Ethical Dilemmas Just War and Military Ethics

Introduction
The consideration of when it is or is not legitimate to use military force against another group or country is one that requires astute ethical analysis. Deontological ethics can be useful for determining the moral righteousness of military intervention, specifically given the ability of a duty-based ethical system to offer the international community a set of ground rules member states can agree upon. The Geneva Convention is a prime example of how deontological ethical standards can create a worldview whereby war in general is deemed morally unjust except in certain specific circumstances. One of the great weaknesses with deontological ethics, as applied to the military, is that not all entities share the same moral precepts. Terrorism and rogue states are examples of parties that do not ascribe to a set of moral rules like the Geneva Convention. Although deontological ethics can be overly rigid when applied to the complexity of international relations, the ethical theory does underscore the importance of outlining clearly the circumstances under which military force is warranted, in order to promote a universal ethic of peace.
Deontological Ethics
Deontological ethics are duty-based ethics, meaning that the obedience to ethical laws or precepts are tantamount to the consequences of one’s actions. Philosopher Immanuel Kant is the premier philosopher associated with deontological ethics. Kant wrote extensively on the application of deontological ethics specifically to military matters and issues relating to war and peace.
Grounded in the notion that there are universal ethical principles, deontological ethics suggest that there are absolute, “definite laws,” (Kant, 1785, p. 1). Furthermore, Kant affirms the inherent rationality of obeying ethical laws: something that Kant calls a “supreme practical principle,” or the “categorical imperative,” (Kant, 1785, p. 1). In other words, it is irrational as well as immoral to deviate from universal ethical principles. In 1795, Kant developed deontological principles and applied them specifically to the analysis of war and peace in Perpetual Peace. According to Kant, the ultimate objective in all political philosophy and international relations is to eventually abolish war and the military altogether. Until that time, states should refrain from infringing on the rights of others. Kant does also believe in the morality of freedom, and suggests that only republican or democratic forms of government are legitimate. Yet a deontological framework does not support military interventions into sovereign states only with the intent of manufacturing democracy, as the United States has attempted to do in the past (Orend, 1999). Kant’s concept of a “just war” is far more limited, mainly acknowledging the ethical imperative to self-defense or to defend one’s allies. Therefore, deontological ethics aptly describe the direction of international political philosophy since the Second World War.
Application
Deontological ethics provide a sound framework for answering the question of when military intervention is warranted or justified. Simply put, war is almost never justifiable. War is never morally acceptable for any selfish reason such as territorial expansion. Likewise, war is never morally acceptable as a means of resolving a dispute. Resorting to the use of force when peaceful options exist would be considered categorically immoral.
The reason behind the deontological ethical principles that condemn use of force in a general way is straightforward: all human beings have inherent value. Therefore, killing any human being is wrong even if waging war might lead to some desirable outcomes such as the ousting of a terrible dictator. Deontological ethics are by definition not consequential ethics. In other words, the consequences of an act (or failure to act) are less important than the moral duty to act in a certain way.
However, deontological ethics are not overly simplistic. Kant acknowledges that while aggressors and tyrants still exist, standing armies still have relevance. Militaries serve essential moral functions, mainly in that they protect the rights of citizens. As Van Der Linden (2012) and Orend (1999) also point out, Kant did leave the door open for a “just war” policy, in which military intervention may in rare cases be justified in order to liberate a people or to promote peace more broadly. The “just war” principle is the foundation of the United Nations peacekeeping forces, for example. Occasionally peacekeepers need to use force to protect their grander mission, or to protect the people whose lives they are entrusted with. Van der Linden (2012) claims that while Kant did not support interventions with good intentions, deontological ethics can be stretched to support “just war” military action under the auspices of promoting liberty or freedom. For instance, it could be argued that it is morally unjust to allow North Korean people to continue to suffer, or Venezuelan people, when military aggression could foreseeably end that suffering. Standing by and doing nothing could be considered as morally reprehensible as intervening.
The “just war” principle brings to light some of the ways deontological ethics can help discern between two competing moral objectives. On the one hand, military intervention is categorically wrong and against the ideal universal order of peace. On the other hand, allowing people to suffer is also categorically wrong.
Generally, though, deontological ethics would preclude military intervention in a sovereign nation even when doing so would liberate its people from an oppressive regime. The decision of the United States to use military intervention under the pretense of spreading democracy is not one that would be considered morally just according to the deontological ethic, regardless of the results of those interventions. Deontological ethics value the sanctity of human life as well as the sanctity of freedom and liberty.
Objections
Deontological ethics can be rigid and difficult to apply to the nuances of human behavior, particularly in political situations. Using the example of “just war,” a reasonable objection to deontological ethics is its tendency to deny the importance of consequences when making political decisions. A strict interpretation of the peace principle would, for example, preclude even a peacekeeping mission. Likewise, strict deontological ethics could even come dangerously close to promoting a weak society that cannot defend itself from aggressors. Deontological approaches to military intervention are too idealistic, and do not take into account the reality that many state and non-state actors will not believe in the same moral precepts and will use military means to achieve their goals. Demilitarizing in the name of deontological ethics could allow nefarious, malicious rulers to win.
Conclusions
Deontological ethics is a comprehensive philosophy that can be applied to international relations and military strategy. Based on universal human rights and principles, deontological ethics promotes a peaceful world order in which multilateralism can prevail. Deontological ethics do not categorically demand that all nations set down their arms, but the ultimate objective would be a world in which war did not exist. Until that time, deontological ethics does allow for the use of force in certain, albeit rare, circumstances. Self-defense is the most notable of those exceptions, although the “just war” principle could be applied to situations in which military intervention is preferable to allowing human beings to suffer needlessly. Although the deontological framework cannot take into account the unfortunate reality of terrorism and tyranny, it does offer the means by which to envision a world order where diplomacy and non-military methods are ethically preferable to use of force.



References
Kant, I. (1785). Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. Abbott, T.K. (Trans). http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5682/5682.txt
Kant, I. (1795). Perpetual Peace. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm
Orend, B. (1999). Kant’s Just War Theory. Journal of the History of Philosophy 37(2): 323-353.
Van Der Linden, H. (2012). Review of Williams, H. Kant and the End of War: A Critique of Just War Theory. https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/kant-and-the-end-of-war-a-critique-of-just-war-theory/