China's Taiwan Policy
China -- the most populous country in the world -- has exhibited remarkably high levels of sustained economic growth in the two decades since it reformed its economy following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. According to some analysts, the country is poised to become the number one economy in the world sometime in the mid-twenty first century. There are, however, certain political issues that may affect China's rightful role in the future world affairs. One of them is the 'Taiwan affair' -- a problem that has defied a satisfactory resolution ever since the Communist forces defeated the Kuomintang (KMT) in the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and Chiang Kai-Shek
retreated to Taiwan along with 2 million of his supporters from the Mainland China. The political status of Taiwan (or the state of Republic of China) has, since that time, been a source of concern for China as well as the rest of the world.
This research paper on China's Taiwan Policy takes a detailed look at the Taiwan issue by tracing its background and history, outlining the legal position of Taiwan, examining the changes in China's Taiwan policy over the years; the strategy adopted by Taiwan in dealing with its larger neighbor and how the rest of the world looks at the issue. It also analyzes how far the issue is likely to affect China's future role in the world affairs.
Recent History and Legal Status of Taiwan
To understand Communist China's policy towards Taiwan, it is necessary to examine the legal status of Taiwan and its recent history.
Taiwan under Japanese Rule:
Taiwan was a province of China under the Qing Dynasty but was permenantly ceded to Japan in 1895 under the "Treaty of Shimonoseki" at the end of the First Sino-Japanese war. Not long thereafter, the Republic of China (ROC) succeeded the Qing Dynasty in 1912 after almost 2,000 years of imperial rule in China. Its rule in mainland China, however, remained unsettled as a number of warlords seized control of much of Northern China; a civil war was fought between the Communists and the Nationalists from 1926 to 1949 and the Japanese invaded China in 1937, which resulted in the Second Sino-Japanese War. At the start of the War, the ROC declared the Treaty of Shimonoseki "null and void." The Sino-Japanese War merged into the 2nd World War and at the Cairo Conference held in 1943 by the Allied powers, it was decided that Taiwan would be returned back to China at the end of the War. (Pannel)
Returned Back to China:
Subsequently, when Japan surrendered unconditionally, the Japanese troops in Taiwan handed over its administration to ROC military forces as per the terms of the Post Dam Declaration. The Chinese KMT administration in China was perceived as repressive, which led to friction between the Chinese mainlanders and the local Taiwanese and an uprising in February 1947, known as the 228 incident. Some Taiwanese who wanted Taiwan to remain independent appealed to the U.S. And the UN to intervene on the plea that Japan had not formally transferred sovereignty over the island aand it was still legally part of Japan, which was now occupied by Allied forces. The proposed intervention, was rejected by the U.S. And ROC administration was able to crush the rebellion with brute force. (Ibid.)
ROC or PRC?
In the meantime, the Chinese Civil War on the mainland had ended with the defeat of the Kuomintang Nationalists by the Communists and the ROC government led by Chiang Kai-Shek fled to the island of Taiwan
in December 1949 where it set up its provisional capital in Taipei. The ROC government continued to regard itself as the sole legitimate government of China while the Communists proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC) and claimed to be the successor state of the ROC over all of China. It condemned the Nationalist government in Taiwan as illegitimate and planned to invade the island to bring it under its rule. The Communist plans were, however, frustrated by the United States, which sent naval forces to defend the island in 1950. When Japan regained sovereignty in 1952, it renounced all claims over Taiwan and the Pescadores. Both ROC and PRC -- major claimants of Taiwan -- were not invited to the peace conference that decided the terms of Japan's sovereignty. The defacto rule of ROC over Taiwan, however, continued and subsequently the ROC and Japan signed the "Treaty of Teipei" in 1952, which reaffirmed the terms of the Treaty of San Francisco. The ROC and the United States also signed a mutual-defense treaty in 1954, in which the United States agreed to defend Taiwan militarily, if the Communist regime in mainland China attacked the country. The legal position of Taiwan, therefore, remained unclear (and does so till today) with the People's Republic of China, the ROC and the movement for independence of Taiwan, each having their own interpretation of its legal position. (Lee 84)
Taiwan in the Cold War Period (1949-1971)
Chiang Kai Shek cleverly exploited the Cold War obsession of the Western powers who wanted to block the spread of Communism at all costs; he strengthened the economy and the military of Taiwan with the help of massive aid from the United States.
As a result, the industrial production of Taiwan rose by 300% in the first decade of its existence; its exports tripled and its imports doubled. The island became a model of modern economic development, with a growth rate far above that of most other Asian economies and was showcased as an example of the superiority of Capitalism over Communism by the Western powers. (Pannell, Para on "Time of Prosperity")
Until the mid-sixties, the country enjoyed wide diplomatic recognition throughout the world and a booming economy, and more governments around the world including the United Nations recognized ROC as the legitimate government of China as compared to the PRC. Such international support, along with a booming economy, allowed Chiang Kai-Shek to consolidate his political powers and he continued to head a one-party authoritarian government in Taiwan.
Gradually, however, more and more countries started to form diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China
and since the PRC would not form formal ties with any country that recognized ROC, Taiwan began to lose international support.
The United States Changes Track
In the early 1970s the United States decided to seek closer ties with Communist China and the People's Republic was given China's seat in the United Nations after Taiwan's expulsion from the world body. Several other nations followed the lead of the U.S. And the UN and shifted their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the mainland Communist government. The Communist government in Beijing followed a hardline policy on Taiwan and would not have diplomatic relations with any country that recognized Taiwan or had diplomatic ties with its government. Hence, when the United States formalized its diplomatic relations with mainland China in 1979 it had to cut-off its diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Despite the ending of its diplomatic relations, trade relations between the two countries have continued unabated and Taiwan's economy has thrived becoming one of the 'Asian tiger' economies in the 1990s. In 1980 the United States-Taiwan defense treaty of 1954 lapsed and only a handful of nations (mostly African and South American countries) continued to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, thereafter.
The Chinese Position: A Three Pronged Policy
As stated earlier, when the Communists defeated the Nationalists in the Chinese Civil War, they proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and claimed to be the successor state of the ROC over all of China, including Taiwan. Since the Communist government was prevented from invading Taiwan and forcebly ejecting the ROC government from the island by U.S. intervention, the PRC has followed a three-pronged policy towards Taiwan while consistently proclaiming that it was an integral part of China. In order to achieve its objective of re-unification of China, it has followed a policy of "Military Offensive," "Diplomatic Offensive" and the "Peaceful Offensive."
Military Offensive:
The PRC had first contemplated the use of military force for "re-unifying" China and Taiwan in 1950. Its plans for invading Taiwan by launching an amphibious opeartion across the Taiwan Strait were frustrated by the start of the Korean War and a subsequent change in the "hands off" policy of the United States on Taiwan. President Truman's sending of the Seventh Fleet to prevent Communist China's attack on Teipei precluded the option of a military offensive for some time. (Lee 1) The signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty in December 1954, between Washington and Taipei, also clearly demonstrated to PRC that the U.S. was serious in preventing a military attack by China on Taiwan.
The inability of PRC to exercise the military option forced it to look for other policy alternatives for the re-unification of China.
Diplomatic Offensive:
After realizing that the military offensive was a non-option, the People's Republic of China launched an all-out diplomatic offensive. It included an intensive use of propaganda broadcasts, infiltration of agents, and mobilization of support from the overseas Chinese against the ROC. More importantly, the PRC conducted an effective diplomatic campaign to get admitted to the United Nations and to unseat Taiwan from the major world body. For some time, the United States prevented this from materializing by using the Korean War as an excuse and depicting China as an aggressive nation. China, too, got bogged down in its internal affairs and the pursuit of radical reforms such as the Cultural Revolution and a self-imposed isolation. Eventually, after the election of Richard Nixon as President of the United States, relations between China and the U.S. began to improve. China remained steadfast in its stand regarding Taiwan and the U.S. conceded by diluting its all-out support for ROC. President Nixon's withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet from Taiwan Straits and his declaration in July 1971 that he would visit Communist China the following year, were decisive signals that the U.S. was no longer opposed to China's admission to the United Nations at the expense of Taiwan. As a result, when the United Nations' General Assembly met in October 1971 to debate the question of China's admission to the UN, the result was a foregone conclusion. Previously, PRC had been successful in establishing diplomatic relations with France in 1964 and with Canada in 1970, but its admission to the UN in 1971 opened the floodgates of diplomatic relations with a number of countries.
Having gained a major success in its diplomatic offensive by being recognized as the "sole legitimate government" of China, the PRC could now afford to go on a peace offensive. (Lee 3-5)
Peaceful Offensive:
China's Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai had indicated as early as 1955 at the Bandung Conference that his country was willing to take the "peaceful" option in "liberating" Taiwan. Mao also mentioned China's interest "in a third CCP-KMT alliance" during the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in April 1957. The "peaceful" Chinese proposals did not make much headway with Taiwan though as China's other moves during the 1950s and the 1960s, such as its military offensive in the second Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958 and the internal upheavals of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, did not match its declared 'peaceful' intentions. Furthermore, Taiwan considered itself to be in a strong position as long as it enjoyed the support of the United States, and felt no real need for responding to China's "peaceful" overtures.
Only after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, purging of the "Gang of Four" and the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping, did China resume its peace offensive on Taiwan. Significantly China now replaced the phrase peaceful "liberation" with peaceful "reunification" and Deng, while talking to a foreign correspondent in November 1978 conceded: "after a peaceful reunification of the country is achieved, Taiwan may still retain non-socialist economic and social systems." (Quoted by Lee 6) This was a big change from the hard-line stance of the Mao era when the number one aim of the Chinese Communist regime was to spread the revolution.
The "One Country-Two Systems" Policy
Since that time, China has pursued the "peaceful reunification" policy by putting forward the concept of "one country-two systems." In its "White Paper on Taiwan Issue," issued in January 2001, the PRC government asserted repeatedly that it is willing to take all necessary steps for the peaceful 'reunification' of China, as long as Taiwan agreed with the concept of "one China." It declared, "the Chinese Government remains firm in adhering to 'peaceful reunification' and 'one country, two systems;' ... And [was] doing its utmost to achieve the objective of peaceful reunification." However, China was extremely suspicious of the 'separatist' movement in Taiwan that was being actively promoted by its President Chen Shi-bian, so the official White Paper warned:
....if a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded ... Or if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits reunification ... then the Chinese Government will only be forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force ... ("The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.")
Hence, although China's main concern at the time was (and still remains the declaration of independence by Taiwan) and the most likely scenario in which China is likely to take direct military action, it had also declared or implied at other times that it would not hesitate in taking the extreme step of direct military action if:
1. Taiwan makes a military alliance with a foreign power
2. There is internal turmoil in Taiwan
3. Taiwan develops or gains Weapons of Mass Destruction
4. Taiwan refuses to negotiate indefinitely on the basis of "one China."
Subtle Softening of China's Stance:
There has been a subtle softening of the Chinese government's stance on the issue since that time and particularly in the last two years since President Hu Jintao took office. Political analysts have noted a strategic shift in China's Taiwan policy from "timetable for reunification" to "opposing secessionism as top priority."
"Opposition to secessionism" to the Chinese means the maintenance of the status quo and to prevent secessionist forces in Taiwan from proclaiming "de jure independence." ("Policy adjusted to meet changes") This adjustment in China's Taiwan Policy is in line with current international thinking, particularly that of countries like the United States, that does not support Taiwan's secession but is not enthusiastic about reunification efforts by China either. President Hu Jintao has also declared that "the rise of China and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation depend on development first and reunification second" (Quoted in "Policy adjusted ... ") which is a marked departure from the mainland's previous departure from the previous insistence on urgency for reunification. This, by no means, implies that China has abandoned its ultimate objective of "reunification" of China; it just means that the Chinese leadership is prepared to take a more long-term view of the issue.
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