Morocco's Berber heritage. Morocco is not an Arab state in the same sense as others in the region. As noted in the Library of Congress Country Profile for Morocco:

"Islamic influence began in Morocco in the seventh century A.D. Arab conquerors converted the indigenous Berber population to Islam, but Berber tribes retained their customary laws. The Arabs abhorred the Berbers as barbarians, while the Berbers often saw the Arabs as only an arrogant and brutal soldiery bent on collecting taxes. Once established as Muslims, the Berbers shaped Islam in their own image and embraced schismatic Muslim sects, which, in many cases, were simply folk religion barely disguised as Islam, as their way of breaking from Arab control."

This is much the same as what took place in the early years of Christianity. In order for Christianity or Islam to be integrated into the lives of a pagan population, the integrating religion had to absorb and incorporate indigenous practices; otherwise it would remain foreign and be resisted or rejected. Morocco is also a country with a substantial Jewish population and a large Christian population — a cultural mixture of Arabs and non-Arabs. For that reason, Morocco does not fit the pure Islamic profile that would sustain the AMU. The world has seen how Arab nationalism has interacted with non-Arab Muslims in the Darfur region of Sudan, and there is no reason to believe it would unfold differently elsewhere. Algiers and Morocco are perhaps postponing an inevitable confrontation, which the UN seems to understand requires constant monitoring and intervention by the international community.

In summary, Algeria maintains that the conflict is one between Morocco and the SADR. So long as Algeria is experiencing internal upheaval, it cannot involve itself in Western Sahara to the extent necessary for the PF to prevail. Algeria's internal upheaval, a civil conflict ongoing since independence from France, is unlikely to end soon. It would be difficult to imagine Algeria simultaneously ending its internal conflict and achieving the internal stability needed to engage fully in Western Sahara.

Conclusion

There are more perspectives than have been presented in this essay to consider: international law, the United Nations as an entity whose mission it is to sustain global stability, and alternatives to conflict resolution that do not involve military aggression between contentious parties. However, the current forces that are at a standstill — a stalemate — are the ones upon which this paper has focused, as must the international community. There is a great deal at stake if any one of the players is declared the "winner" of the current stalemate. Once that occurs, it can reasonably be expected that violence will ensue on a greater scale than what has occurred in the past. Should Morocco succeed in establishing itself as the "Greater Morocco" on the international stage, it will likely pursue its "historical" claims against Mauritania and Algeria in the same manner it has asserted its claim to Western Sahara.

Human rights organizations have every reason to be concerned that should violence begin anew at the scale of the past, Morocco would probably not agree to another ceasefire but would pursue a course of action consistent with its notion that the Sahrawi will eventually become a minority in the region. Another concern is that the declaration of a winner — predictably Morocco — would bring about a country-to-country conflict between Morocco and Algeria. At present, Algeria supports the Polisario Front through financial aid and refuge as the governing authority in exile. That relationship would change if Morocco were recognized by international law and the United Nations as the official governing body of Western Sahara. The conflict would then be between Morocco and Algeria, and it would take on an altogether different character and level of warfare. The stakes for Algeria would be much greater, in that it would then be protecting its own territorial claims from Morocco's "historic" claims on behalf of Greater Morocco.

Algeria would have the support of the Polisario Front, but that support would be reduced by casualties of war presumed to occur in the PF's ranks during confrontation with Morocco before Algeria became engaged in its own conflict with Morocco. Mauritania would then be forced to join forces with Algeria, because Morocco holds a "historic" claim against Mauritanian territory on behalf of Greater Morocco as well. Even combined, however, Algeria and Mauritania would still not be at the level of military readiness needed to confront Morocco, which — whether overtly or covertly — could be expected to enjoy the financial support of entities contracting for offshore oil exploration under Moroccan authority in Western Sahara.

The issue for Algeria is that it is focused on its own internal turmoil and cannot spread itself militarily thin enough to confront Morocco on a greater scale than lending asylum and financial resources to the PF. There can be little doubt that this is a major reason why Algeria has not become more militarily involved in Western Sahara. Algeria simply cannot risk dividing itself between an internal conflict and an external one.

The Polisario Front continues to serve as the authority of record by virtue of the recognition given it through UN resolutions passed before Spain left the country in the early 1970s. If the international community is ever forced to recognize an alternative international authority in order to stop war in the region, the PF risks losing its standing as the officially recognized authority. In the interim, the PF continues to receive aid from Algeria and other international interests that support it.

According to the 2007 Executive Summary, the PF is experiencing waning support, internally and externally, because of allegations of embezzling funds designated for the poor and disadvantaged. In this modern age of mass communication, news of such embezzlement is likely to spread quickly, and there is a present lack of support for the PF alongside increasing support among the people for Moroccan leadership. As one analysis notes:

"Not only is the Polisario overmatched militarily, but they continue to be overly dependent on Algeria, which is far too distracted by its internal crises to muster effective leadership at this critical juncture. Indeed, the flow of arms from Algeria, already reduced, has essentially been halted since the ceasefire. By contrast, Morocco has far more freedom of action, given its usefulness to France, the United States, the Gulf monarchies, and whatever Maghrebi regime with which it may be courting favor at a given time. In addition, the stakes for the Moroccan government are much higher and popular support for the cause is much greater than in Algeria. Indeed, there is an assumption in diplomatic circles in Rabat that King Hassan would lose his throne if he lost the referendum."

This is the reason that the Executive Summary concludes that all three parties — the PF, Morocco, and Algeria — are content, for the time being at least, with the status quo of the ceasefire brokered by the UN in 1991. For the foreseeable future, that status quo is likely to remain, and, unless the PF forces Morocco into a position where Morocco must take a more politically and militarily aggressive action, it probably will not change so long as the Moroccan sultan rules and strives to restore the concept of Greater Morocco. Once there is a change of leadership in Morocco, it could bring about a change in the political environment of the region. This is something that cannot easily be predicted, and the hope is that the United Nations will pre-empt any further political or military upheaval.

In order for dialogue and discussion to take place around Western Sahara, it is necessary to become familiar with the vocabulary of the subject. For instance, the region dividing the "occupied territories" from the area where the Polisario exerts authority is called the "Berm," which translates roughly as "wall of shame." This is indicative of the fact that there may never be a full Arab–Moroccan peace, though a stalemate — until such time as supporting parties like Algeria can afford to become more involved in what seems, at some point, an inevitable ethnic confrontation — remains the only apparent solution.

Whether the United Nations or any third party will ever be able to negotiate a final solution to the region remains to be seen. However, the involvement of corporate entities with an interest in the region's natural resources very much predetermines which authority will prevail if it comes to total confrontation. This is not a reality that members of the international community or the United Nations want to face, and that is precisely the reason that more than $600 million has been spent in efforts to maintain the current stalemate.

What is certain is that there are countries in Africa that have demonstrated post-colonial success economically and socially. Andrew Borowiec (2003) cites Tunisia as proof of what can be accomplished when stability is achieved, political corruption is abated, and self-determination is realized. Borowiec suggests that the same economic and political stability demonstrated by Tunisia can be accomplished in Western Sahara, and that the Maghreb is capable of forming a unified bloc, not unlike the United Arab Emirates. It should be noted, however, that Borowiec refers to the Sahrawi as "inhabitants calling themselves Sahrawis" — a phrasing that suggests they are actually Moroccan, Algerian, or of some other cultural heritage. In fact, the Sahrawi are a people with a distinct and unique cultural heritage, and to suggest otherwise is to erase that identity in service of a broader regional integration narrative.

"Western Sahara is the only remaining non-self-governing territory in Africa." This statement, as if a magical utterance, will not by itself resolve the impasse that Western Sahara represents. However, the most pressing goal must first be the protection of human life. As of 1991, when the United Nations brokered a ceasefire that continues today, the loss of human life through direct conflict has been greatly reduced. The second goal must be to improve the health, education, and welfare of people in the refugee camps. Once those two goals are achieved, more focused attention can be directed toward resolving the stalemate, as required of the UN by its 2003 Resolution 1495.

At present, the Sahrawi have no prominent external support system — no high-profile advocates proactively championing their cause in the United States or elsewhere. Perhaps the United Nations should work toward ensuring that Morocco grants them political representation, even within an arrangement in which Morocco annexes Western Sahara. The immediate goal must be one that involves preserving the cultural existence of the Sahrawi as a people and as a civilization.

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