America's engagement with China, with historic ice-breaking between the two countries carried out by Henry Kissinger, has been complicated. I would suggest that it were the U.S. domestic preoccupations and compulsions that did not allow me to take any bold stance on the issue of Dalai Lama. I disagree with notion that U.S. betrayed the cause of human rights while not choosing to visit Dalai Lama.
It must not be forgotten that unlike Russia, China's geography allows her to exert much more influence than the former. In the words of Kaplan (2010), China is both a land and a sea power. Thus, my foreign policy towards China has been reflective of this potential next power of the world. The U.S. has benefited from the Chinese market significantly in the wake of financial crisis. The author failed to acknowledge the huge compulsions that China faces in meeting its energy and other strategic demands. China is following the same 'outward' approach as was adopted by the U.S. more than 100 years ago (Kaplan, 2010, p. 52).
Therefore, China is not expanding her interests against those of the U.S., in fact it bumping up more against those of India and Russia. I have therefore chosen to adopt a restrictive policy in circumventing China. U.S. cannot and should not adopt a hawkish policy towards China. This would amount to direct conflict and U.S. has bigger stakes in China than does China has currently. We have much sophisticated situation of ours to guard. I would have to admit that had my predecessor anticipated the outcome of our Afghan War on China, he might have opted out of the war as China is bigger beneficiary of the war than the U.S. herself.
This is substantiated by Kaplan (2010; p. 53) when he observed that "China's strategic geography would be enhanced if the United States stabilized Afghanistan." Therefore, the U.S. might be in a long-term fix to handle Afghanistan and China as instability of either one of them will hurt the U.S. interests in the long-term.
I would take the opportunity to express that the main concern for both China and the U.S. are its relations with respect to the Taiwan issue. The RAND corporation report has predicted that after 2020 it would become significantly difficult for the U.S. To protect Taiwan from any of the Chinese side aggression. Over here I agree with the author of article that China has been changing its modus operandi in several issues such as Taiwan and Tibet. China also denied entry of U.S. navy into the area and this was aimed at a larger design game planned by the Chinese.
China has been very careful not to provoke any military ambitions as it successfully created an economic and social balance of partnership with Taiwan. Some 270 flights per week from Taiwan to mainland China and other statistics regarding trade and tourism also depict that 'Greater China' is not a thing of distant future but nearby. China is aware that it cannot directly attack the U.S. navy and therefore China sends signals that war is no option for both the countries.
I suggest the U.S. is already moving along these lines. I would again state that "To paraphrase Mearsheimer, the United States, the hegemon of the Western Hemisphere, will try to prevent China from becoming the hegemon of much of the Eastern Hemisphere. This could be the signal drama of the age" (Kaplan, 2010; p. 63). Over here, I would again emphasize that so-called 'rouge states' such as Pakistan should not be left with an easy option to choose between the U.S. And China should there become a war event between China and the U.S., the latter should keep its presence in social and military as well as civil circles of Pakistan.
It would also be pertinent to mention that unlike the image portrayed by several authors in contemporary international relations domain, the Chinese are making huge strides forward in their adoption of democratic norms. "The Xiamen and Shanghai walks illustrate how new social groups as well as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continue to adapt and experiment with ways to act on new interests while avoiding or preventing direct challenges to CCP rule (Gilboy & Read, 2008; p. 64). Therefore, I as president of the U.S. do not estimate that Sino-U.S. tensions would be same as the U.S.-Soviet tensions during the cold war. The Soviets represented a much different value system whereas Chinese are only compelled by their appetite for natural resources. I am more than hopeful of a 'swift' relationship between the U.S. And China. We as a nation should not come at loggerheads with China by over-pampering India.
The U.S. relationship with India is still shaping up and the soft initiatives taken by Mr. Bush are commendable. However, there plethora of details to be satisfied before the U.S. can actually assist India in its journey to become a regional power as per the U.S. national security interests. It is pertinent to mention that I recently, during G20 summit, backed Indian PM Manmohan Singh's proposals for stimulating growth in the regional and world economies (Tellis, 2009; p. 240). At Pittsburg, I endorsed the ideas of Mr. Manmohan and can assure that we had developed a good working relationship despite my several reservations regarding handling India during the Bush era. India can be equated as 'game balancer' in Asia. China is also closely watching the relationship of U.S. with India. To take advantage of the occasion, I assured the India PM regarding the U.S. intentions to continue supporting India in maintaining power balance against China and Pakistan. India also has interest in the same. While both the aforementioned countries have occasionally worked in close collaboration against the Indian interest in the region, I urged Mr. Manmohan not to engage in any conflict at the cost of India's path to becoming a 'United Nations Security Council UNSC' member that the U.S. eagerly wants India to become.
As described in the policy brief 81, the U.S. plans to enhance relationship with India based on five key areas. These are energy, economics, trade, agriculture, and education. With science and technology being the core attention area by Mr. Bush as well as my own office, I would caution analysts that any '2005 like breakthrough' deal shall not be expected out of my meeting with Indian PM in coming month. This is because both India and the U.S. are now more interested in consolidating the earlier MoUs being signed by me as well as my predecessor (Mr. Bash) with the Indian counterparts.
As far as India's projection by the U.S. As a regional power is concerned, I am glad to share that U.S. has developed very cordial and far reaching partnership with India in this regards. The civilian nuclear deal signed by Bush Jr. was important for a thaw in stalemated relations between U.S. And India since the nuclear explosion by India. I would also support the Indian cause of securing UNSC membership but critics should not expect a breakthrough as the U.S. primary interest in coming five years is the Afghan war and I would not like to risk that owning to Pakistan's inherent antagonism towards a 'stronger and hegemonic' India. Nonetheless, India's UNSC membership in inevitable and the U.S. shall support so.
I would also retreat my support for a bilateral trade treaty with India but only after reform in the Indian domestic market are initiated. It is important for the U.S. And for a democrat government that India is presentable as a 'free trade partner' whose economy is based on free enterprise principles, rather than state assuming a leading control. Bilateral trade liberalization can precede any eventual 'bilateral free-trade agreement' (Tellis, 2009; p. 241).
After considerable stalemate in our military-to-military relationship, I expect that the U.S. will show deep concern for the Indian need of securitizing its interest given that China is actively courting the South East Asian and Central Asian states in developing a military as well as economic relationship. It is also worth mentioning that one area of contention between the U.S. And India is that of relationship of India with Iran. Since Iran has not abided by the UN resolutions regarding arms inspection and nuclear proliferation treaty, I would use the opportunity of meeting Indian PM to persuade him for supporting the U.S. In case that a UN resolution for another round of sanctions is tabled. This will make things clear whether or not India realizes the role that the U.S. envisions for her in the future course of Asia. I would strive to convince of making huge strides forward in its obligations as bigger nation as compared to her neighbors. The relationship of India with the U.S. will have to become a normal one that includes trade and investment in…