Fatal Vision
Dr. Jeffrey MacDonald
For the majority of Americans who watched television in the 1980's, the name "Jeffrey MacDonald," was synonymous with the term "monster." MacDonald had been convicted of the brutal murders of his wife and children. Even more horrifying to the average person were the allegations that the murders were the senseless result of MacDonald's drug abuse. Adding to the strong sense of revulsion was the fact that Joe McGinnis, the author who MacDonald selected to tell his side of the story, became convinced of MacDonald's guilt, and omitted facts that might pointed towards another perpetrator. However, the image that Americans have of MacDonald and the murders may be incorrect. While there is not enough evidence to definitely claim that MacDonald was not the actual perpetrator of the murders, a look into the investigative process reveals several serious errors, which made it virtually impossible for the police to locate any other suspects.
First, it is important to realize that there was not one single investigation in MacDonald's case, but multiple investigations by different investigative units. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that there was more than one theory of investigation. For the military police responding to the initial call, they believed that they were responding to a domestic disturbance. Therefore, they expected to come into a scene where a family member, most likely the husband, was causing violence in the home. The horrible murder scene in the home, coupled with the fact that MacDonald's wounds turned out to be relatively minor, reinforced the notion of family violence, and they failed to seriously investigate any other avenues. Instead of looking for other suspects, they only concentrated on determining whether or not they had sufficient evidence to try MacDonald for the crime. Even after the court martial proceeding cleared him of wrongdoing, the army continued to investigate MacDonald, even though he had since been honorably discharged and such investigation was illegal. The second investigation was conducted after MacDonald's father-in-law Alfred Kassab and two other individuals, Peter Kearns and Richard Cahn, presented a citizen's complaint against MacDonald and requested the convening of a grand jury. Those investigations were conducted based on the assumption that MacDonald was guilty, and focused solely on finding evidence of that guilt. To account for the fact that MacDonald had no motive to kill his wife and children, the prosecution developed the theory that MacDonald was a drug abuser and killed his family during an episode of drug-abuse. This failure to consider and seriously investigate other possible suspects made MacDonald's conviction almost a foregone conclusion.
One of the first errors that the investigating officers made was to fail to document MacDonald's wounds. The reports about the nature of his wounds are conflicting; the defense suggested that the wounds were far more severe than the prosecution demonstrated. In fact, eye witness accounts and medical records describe injuries to MacDonald that go far beyond those minimized by the prosecution." (MacDonald Defense Committee, 2004). Witnesses, including medical witnesses, have stated that MacDonald's wounds were not minimal. Not only did he suffer from a collapsed lung, but also from a contusion to the head, several puncture wounds at different locations on the body, and numerous scrapes and bruises. More importantly, according to witnesses, some of these wounds were on the hands, which would have substantiated MacDonald's version of events, which is that he attempted to protect himself from the actual murderers. By the time of MacDonald's trial, which occurred almost a decade after the murders, the jury heard conflicting evidence regarding the nature of MacDonald's injuries. Photographs would have permitted them to determine, for themselves, whether the injuries were truly superficial, or whether MacDonald had simply been lucky not to die.
In addition, the army failed to carefully preserve the crime scene. An ambulance driver moved things around the crime scene, which may have helped lead an investigator to the conclusion that the crime scene was staged. (Boston, 2007). That same driver stole MacDonald's wallet while responding to the scene. (Boston, 2007). The army failed to take fingerprints and hair samples from the victims, and even wiped fingerprints off of items after MacDonald was taken to the hospital. (Boston, 2007).
Finally, the army allowed people into the crime scene before completing its investigation. (Boston, 2007).
The investigative errors did not end at the crime scene. The physical evidence supported MacDonald's version of the crime. For example, hair and skin samples, which did not match any of the MacDonald family members', were found at the scene. However, this evidence was never reported to the defense; nor did investigators attempt to find the source of these extraneous physical materials. In addition, many of these items were lost or never put into evidence, precluding sufficient investigation at the time, and preventing DNA testing once that technology became available.
The investigating officers also failed to find a match for one of the most significant items of physical evidence found at the crime scene. There was a bloody handprint on the MacDonald's bed. The handprint was adult-sized, but it did not match MacDonald, his wife, or any of the people known to be at the crime scene. (Potter and Bost, 2000). Despite this apparent proof that someone else had been at the crime scene, no attempts were made to match this print to any other possible suspects, despite the fact that the investigating officers had several substantial leads about possible suspects, and that matching their palm prints against the print at the scene would have been a relatively easy way to eliminate suspects.
The investigative team also attempted to sway witness' recollection of certain events. For example, when initially questioned about the MacDonald home, MacDonald's mother-in-law and the family babysitter both denied ever seeing an ice-pick in the MacDonald home. However, after considerable and suggestive questioning by the police, the women recalled having seen such an ice-pick. (Boston, 2007).
Perhaps the most serious investigative error was for the army to fail to question Helena Stoeckley. MacDonald had told them that one of the murderers was a woman in a floppy hap, and a tip to his defense attorney identified Stoeckley as that woman. The investigative officer testified that he questioned Stoeckley, but he did not make notes of the interview. Furthermore, he failed to investigate any of Stoeckley's known associates, or run any type of basic background investigation on Stoeckley, which may have revealed the full names of the people she lived with at the time of the murders.
More importantly, the FBI failed to investigate Stoeckley in 1978, when she contacted them and admitted that she had taken part in the murders. (Boston, 2007). At that time, she identified some of her accomplices, including her boyfriend, Greg Mitchell and several soldiers from Fort Bragg. (Boston, 2007). Furthermore, she named key elements of the crime, which were corroborated by the physical evidence. In addition, she made this confession to the prosecuting attorney as well as the FBI. Despite these repeated confessions and the corroborating evidence, Stoeckley was never investigated as a serious suspect.
The failure to investigate Stoeckley and her cohorts seems inexplicable, until one learns some substantial facts about Stoeckley. She was not merely a drug abusing, hippie who was into witchcraft, but also the child of a colonel. In addition, many of the people suspected to be involved in the drug trade at Fort Bragg were the children of high-ranking army officials. (Potter and Bost, 2000). Army investigations, though ostensibly independent of the chain of command, are still rigidly controlled by the army's hierarchy; investigators who accuse their commanders of wrongdoing without sufficient substantiation can face court martial themselves.
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