Aviation security vulnerabilities and post-9/11 safety improvements

Aviation Safety

Aviation Security

"As the first flights began again on September 15, some crews refused to fly, not confident of airport security. Those who steeled themselves to work entered a strange new workplace. With no guidance from the airlines or the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on how to handle potential future hijackings, flight attendants inventoried galleys for objects they could use as defensive weapons. Shell-shocked passengers sometimes hugged flight attendants as they boarded. Many crewmembers barely contained tears, often hiding in galleys to avoid alarming passengers."

Rodney Ward

Association of Flight Attendants

As the growth in air traffic appears to be picking up again, people are demanding more safety and security. As we look back to the events of September 11, 2001, we realize that this was a day that most Americans will never forget as long they live. Some of those who witnessed and watched airplanes plunge into both World Trade buildings in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC will have to live with those memories for the rest of their lives. The impact and aftermath of that dreadful day are still being felt emotionally and economically by many private citizens and commercial industries.

Airline safety is one of the most important issues facing the world today. In a recent study, Wassink and Cherry (2003) showed that this has been a consistent phenomenon in history; major increases in safety and security efforts are implemented in response to successful terror attacks. Government direction and funding, which are generally required to enforce these improvements, are more readily available after a successful terrorist attack.

Wassink (2003) stated that one of the most significant challenges for the aircraft manufacturing and air travel industries is to identify vulnerabilities and implement a combination of technical and procedural solutions prior to a successful attack. This challenge is made significantly more complex because market forces drive neither aircraft manufacturers nor the air travel industry towards enhanced safety and security measures. These industries readily recognize the devastation another successful terrorist attack would have on both the U.S. And international air travel markets. However, profitability currently drives the aircraft industry. For this reason, efforts to enhance safety and security will not be undertaken voluntarily by the aviation industry (Wassink & Cherry, 2003).

This paper is aimed at exploring the most important safety issues in the airline safety and suggestions to address these issues. The author used empirical research studies on the topic of aviation security.

Issue in Aviation Security

Since September 11, 2001, Americans have become all too familiar with the flaws in the nation's aviation security. According to Yeoman and Hogan (2002), "throughout the 1990s, government inspections designed to intentionally breach airport security met with extraordinary success. Federal inspectors discovered that they could smuggle firearms, hand grenades, and bomb components past screening checkpoints at every airport they visited" (p. 2). They got on airplanes with no problems and placed objects throughout the cabins. In one investigation conducted in 1999, "they successfully boarded 117 airplanes, some filled with passengers, and were asked to show identification only one fourth of the time" (Yeoman & Hogan, 2002, p. 2). Mary Schiavo (as cited in Yeoman & Hogan), the inspector general for the Department of Transportation from 1990 to 1996, said "her office repeatedly recommended security improvements, including a system to match checked bags with onboard passengers" (p.2). The FAA wanted no part of this, said Schiavo. Their attitude was since we had never had a major incident in the United States, the risk was low.

"The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) sets standards for the air-worthiness of all civilian aircraft, inspects and licenses them, and regulates civilian and military air traffic through its air traffic control centers. It investigates air accidents and, in response, may establish new rules on such issues as de-icing and airframe inspections. It also promotes the development of a national system of airports" (FAA, 2001).

According to Claybrook (2001), the FAA has been taken over by the very industry it regulates; as a consequence, airline safety and security has become seriously and dangerously lax. She further stated that millions of people fly daily for pleasure and employment and depend on airlines -- and the FAA's oversight of those airlines -- to keep them safe.

Wassink and Cherry (2003) suggested that the most significant challenges facing the leadership of federal agencies, including the FAA and the aircraft manufacturing and air travel industries, are identifying vulnerabilities and implementing a combination of technical and procedural solutions prior to a successful attack. These challenges are made significantly more complex because market forces drive neither aircraft manufacturers nor the air travel industry towards enhanced safety and security measures. Wassink and Cherry further posited that profitability currently drives the airline industry. As a result, efforts to enhance safety and security will not be undertaken voluntarily by the aviation industry.

Wassink and Cherry (2003) stated that federal intervention and direction is required to establish a long-term balance between aviation commerce and profit, aircraft security, and aircraft and air travel safety. These three forces frequently operate in opposition to each other. Numerous security enhancements, both implemented and proposed, have wide-ranging safety implications.

Claybrook (2001) pointed out that the ATA (Air Transport Association of America, Inc.), the lobbying group formed by the top nine airlines, has spent millions of dollars trying to dissuade the FAA and legislators from passing stronger security measures that would cost the airlines more money.

Claybrook (2001) pointed out that the ATA, the lobbying group formed by the top nine airlines, has spent millions of dollars trying to dissuade the FAA and legislators from passing stronger security measures that would cost the airlines more money.

The ATA meets the definition of a dominant coalition, "a social network of individuals having the greatest influence on the selection of an organization's goals and strategies" (Ansoff, 1983; Charan, 1991; Neilsen & Hayagreeva Rao, 1987; Pearce & David, 1983; Pearce & DeNisi, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The airlines want the safety and security changes, but they insist that the federal government pay for any or all safety and security enhancements. Thompson (1967) stated that dominant coalitions are bound together by the fact that the achievement of members' goals usually requires interdependent action by the coalition members.

The Airline Industry: The Present

According to B.L. Cherry (2003), the airline industry is clearly about to undergo great changes, as suggested by the recent shutdown of Vanguard Airlines, the Chapter 11 filing by U.S. Airways which later recovered, and the possibility that United Airlines may also file Chapter 11. Business and commercial travel has declined because of the poor economy B.L. Cherry argued that many travellers are still uneasy about airline safety and security or irritated by the delays and inconvenience of intensified security post 9/11. He also suggested that the FAA has no real solutions to these problems, although technically the FAA does not involve itself with the business aspects of the airlines. The FAA sets rules and guidelines on safety and security for airports and carriers. The FAA and the federal government will have to step in and mandate some of these measures (B. L. Cherry). Potential measures include the following:

1. Enhanced police surveillance at airports

2. Further enhancements and increased vigilance at pre-board screening checkpoints

3. Expanded searches of passengers immediately before boarding

4. A requirement for passengers to provide government-issued photo identification at departure gates

5. Enhanced screening of checked baggage

6. Expanded screening of personnel accessing aircraft

Prevention and Protection

Two broad options exist for defining safety and security measures. According to Wassink and Cherry (2003), these measures can be designed to prevent an attack against the aircraft, aircrew, and passengers, or they can be designed to protect the aircraft, aircrew, and passengers by minimizing the effects of such an attack. Wassink and Cherry also pointed out that enhanced safety and security results from an appropriate combination of preventive and protective measures. One significant challenge is to find the most cost effective balance between multiple safety and security options. Wassink and Cherry thought that this choice would involve substantial difficulties because the implementation of any measure will have both direct and indirect costs. Indirect costs, such as the impact that increased security delays might have on travel demand, can only be estimated. Conversely, increased security, even with slightly longer delays, might boost traveller confidence and ultimately increase revenue and profit. An additional challenge arises from the need to analyze the potential consequences of implementing preventive and protective measures to ensure that they do not lead to decreased air travel safety or present or create additional vulnerabilities that might be exploited by malicious persons.

Wassink and Cherry (2003) considered that the primary purpose of preventive measures is to deny malicious individuals the ability to introduce weapons into the aircraft. Generally, these persons want to introduce weapons into an aircraft for one of two reasons: the weapons may be designed to destroy the aircraft and persons on board or they may be used to take over the aircraft or intimidate the aircrew into changing the destination. Examples of preventive measures include controlling aircraft access, passenger screening, and baggage matching; widening the airport security perimeter; and protecting aircraft control and navigation systems.

Wassink and Cherry (2003) considered that the primary purpose of protective measures is to ensure that any failure of preventive measures does not allow weapons to be introduced into the aircraft. Protective measures should seek to reduce aircraft damage, limit bodily harm to passengers, and preclude the airplane's being flown to somewhere other than its intended point of landing either by the aircrew under duress or by malicious persons. Examples of protective measures include hardened cockpit doors, arming pilots, increased use of sky marshals, and video monitoring systems.

"There's so many unknowns," says Dave Barger, President of JetBlue Airlines (as cited in Levin, 2002, p. 3). "I don't think the legislation has really been thought out" (p. 3). Aviation safety advocates say giving pilots the added responsibility for security could threaten safety by disrupting their normal routines. "We've trained these pilots so carefully, and we've ingrained in them that predictable routine makes it safe," says Susan Coughlin, a former member of the National Transportation Safety Board who is president of the Aviation Safety Alliance, "Let's let them do that and let law enforcement do the rest" (as cited in Levin, p. 3).