Gunderson, Brian S. (2007). \"Strategic

Gunderson, Brian S. (2007). "Strategic Air Command's B-29's During the Berlin Airlift."

Air Power History. 54(1):38-43. Retrieved 3 Aug 2008 at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-31249540_ITM

Author and B-29 navigator from the 1948 28th Bomb Wing Brigadier General Brian S. Gunderson's article "Strategic Air Command's b-29's During the Berlin Airlift" appears to be a fairly straightforward account of the Berlin Blockade with an emphasis on the previously unacknowledged, but crucial role played by B-29s during the famous airlift. Gunderson was personally involved in the airlift, although his article takes a cooler, more dispassionate tone than other attempts to provide the reader with a gripping, involved, and 'grounds-eye' narrative of the events that transpired. His thesis, vaguely defined, seems to underline the significance of the airlift and the essential fellowship and hospitality of the British that enabled the airlift to be so successful. However, although a valuable document in its detail and meticulous, step-by-step chronological unfolding of the events leading up to and after the airlift, he lacks engagement with a central, driving thesis because of his failure to really make an argument about the significance of the airlift.

Admittedly, Gunderson does note that at first, the use of B-29s was controversial on the American side. Gunderson notes how General Curtis E. LeMay had to pressure the Pentagon to position B-29s on continental Europe and in Britain even though the crafts were not configured to carry atomic bombs. This aspect of the article suggests that the threat of nuclear power alone was not enough to contain the Soviets, and the threat of atomic power was therefore not always necessary, even during the beginning of the Cold War, to act as a show of force against the Soviets. This challenges the notion that tensions between the U.S. And the U.S.S.R. always existed as a zero-sum game. Unfortunately, Gunderson does not make this a focus or a feature of his article. His article also notes how the commitment of the United States to the people of Berlin was shown in a variety of capacities and that the action regarding the B-29s was historically significant, given that the deployment of these two bombardment groups ultimately marked the establishment of a permanent U.S. Air Force presence in England. This presence, Gunderson notes, was welcome, and characteristic of the 'special relationship' between the two countries.

The conflict over Berlin between the NATO powers and Eastern block began in April, 1948 when the Soviets had stopped all trains departing East Berlin that were heading to Western Germany. After the U.S. resolved to respond by flying military aircraft out of Berlin, 30 B-29 aircraft were deployed to England. Gunderson notes that the reception of the Americans was extremely positive: "The major London newspapers gave front page coverage to the arrival of the B-29s. The Sunday Express headed their story: 'The Forts Stream in All Day.'" Others read, seemingly with relief: "The Yanks are Back' and 'Superfort Fleet Will Be Here Today.' The RAF made certain that the deployed B-29s would not want for anything."

This suggests that at the time, the American military presence was seen as a symbol of hope in Europe, at the outset of the Cold War. Despite the difficult flying conditions for the B-29s, including strong headwinds, the British accommodations were described as comfortable and "clubby" for the Americans, an unusual luxury for any troops given the austerity of devastated, post-wartime Britain. The Americans' quarters were "built of brick, with living quarters made up of separate rooms, instead of crowded quarters, and featured heated, indoor bathrooms...A large bar offered cams, darts, and "shove-ha-penny" games to test one's skills. All in all, the atmosphere throughout the airfield was such that it fostered many new friendships between the American and British personnel."

Thus, the mission was important not simply in freeing Berlin, but also in terms of its positive impact upon British and American relations. "They have done a splendid job in making the USAF visitors feel right at home," said one of the American generals at the time. However, Gunderson does not include any personal anecdotes detailing his experiences with his British hosts' hospitality, or any of the fear, excitement, anticipation, or patriotism he may have felt during his experiences. In making such an addition, his article would have benefited in terms of raising the reader's interest level, and also conveying the emotional mood amongst the airmen during this period of history.

The mission's objective was to ensure that the B-29s were to be flying as frequently as possible at low altitude over the United Kingdom and across continental Europe to make the Soviets constantly aware of the American air presence. From the beginning, psychological intimidation of the Soviets was just as important part of the mission as the military objectives of the airlifts. Practice bombing had a similar objective of intimidation, as well as being an essential component training the men for their eventual flights for the airlift. Maintaining the security of the B-29s on the ground day and night, often with guards keeping watch 24 hours a day, fortified by coffee and little else was required. The men road second-hand bicycles from their accommodations to go to work on the aircrafts. Despite the British hospitality, utter dedication was demanded of the fighters, and the flight crews and their support had almost no opportunities to take any leave, although Gunderson does note that those airman stationed in Scampton were able to visit the city in the evenings: "the pubs and dance halls were usually full and many new friendships were made" between the British and the Americans.

After January 1949, the tensions in Berlin Airlift had eased, so the men prepared for their mission home. This was, according to Gunderson, almost as perilous as the actual work on the airlift because the east winds across the Atlantic were so strong. Gunderson notes the long hours of the daylight flight -- "The return trip took 24 hours and 45 minutes versus 18 hours on the flight to England in July." But unfortunately, he includes little of what it was like to participate in the actual airlift, or what he and his fellow soldiers felt about Great Britain, the Cold War, or the Soviet Union.