Homeland security: overview and key concepts

Criminal Justice -- Homeland Security

Understanding Emergency Management

Emergency management refers to the entire network of government agencies, public institutions, and their various resources, policies, and procedures for responding to circumstances that threaten the immediate health and safety of the population (DHS-FEMA, 2006). These threats come from different sources, including so-called "acts of god," natural disaster, industrial accident, and intentional acts of destruction perpetrated by humans such as in connection with modern terrorism (DHS-FEMA, 2006).

Generally, emergency management consists of systems, policies, and procedures for implementing first responders to emergency situations and for providing external support and resources to areas affected directly by the consequences of emergencies. Those efforts typically include first response, emergency rescue and evacuation, medical triage and treatment, maintenance of government and other essential public and municipal functions, temporary logistical support of local populations, and the restoration of damaged areas and facilities (DHS-FEMA, 2006).

The Role of the Emergency Management Coordinator

The most important roles of the emergency management coordinator is to establish efficient plans for dealing with emergencies well in advance of their occurrence. In that regard, outlining and delineating the respective responsibilities and authority of the many subcomponents within the emergency management system is crucial to maintaining the ability to make use of available personnel and other resources. The emergency management coordinator is responsible for establishing policies, procedures and communications channels among the various public emergency management entities.

Strategies for Coordinating Emergency Responders

As was painfully demonstrated in New York City after the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks in 2001, it is essential that communications (and other) equipment furnished to first responders be capable of ensuring uninterrupted communications. While better communications equipment available to the New York City Fire Department (NYFD) could not have made any difference in terms of protecting the public in that particular scenario, it would likely have saved the lives of many of the NYFD firefighters who never received orders to retreat from the scene of the remaining tower after the first World Trade Center tower collapsed (Larsen, 2007).

The other lesson of emergency response gleaned from the emergency response to the World Trade Center attacks was the need for specific protocols between respective emergency first responders, such as between the NYFD and the New York City Police Department (NYPD). In the aftermath of the initial first response, the police officers and firefighters clashed over respective departmental authority between the two departments (Larsen, 2007). In that particular situation, no lives were still at stake but that is not necessarily the case in most conceivable emergency management situations.

Generally, the absence of very specific guidelines established well in advance of the need to deploy large scale emergency management services can be a threat to human life and public safety.

More recently, Hurricane Katrina highlighted the importance of advance planning for the deployment of resources long before an actual emergency occurs (Larsen, 2007). Particularly in the case of contemporary health threats such as flu (and other) epidemics, those plans must incorporate hospitals and medical providers as well. In principle, effective emergency management requires liaisons between and among all involved agencies and both public and private medical institutions.

Issues of Structure and Responsibility in the Department of Homeland Security

Partly by necessity, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) consists of numerous component agencies with very different individual responsibilities, areas of authority, and specific missions (DHS-FEMA, 2006; Larsen, 2007). On the other hand, many well-informed observers have criticized the fact that the Intelligence & Analysis function is not sufficiently integrated into other components of homeland security, and in particular, into the National Protection & Programs.

Law enforcement fusion centers and more federal, state, and local joint task forces have been established since 2001 to better consolidate intelligence and other important information collected by the thousands of separate law enforcement (and other) agencies. However, the evidence (including the most recent thwarted terrorist attack on Christmas Day aboard Northwest Airlines Flight 253) strongly suggests that the intelligence that is available to authorities is simply (still) not processed and shared efficiently among the various components of DHS.

Another criticism relates to the fact that the lead domestic counterterrorism agency is not well suited to that function (Larsen, 2007). Specifically, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) is one of the premier law enforcement organizations in the world. However, it was conceived, designed, and structured more for the purpose of investigating past crimes and apprehending and prosecuting criminals. For example, the FBI is, by design, a decentralized agency so that field offices in different states can pursue independent investigations. In the field of counterterrorism, the exact opposite structure is required: the counterterrorism mission demands a highly centralized structure whereby intelligence collected from many different locations and by many different agencies and entities is funneled into an integrated analysis center (Larsen, 2007). In many respects that deficiency still pervades the national homeland security mission, as evidenced by the failure of authorities to identify the perpetrator of the Northwest 253 plot on the basis of information that had previously been made available to the national counterterrorism and intelligence infrastructure.

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Emergency Management

Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) present a serious concern for the entire emergency response community by virtue of the tremendous damage they are capable of causing to society (DHS-FEMA, 2006; Larsen, 2007). However, in principle, the risk from WMDs is not different from those associated with other risks to public health and safety. Like other types of threats, WMD risks and concerns must be evaluated according to a matrix that represents the magnitude of potential harm in conjunction with the likelihood of an emergency caused by WMD attacks (DHS-FEMA, 2006; Larsen, 2007).

However, from a practical or operational perspective, WMDs merely represent circumstances in which emergency management systems and entities must respond to emergencies likely to be larger in scale and, depending on the particular type and size of the WMD unleashed, that may involve more types of specific concerns simultaneously than most other emergencies or even conventional terrorist attacks (DHS-FEMA, 2006; Larsen, 2007).

Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the types of issues capable of arising in the emergency planning and response that would be required to provide adequate emergency response to any WMD attack. In addition to coordination and communications protocols between and among multiple agencies and entities, the prospect of WMD attacks also requires a plan for dealing with panic on a large scale that could otherwise overwhelm authorities and hamper emergency response rescue and support efforts. In that respect, WMDs represent different situations from other types of risks for which emergency management is designed to respond. Otherwise, even WMD concerns are analyzed according to the same threat matrix as other risks to public safety and security (Larsen, 2007).