Geopolitical Analysis of China From

Geopolitical Analysis of China From the President's Perspective

Agreement/Disagreement with author's opinion

Instruments of National Power

Analysis of entire region

Iran

Russia

Israel-Palestine Conflict and the role of U.S.

China

India

Africa

A Geopolitical Analysis of China from the President's Perspective

This paper is a personal reflection of an opinion article (OPED). The article appeared in Eurasia Review and was written by Maitreya Buddha Samantaray. The following response to this piece of writing is presented assuming the role of President of the United States of America. The review article will include opinion on the quality of analysis done by the writer from a perspective of the U.S. president. Agreement or disagreement with the author's premise regarding geopolitical analysis of China will be presented and substantiated with analyzing past records of U.S. foreign policy compared with today's policy direction. An analysis of entire region with respect to the U.S. policy of regional interests will also be presented in this paper.

Thesis statement: The main thesis of this President's perspective is that no single Instrument of National Power (IOP) is exclusively sufficient to further the U.S. interests in the region. An intelligent combination of diplomatic, economic and military instruments has to be utilized in order to further the U.S. interests in Asia.

In order to pursue an inclusive and effective policy in Central and South Asia, the U.S. government has to rely on multiple stakeholders of different countries, each having different capacity to serve the U.S. interests while not disregarding the interests of host countries. The second section of this paper will present personal opinion of President regarding this piece of writing followed by relevant comparison and analysis to substantiate the initial position. References to foreign policy in the past along with its consequences will also be made part of this article. This paper will conclude the findings at the end of analysis.

Agreement/Disagreement with author's opinion

As being President of the U.S., I only partially agree with the author's premise regarding India's proactive strategy on China-Pakistan proximity. The author is correct in asserting that the U.S. did not look Pakistan's engagement with China as positive in its entirety. The visit of Pakistan's premier was aimed at signaling the U.S. regarding the presence of other regional powers that support Pakistan on its stance regarding the on-going conflict in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the author fails to appreciate that these have been few takers of Pakistan's stated stance on Osama Bin Laden's hiding in Pakistan. China may have accorded warm welcome to Pakistan's premier but the consultations that the U.S. emissaries had with their Chinese counterparts reveal that China has time and again encouraged Pakistan to adopt an alternative course of action on its policy in Afghanistan. However, this has been communicated in a concealed manner since China does not want to stale its ongoing strategic projects in Pakistan. Unlike popularly held view of 'Carter Syndrome' alleged to have engulfed me, I would like to opine that there the formation of Pak-China bloc against the interests of the U.S. is not based in reality. In fact, Pakistan has found herself isolated during the past five years due to the multi-lateral approach adopted by President's office.

Had I chosen to isolate Pakistan and China through active diplomacy and more military power being concentrated in the region, either through U.S. led forces or through active engagement of India, matters would have been even worse as they seem today. Unlike my predecessor, I abandoned the term 'war on terror' as it divorced America from the empathy it obtained from Western and Eastern powers alike after the incident of 9/11. The author is also correct in assuming that India has a bigger role to play in the aftermath of Afghan withdrawal. However, the U.S. foreign policy has been flawed in cornering Pakistan while engaging India in the Central Asian region. The U.S. cannot ignore the fact that India does not share a border with Afghanistan and any engagement of India in Afghanistan will be suspected by both Pakistan and China. Considering the U.S. led forces being highly engaged with Pakistan's military force, it would be unwise to twist Pakistan's arms by encouraging more Indian presence in Afghanistan. The U.S. can adopt this policy once the coalition forces have withdrawn from the region post 2014. Until then, the U.S. will have to adopt a prudent policy of pressuring Pakistan to submit to the international agenda. The U.S. influence over Pakistan is significantly compromised when India fails to manage good relations with countries such as Sri Lanka, Nepal, China, and Pakistan.

Although, the U.S. has differed with China over most of the regional conflicts such as Afghan issue, the North Korea problem, and the issue of Tibet, however I have restrained from making this a focal point of my policy as this will amount to limiting the U.S. interests to these three issues. Whereas the U.S. interests in striking a balance of relations with regional powers is much important to ensure a safe and timely exit of coalition forces in Afghanistan while still having the leverage of an honorable exit. Domestic compulsion of my foreign policy is more intertwined in the split mandate that I have got in the Senate where Republicans dominate. Thus, to encourage India for an even bigger military role in comparison to China will not be prudent enough till 2014.

Instruments of National Power

Economic, military, and diplomatic instruments are available to any President for engaging and disengaging with different countries in the World. The continuity of the U.S. support to Pakistan, both financial and military has also important backdrop. While comparing the U.S. policy of foreign affairs towards Pakistan during 1995-2001, I along with my foreign secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton reached a conclusion that isolating Pakistan, either through financial or military sanctions will only aid India's dominance in the region. Once India becomes too powerful as compared to Pakistan, the latter's chances to seek support from China and China's chances of military support to Pakistan increases. This was the case during the time period of 1995-2000 when Pakistan obtained significant support in nuclear and non-nuclear weaponry from China. If compared with the prevalent U.S. foreign policy towards China and Pakistan, it was more punitive than rewarding. The U.S. used economic and military sanctions to persuade Pakistan whereas this only increased China's involvement in Pakistan's domestic issues and in regional matters.

Thus, to avoid such situation whereas Pakistan has to choose between the U.S. And China, I intend to pursue a more logical policy of engaging both Pakistan and China. By doing so, the U.S. will keep its option open regarding sanctions while achieving same results as the country intends to achieve from sanctions.

Analysis of entire region

Iran:

The U.S. does not have any easy options on the table to deal with the regional conflicts. The balancing of the U.S. obligations towards human rights as being global power is not an easy task. Iran ability to inflict potential harm to U.S. interests in the region limited due to three reasons. Firstly, there is limited economic and military capacity of Iran to dominate the Gulf region. The country has suffered hard due to management inefficiency of Ahemedinejad led government. Further, the economic sanctions imposed by the UN also restrict Iran from earning foreign currency reserves through its oil exports (Rahigh-Aghsan & Jakobsen, 2010). Last but not the least, there is an increased fragmentation with the Iranian society regarding taking a hardliner towards the U.S. And other Western powers. The rise of Iran is largely due to the death of 'Pan-Arabian Nationalism' but the country faces many risks that will limit its ability to become an active threat to the U.S. interests (Rahigh-Aghsan & Jakobsen, 2010). The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have outspent Iran in military expenditure. GCC countries have spent 15 times more as compared to Iran for military expenses. Further, the U.S. maintains an active engagement policy with all the GCC countries. This offsets the threat emancipating from Iran. Another important impediment to a thaw in U.S.-Iran relationship is in fact validated and recommended by the U.S. public herself as a 2011 Gallup survey indicated being supportive of the U.S.-Israel relationship (Oren, 2011).

Russia:

Unlike the author of the OPED, I as being president of the U.S. am more concerned regarding U.S. Russia relations. Russia has been supporting the Central Asian states to gain increased control of the natural resources of the region as well as increase its political clout.

Israel-Palestine Conflict and the role of U.S.:

The role of U.S. assumes much importance as Israel is a close ally of the U.S. As being president, I am fully aware of the deepest sentiments that prevail in the U.S. population regarding Israel. As mentioned earlier, the Gallup survey and a recent CNN poll indicates towards a high trust level of U.S. public over the U.S.-Israel relationship (Cohen, 2011).

China:

China is the main focus of the article that I have read and I cannot agree more with the author when it is mentioned that domestically the Chinese are facing some serious issues such as deflated economy and inflation on the other hand. America's engagement with China, with historic ice-breaking between the two countries carried out by Henry Kissinger, has been complicated. I would suggest that it were the U.S. domestic preoccupations and compulsions that did not allow me to take any bold stance on the issue of Dalai Lama. I disagree with notion that U.S. betrayed the cause of human rights while not choosing to visit Dalai Lama.

It must not be forgotten that unlike Russia, China's geography allows her to exert much more influence than the former. In the words of Kaplan (2010), China is both a land and a sea power. Thus, my foreign policy towards China has been reflective of this potential next power of the world. The U.S. has benefited from the Chinese market significantly in the wake of financial crisis. The author failed to acknowledge the huge compulsions that China faces in meeting its energy and other strategic demands. China is following the same 'outward' approach as was adopted by the U.S. more than 100 years ago (Kaplan, 2010, p. 52).

Therefore, China is not expanding her interests against those of the U.S., in fact it bumping up more against those of India and Russia. I have therefore chosen to adopt a restrictive policy in circumventing China. U.S. cannot and should not adopt a hawkish policy towards China. This would amount to direct conflict and U.S. has bigger stakes in China than does China has currently. We have much sophisticated situation of ours to guard. I would have to admit that had my predecessor anticipated the outcome of our Afghan War on China, he might have opted out of the war as China is bigger beneficiary of the war than the U.S. herself.

This is substantiated by Kaplan (2010; p. 53) when he observed that "China's strategic geography would be enhanced if the United States stabilized Afghanistan." Therefore, the U.S. might be in a long-term fix to handle Afghanistan and China as instability of either one of them will hurt the U.S. interests in the long-term.

I would take the opportunity to express that the main concern for both China and the U.S. are its relations with respect to the Taiwan issue. The RAND corporation report has predicted that after 2020 it would become significantly difficult for the U.S. To protect Taiwan from any of the Chinese side aggression. Over here I agree with the author of article that China has been changing its modus operandi in several issues such as Taiwan and Tibet. China also denied entry of U.S. navy into the area and this was aimed at a larger design game planned by the Chinese.

China has been very careful not to provoke any military ambitions as it successfully created an economic and social balance of partnership with Taiwan. Some 270 flights per week from Taiwan to mainland China and other statistics regarding trade and tourism also depict that 'Greater China' is not a thing of distant future but nearby. China is aware that it cannot directly attack the U.S. navy and therefore China sends signals that war is no option for both the countries.

I suggest the U.S. is already moving along these lines. I would again state that "To paraphrase Mearsheimer, the United States, the hegemon of the Western Hemisphere, will try to prevent China from becoming the hegemon of much of the Eastern Hemisphere. This could be the signal drama of the age" (Kaplan, 2010; p. 63). Over here, I would again emphasize that so-called 'rouge states' such as Pakistan should not be left with an easy option to choose between the U.S. And China should there become a war event between China and the U.S., the latter should keep its presence in social and military as well as civil circles of Pakistan.

It would also be pertinent to mention that unlike the image portrayed by several authors in contemporary international relations domain, the Chinese are making huge strides forward in their adoption of democratic norms. "The Xiamen and Shanghai walks illustrate how new social groups as well as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continue to adapt and experiment with ways to act on new interests while avoiding or preventing direct challenges to CCP rule (Gilboy & Read, 2008; p. 64). Therefore, I as president of the U.S. do not estimate that Sino-U.S. tensions would be same as the U.S.-Soviet tensions during the cold war. The Soviets represented a much different value system whereas Chinese are only compelled by their appetite for natural resources. I am more than hopeful of a 'swift' relationship between the U.S. And China. We as a nation should not come at loggerheads with China by over-pampering India.

India:

The U.S. relationship with India is still shaping up and the soft initiatives taken by Mr. Bush are commendable. However, there plethora of details to be satisfied before the U.S. can actually assist India in its journey to become a regional power as per the U.S. national security interests. It is pertinent to mention that I recently, during G20 summit, backed Indian PM Manmohan Singh's proposals for stimulating growth in the regional and world economies (Tellis, 2009; p. 240). At Pittsburg, I endorsed the ideas of Mr. Manmohan and can assure that we had developed a good working relationship despite my several reservations regarding handling India during the Bush era. India can be equated as 'game balancer' in Asia. China is also closely watching the relationship of U.S. with India. To take advantage of the occasion, I assured the India PM regarding the U.S. intentions to continue supporting India in maintaining power balance against China and Pakistan. India also has interest in the same. While both the aforementioned countries have occasionally worked in close collaboration against the Indian interest in the region, I urged Mr. Manmohan not to engage in any conflict at the cost of India's path to becoming a 'United Nations Security Council UNSC' member that the U.S. eagerly wants India to become.

As described in the policy brief 81, the U.S. plans to enhance relationship with India based on five key areas. These are energy, economics, trade, agriculture, and education. With science and technology being the core attention area by Mr. Bush as well as my own office, I would caution analysts that any '2005 like breakthrough' deal shall not be expected out of my meeting with Indian PM in coming month. This is because both India and the U.S. are now more interested in consolidating the earlier MoUs being signed by me as well as my predecessor (Mr. Bash) with the Indian counterparts.

As far as India's projection by the U.S. As a regional power is concerned, I am glad to share that U.S. has developed very cordial and far reaching partnership with India in this regards. The civilian nuclear deal signed by Bush Jr. was important for a thaw in stalemated relations between U.S. And India since the nuclear explosion by India. I would also support the Indian cause of securing UNSC membership but critics should not expect a breakthrough as the U.S. primary interest in coming five years is the Afghan war and I would not like to risk that owning to Pakistan's inherent antagonism towards a 'stronger and hegemonic' India. Nonetheless, India's UNSC membership in inevitable and the U.S. shall support so.

I would also retreat my support for a bilateral trade treaty with India but only after reform in the Indian domestic market are initiated. It is important for the U.S. And for a democrat government that India is presentable as a 'free trade partner' whose economy is based on free enterprise principles, rather than state assuming a leading control. Bilateral trade liberalization can precede any eventual 'bilateral free-trade agreement' (Tellis, 2009; p. 241).

After considerable stalemate in our military-to-military relationship, I expect that the U.S. will show deep concern for the Indian need of securitizing its interest given that China is actively courting the South East Asian and Central Asian states in developing a military as well as economic relationship. It is also worth mentioning that one area of contention between the U.S. And India is that of relationship of India with Iran. Since Iran has not abided by the UN resolutions regarding arms inspection and nuclear proliferation treaty, I would use the opportunity of meeting Indian PM to persuade him for supporting the U.S. In case that a UN resolution for another round of sanctions is tabled. This will make things clear whether or not India realizes the role that the U.S. envisions for her in the future course of Asia. I would strive to convince of making huge strides forward in its obligations as bigger nation as compared to her neighbors. The relationship of India with the U.S. will have to become a normal one that includes trade and investment in multi-sectors and that reflects U.S. interests as well. Unlike 2005 visit of Manmohan Singh, I would concentrate more on developing deeper ties and consolidating existing ones rather than undertaking new commitments in new sectors. East Asia present a serious cost over head for the U.S. And I have suggested that foreign office should conduct tri-lateral meetings by courting friends and allies. The recent U.S.-Japan-India trilateral meeting was also such an effort and I hope this will be more productive than more cumbersome 'multi-lateral' agreements and cooperation pacts. Such tri-lateral efforts of strengthening relations are also underway in form of U.S.-Japan-Australia. Thus, it is appropriate to observe that U.S. partnership with India will only strengthen with the passage of time. "The Indian government, for the first time in a long time, has money. It is a country that can greatly complement U.S. efforts in the region" (Rogin, 2011; P. 254).