FASB Accounting Rules Did FASB 157 Cause the Financial Crisis?

Since the financial crisis began in February 2007, there has been an ongoing debate in the financial community over the causes of the crisis. One target that has come under fire for its role in the financial meltdown is FASB 157, which created new rules for valuing mortgage-related assets. Wall Street analysts and others blame 157 for implementing mark-to-market accounting standards. They believe that financial institutions took unnecessary losses to accounting rule changes that created billions in paper losses.

This study scrutinizes the role of accounting in general and FASB 157 in particular in creating the crisis. The authors review a number of reports, as well as financial accounting standards 142, 144 and 157. Having reviewed those, the study offers reasons to explain the impact of 157 in the context of other developments in the markets. They also examine how the guidelines apply to the asset categories that were created. The authors discuss fair value methodologies, and highlight problems with level 3 asset valuation. Prior to 157, level 3 assets were valued using a mark-to-model approach that was subject to manipulation and unrealistic assumptions. FASB 157 requires that a fair market value be assigned and that that derivation be disclosed.

The study discusses repercussions to the investment community of exaggerated write-downs and losses to level 3 assets. The authors explain shortcomings in the mark-to-model approach that are mitigated by 157. They highlight ratios of level 3 assets to stockholders' equity for several financial institutions; these ratios demonstrate the magnitude of the problem posed by level 3 assets.

This analysis also presents advantages of FASB 157, discussing the guidelines that bring about greater transparency for investors. Requiring companies to take losses on a yearly basis provides a disincentive for further Wall Street engineering and greed. The authors...

The authors propose several areas for future research to analyze issues around FASB 157 and its impact on financial markets.
Thesis

FASB 157 was not responsible for the financial crisis. The study explains its role and makes the case that 157 may have been a contributing factor, but was not the primary cause of the crisis.

Arguments Supporting the Thesis

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011) undertook a massive investigation into the causes of the financial and economic crisis. The report determined the most significant causes. The following is a partial list of their conclusions:

Widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision devastated the stability of the nation's financial markets.

Dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at systemically important financial institutions were the primary cause of the crisis.

A combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency made the crisis inevitable.

The Report does not list FASB 157 as being a primary cause of the crisis.

Arguments Opposing the Thesis

Critics of 157 argue that fair value accounting forced financial institutions to report unnecessary losses, which in turn, they claim, led to bank failures and distressed financial circumstances. According to Matt Hudgins in his article FASB 157: Warning Light or Smoking Gun? (2008), marking-to-market at a time when there is no demand for a security may cause punitive pricing; the few bonds that do trade in that period are likely to be underperforming or to be sold by distressed sellers, or both. In Hudgins' opinion, basing the value…