China IR Study Notes

China

Is China a status quo or aggressive power?

Johnston (2013) argues that China's allegedly new assertiveness is nothing of the sort. He makes the case that this view underestimates the aggressiveness of past Chinese foreign policy, and that the country has not really changed its level of assertiveness. This aligns with the explanations that Fravel (2007) has of past hard power that China has used in border disputes, which also highlights that there has been aggression in the past. The author also argues that the assertiveness level of Chinese foreign policy since 2010 has been overstated. The crux of the argument made is that China was always assertive in certain contexts with respect to foreign policy, and it remains assertive in those contexts. The level of assertiveness has not actually changed much. Perhaps people are just noticing it more -- he literally shows a graph of news articles about Chinese foreign policy that use the word assertive, and how this has spiked since 2009.

A contrasting view is provided by Matsuda (2014), who argues that not only has China been more assertive since 2008, but that the country's assertiveness is reactive in nature. He views Japan as being a status quo nation, whereas China is "the biggest rising revisionist state in the region." China, he argues, engages in strategic framing with respect to its neighbors, following only a single line of discourse when dealing with those nations, something that stands diametrically opposed to the free speech and wealth of arguments that democracies like Japan generate with respect to Asian security issues. Matsuda suggests three hypotheses for China's assertiveness: The rising trend hypothesis, the deterioration and amelioration hypothesis and the redefinition of strategic rivals hypothesis. Each is based on the underlying assumption that China has become more assertive since 2008, and the author never really challenges that assumption.

Ikenberry (2008) characterizes China as a rising power, while Schweller (2011) argues that it should be, but is not. Schweller's point is that while China should be setting the tone for itself in the 21st century, the country is more oriented towards older, status quo models of behavior. Its "aggressiveness" is mostly just the same thing it has been doing for a long time in Schweller's view.

What Ikenberry notes, however, is that China as a rising power is going to be significantly different from other rising powers. He argues that other powers rose in a different world order, whereas today there is a much greater emphasis on international norms, and the nuclear deterrent reduces the use of warfare as a means of gaining strength. His case is more that China is not that aggressive, nor does it need to be.

Johnston (2003) addresses the question directly in this article, though the article is a bit dated at this point. He argues that China is a status quo power, and that the chorus of commentators who have expressed concern about China's behavior -- that it is a source of instability -- are overblowing the issue. China has worked within the international system as long as it has become involved in the system. There may be instances where it has sought to express hard power, but it has not been out of line with international norms of behavior in those instances -- indeed it was more out of line with international norms prior to 1980 in some of its conflicts. In this work, he specifically looks at what other commentators are saying, and evaluates their arguments.

Johnston argues that on the issue of sovereignty -- where China may perhaps be the greatest source of "instability" as other commentators would argue -- China is applying a traditional absolutist doctrine. It is "fighting as a conservative power to reaffirm sovereignty and internal autonomy against challenges from evolving concepts of human rights, domestic governance and humanitarian intervention." In other words, Johnston takes the view that where China is seen as being out of step with international norms, that is mostly a reflection of the changing norms, rather than a change within China itself. The norms are changing faster than China. As an autocratic state, China simply is not as flexible with the changing power structures that those emerging issues create.

Johnston further notes that with respect to other critical foreign policy issues, such as non-proliferation and arms control, China is more in line with international norms than, say, the United States. There are instances where China specifically challenges U.S. interests, but these must be distinguished from actions that challenge international norms, as the two are not the same thing. China is much more likely ot challenge U.S. interests than it is to challenge international norms. So China in that sense is more of a power balance than an rule-breaker. It generally is a status quo power in that respect, and alleged aggression is mainly a Western narrative for instances where China stands up to U.S. interests, especially in East Asia.

What best describes China: norm-maker, rule-breaker or norm-taker?

Matsuda (2014) views China a rule-breaker more than anything. His arguments in favor of a more assertive China juxtapose Chinese foreign policy, especially in the maritime sphere, as opposite the status quo or norm of Japan. China, in contrast, lashes out in a reactive manner, making it a rule-breaker.

Schweller (2011) argues that China should be a norm-maker as along with the U.S. China will be rulers of the 21st century. However, they have to this point not been much of that. Not a norm-taker but a status quo power at the most.

Medeiros & Fravel (2003) would argue that China is a norm-taker, more than anything else. The country has become increasingly engaged internationally since the 1990s, which means that it is not a rule-breaker. It has signed a wide range of bilateral trade agreements and joined the World Trade Organization. This engagement, however, has increased China's bargaining power and the result of that is that China has the power to make rules. Their diplomatic tack has changed since the early 1990s.

The author argue that China currently operates within the framework of international rules, but has become quite adept at doing so. They note that at the UN Human Rights Commission, China has enjoyed repeated success. The country works within international rules and norms to pursue its interests. The authors go on to say that China has some issues with aspects of this system. However, China's skill in working the international system will likely be focused in the coming couple of decades on the numerous domestic challenges that it still faces, particularly with respect to the large number of poor in China -- their article is a bit dated in that respect now that climate change and water have also become major concerns in Chinese domestic policy as well.

Pan (2013) argues that while people in the West will talk about "the Chinese century" the view from within China can be different, and significantly nuanced. Beijing in general takes a low profile, but this "belies its ambition to dominate the twenty-first century when its time comes," thus furthering the argument that while China has the power to be a norm-maker, it is for the time being a norm-taker. This is supported in Johnston's (2007) book on China policy-making 1980-2000. In this book, Johnston argues that China became socialized to international relations, thus learning about how the world works and how to work within those frameworks. That makes China a norm-taker through that period of time, though the implication is still there that China intends to move beyond that at some point.

An interesting argument is put forth by Callahan (2012). He sees China as a norm-taker on the surface, looking to the world's systems as a means to build its power. This is characterized as a "harmonious world" narrative. What Callahan notes, however, is that there are differences between this official approach and the ways that it promote certain individual actions. Callahan states that "foreign policy has unintentionally created opportunities for citizen intellectuals to challenge elite discussions of foreign policy." Where perhaps many within China prefer to be norm-takers and work within that context, there are clearly others who see China's increasing power as an opportunity to move beyond that paradigm, and become rule makers.

In envisioning a century of Chinese leadership, Callahan (2012) notes that China's intellectuals are looking to Western norms anyway, things like liberalism, idealism and realism, as their models for behavior. Thus, even should China seek to be a rule-maker, it will still not have a strictly non-Western view of international relations and norms of behavior, but may well simply adapt a Western concept to the Chinese context. He argues that homegrown concepts like "harmonious world', 'Tianxia' and 'the China dream' are far too vague to actually be implemented. China's strategic future therefore remains quite uncertain in light of it not having any replacement for the core Western norms that drive the current world order.

Johnston (2003) notes that in general China works within international law. There are instances where it specifically stands against U.S. interests, but that is not the same thing as international law. Thus, where China is seen as a "rule-breaker" that is mainly due to the need to break rules to stand up to U.S. interests, or it is merely China seeking to set different norms than those that have been imposed by the U.S. Where norms are established on a more international basis, China is more likely to be a norm-taker. It is seldom a rule-breaker to the extent that some Western interests might characterize it, mainly because those interests are framing China's behavior vs. that of the U.S., rather than that of the international community at large.

Johnston (2003) also looks at norms of international self-determination. China is particularly criticized for its treatment of minorities within its borders, but Johnston argues that this is to "misconstrue the intentional norm of self-determination." There is no international law or practice, Johnston points out, that will "recognize the absolute right of any social, political or ethnic groups to sovereign independence." Johnston is right on a technicality here, but that does not invalidate criticism of China for its policies towards minorities -- he is engaging logical fallacy here. China can be criticised for its behavior without suffering accusation that it is violating international norms. Further, he has conflated the status of the Uyghurs in particular with the status of Taiwan. The two are nothing alike, and arguably China's views of Taiwan do stand outside of international norms. Even opponents of North Kore accept that it is a nation, that it could sit at the United Nations or other bodies if it wanted, and that there is a central government there as distinct from that of South Korea. The differential treatment of Korea and China in the wake of their respective civil wars illustrates that, yes, China does violate international norms with respect to its position on Taiwan.

Ikenberry (2008) discusses China's rise, and how this affects the West and the international order. China is, in his characterization, a norm-taker in the sense that there is already an international system and China typically works within that system. This is different from other global powers, who rose to prominence with such a clear international system. The result is that China is essentially the first modern power, to achieve its power and status in the world in the context of the international system, as a norm-taker rather than as a norm-maker or rule-breaker.

What is the role of hard power and soft power in Chinese foreign policy? Discuss with reference to China's recent strategy in Asia?

As a point of background, Johnston (2007) argues that soft power is the predominant use of power in the rise of China over the period 1980-2000. It was during this period that China became socialized in international relations. It learned how to use its soft power to get what it wants within the framework of international rules and, a skill at which it became substantially more adept during this period.

Fravel (2007) discusses China's use of force in territorial disputes. The paper was written before the most recent issues, but it touches upon some of the times that China has used violence in the past. The author notes that the use of hard power is not unusual for China, but that force has only been used in six of twenty-three territorial conflicts prior to 2007. Disputes with India and Vietnam were especially violent. The dispute with the U.S.S.R., the author notes, was not, but in part that was because both countries were nuclear powers. Fravel also notes that the ways China uses hard power are limited to the use of force, but that it seldom seizes territory. The invasion and occupation of Tibet, Fravel apparently forgot about. Fravel also notes that China has not been as belligerent in conflicts to the extent that would be predicted by its level of power and the structure of its state. For example, it has strong military capabilities and there are no internal checks on its use of force, conditions that would normally predict a much higher use of force.

A large part of Fravel's paper is framed around the Senkaku Islands dispute with Taiwan. This dispute is a source of potential conflict with the United States, something that helps to influence whether or not China is likely to use force in this particular conflict. China has used force to defend its territorial claims, and there is some support for preventative war theory, as China has been willing to demonstrate its power as a deterrent for anybody to pursue actions against China's territorial claims.

The author notes, however, that China tends to use force against stronger opponents, while avoiding the use of force against weaker countries on its land borders. With respect to maritime disputes, China has been more belligerent, initiating disputes on multiple occasions with Taiwan, but also with Vietnam. It is worth noting that these are also stronger powers, especially as in terms of military power Taiwan is viewed as being related to the U.S., and therefore strong.

The author also argues that China's use of hard power is related to its relative bargaining power. Where it feels that its bargaining power has been reduced, it is more likely to utilize force (hard power), perhaps as a means of improving its bargaining position, or restoring its bargaining position to prior levels. This is the one area where recent shows of force is not predicted by China's past behavior, as it current has much more soft bargaining power than at previous times when it exerted hard power. These conflicts serve as a backdrop for the more recent events, wherein China has against sought to show its force, albeit not actively engaging in violent acts, in response to perceived threats by stronger nations. This is consistent with past policy regarding disputed islands in particular.

Huang and Ding (2006) argue that China uses both hard and soft power in its "rise." They feel that soft power is the more important of the two, and that China has made extensive efforts to cultivate soft power, in particular where economics and trade are concerned. But China has also made a point to become more involved in global affairs, if even as an observer. The country's use of hard power is more strictly related to East Asia and specific disputes. It is the use of soft power that is more important on the global scale. The interesting ramification of this is that the soft power internationally can affect how foreign powers define their involvement in the East Asia political sphere.

Ikenberry (2008) essentially argues in favor of China as a user of soft power. In the modern world, warfare has been greatly diminished as a means to improving a nation's power, because of the nuclear deterrent. Thus, China has had to become more skilled at the use of soft power. Its economic might has been the source of much of its rising influence. Military actions such as in the context of the maritime disputes may have always been there, but the soft power is what has increased over time.

Is it sufficient to focus on the rise of popular nationalism when trying to explain China's approach to maritime territorial disputes?

Fravel (2007) provides a discussion here that relates to the maritime disputes as reflecting its bargaining position. Popular nationalism might reflect on internal power dynamics, but Fravel believes that China's actions in maritime trade disputes also reflect its relative bargaining power. In particular, he argues that China utilizes hard power in order to restore its bargaining position, when it feels that its bargaining position is weak. Prior to the recent events, popular nationalism would have been insufficient to explain the timing or strength of China's use of hard power. In more recent years, when China has a strong bargaining position and has still sought to engage a show of force, there may be issues relating more to internal balance of power -- still not a case that popular nationalism is a driving factor, but providing a reason to examine the internal driving forces behind the military actions in recent maritime disputes.