Jemaah Islamiyah Tracing the Roots

Jemaah Islamiyah

Tracing the Roots and Dynamics of Jemaah Islamiyah as an Islamic Militant Group and Terrorist Organization

Recent religious movements in nations from different parts of the world have created radical changes in the political movements in the world as well, particularly in North American, Asian, and Middle Eastern nations. These religious movements include, among others, the increased radicalism and development to becoming militant among Islam nations and societies. Most often cited as an example of religious conflict-turned-terrorist attack, the World Trade Center bombing in the year 2001 reflected the active involvement of Muslims (specially among Middle Eastern nations) in promoting an Islam-centered human society.

This plan of action adopted by the terrorist group Al Qaeda brings into fore other militant organizations as well, foremost of which is the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia. A year after the WTC bombing, the Bali bombing four years ago in 2002 marked the continuous, active movement of Muslim organizations in promoting their cause of a new world order under the rule of Islam. This paper discusses the extant literature looking into the roots and dynamics of JI as a politico-religious organization. In the discussion and analysis contained in the following sections, the researcher develops the following objectives:

Research Objectives

Main Objective:

To determine the roots and dynamics of Jemaah Islamiyah as a politico-religious -- that is, both as an Islamic militant group and a terrorist organization.

Specific Objectives:

Determine the characteristics that define Jemaah Islamiyah as an Islamic militant group;

Determine the characteristics that define Jemaah Islamiyah as a terrorist organization;

Determine the relationship and development of the link between Jemaah Islamiyah and Al-Qaeda in promoting terrorism;

Identify the religious precursors that develop Jemaah Islamiyah as a terrorist organization;

Identify the social precursors that develop Jemaah Islamiyah as a terrorist organization; and Identify the political precursors that develop Jemaah Islamiyah as a terrorist organization.

Roots of Jemaah Islamiyah as a Politico-Religious Organization

The development of JI as a politico-religious organization has developed two ways -- or more aptly, into two phases. The first phase illustrates JI as an organization whose primary objective is to convert Indonesia into an Islamic state, centering mainly on politico-religious reforms in the nation's (domestic) affairs only. The second phase involves JI as a militant Islam group evolving into a terrorist organization. Ironically, in both phases, the organization's objectives remained the same, but the methods in which JI tried to achieve this radically changed. In the second phase, JI developed into a terrorist organization as it became more and more involved in militant activities both within Indonesia and outside of the country.

Jemaah Islamiyah as an Islamic Militant Group

JI as an Islamic militant group is hardly its description when it is compared against other extant Muslim religious groups. Looking into JI as a religious group, it can be described, at best, as an organization within a "moderate, activist political Islam" nation, Indonesia. Moreover, assessing its relevance to Indonesian religio-political affairs, JI appears to have a less than significant influence over these affairs, since, as Sheridan (2005) reported, it only comprises "a tiny fraction" of the country's population. The organization's socio-demographic demonstrate the seemingly irrelevant influence it has over domestic and international political affairs, which was the organization's nature prior to its active involvement in international politics, not to mention its "accidental" link with the Al-Qaeda terrorist group.

As mentioned earlier in this section, JI's primary objective as a Muslim organization is to achieve an Indonesia that is an Islamic state. This objective is echoed by its member, Islamic cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, when questioned about JI's alleged involvement in the Bali bombing: "[t]he world and Indonesia belong to Allah. Therefore it should be ruled under Allah's law without bargaining. I believe the clash of civilizations will continue, but in the end Islam will definitely win. It has been predicted by our Prophet Muhammad." As Sheridan's report pointed out, while Bashir looked genuinely the persona of a religious individual honestly believing in his religion and its objectives through peaceful yet active means, the statement just quoted demonstrate the "radical" nature of JI as an organization involved actively in the country's political affairs.

What this report provides, however, is a validation of what JI aims to be: an organization that helped induce social change by introducing a new world order through their country, Indonesia, which they believe will eventually become a pure and independent Islamic state. In the first phase of its development as a politico-religious organization, JI sets itself as a Muslim group with pure religious intentions, wherein its eventual links with Al-Qaeda and terrorism in general had been prompted by the changing political environment of Indonesia, and its fellow Muslim nations as the need for an Islamic furthered with the increased dominance of the U.S. -- both politically and religiously -- furthered before, during, and especially after the WTC bombing.

Jemaah Islamiyah as a Terrorist Organization

In discussing the JI as a terrorist organization, it is important to put into context the discussion in the American politico-legal framework. That is, in determining the 'acts of terrorism' committed by JI, and by labeling JI as a terrorist organization, mean that the discussion is based on international politics' definition of terrorism. As noted by Wright-Neville (2004), terrorism as defined by the U.S. Criminal Code is identified as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups, or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (30).

As an organization motivated to promote an Islam-centered human society and Indonesian nation, JI's cause is evidently "politically motivated," and its act of collaborating with Al-Qaeda, considered "clandestine agents," are evidences that developed JI as a terrorist organization. However, we must be reminded, again, that this definition is based on the American politics context. That is, if we are to consider this definition as what clearly defines terrorism as it happens in all nations and societies today, then JI is indeed a terrorist organization.

Obviously, the definition given concerning terrorism, and what defines an organization an agent of terrorism, is just another perspective that offers one view of how JI is perceived generally through its principles, motivations, and actions. Wright-Neville posed this problem, and stated that "[w]hat is needed is a typology of Islamist political groups, especially those that see themselves as playing an oppositional role, for it is out of resistance to the prevailing status quo that militancy and terrorism can sometimes grow" (30). He considers JI's radical terrorist acts as a response to the prevalent view that democracy is the ideal and best social order that must be adopted by nations and societies of today. Thus, due to conflicting interests and different motivations (i.e., JI's need to establish an independent Islamic state and the U.S.'s objective to promote and encourage democracy in all nations), the dominant political power that is the U.S. -- the nation that establishes the status quo of today's societies -- is in conflict with Indonesia's JI, tagging them as terrorists and collaborators with another terrorist group (fighting against U.S. democracy), Al-Qaeda.

As a terrorist group, JI is identified as the closest network that Al-Qaeda has in the Asian region. According to Kaplan (2003), JI is an Islamic militant group that is made up of "5,000 members, with a hard core of several hundreds of operatives." Kaplan's report also detailed other terrorist acts JI had committed, apart from the Bali bombing last October 2002: the August 5 Marriott hotel bombing at Jakarta (killing a dozen individuals); JI is also allegedly behind the "Christmas Eve bombings" in 2000, which killed 19 people and wounded 120. These attacks are apart from other attacks conducted in collaboration with terrorist groups in Asia, particularly in the Philippines, wherein terrorist networks between Asian Muslim militant groups and the Al-Qaeda are also prevalent. These linkages between JI, Al-Qaeda, and other Islamic militant groups illustrate the second phase of JI's development as a politico-religious Muslim organization.

Dynamics of Jemaah Islamiyah as a Politico-Religious Organization: Links with Al Qaeda

While the previous chapter discussed the roots of Jemaah Islamiyah as an Islamic militant group and a terrorist organization, this chapter looks into the social dynamics that occurred, events which further strengthened the link between JI and Al-Qaeda and cemented the notion that JI is indeed a terrorist organization, with networks from all over the world (particularly in the Middle Eastern region).

These dynamics are identified as religiously-, socially-, and politically-motivated dynamics. While the earlier chapter established the establishment of an independent Islamic state (in Indonesia) as the organization's primary motivation, this chapter looks into the specific details surrounding the JI's objective of establishing a model Islamic state through Indonesia. This chapter seeks to establish how events that are religious, social, and political in nature are pivotal to the strengthening of the JI objective, and influential to its eventual adoption of peaceful to radical, militant measures in order to attain its goals as a Muslim organization.

In this section, religion is considered a primary motivator that led to the creation of JI -- primarily as a militant group, and secondarily, as a terrorist organization. Social dynamics, meanwhile, look into the prevalent perception of JI's society and the international viewpoint on radical Islamism. Lastly, the political dynamics centers on the viewpoints supporting and opposing JI activities, specifically its linkage with Al-Qaeda.

Religious dynamics

Explicated earlier is the ultimate goal of JI in establishing itself as an Islamic militant group: to create an Islam-centered social order, starting specifically in Indonesia. Jones' (2005) analysis of the history of JI as a terrorist organization delved deeply into the events surrounding its early establishment in Indonesia, and its later development as one of the Muslim groups who subsisted to jihad to promote this main objective.

Jihad is an important concept in the lives of JI members, for this became the manner in which it succeeded in increasing its membership and strengthening its network of Muslim militant groups, both locally and internationally. Among the initial contacts that JI had in establishing itself as the "locus of jihad" in Asia were Singapore and Malaysia. The decision to recruit members within these countries was motivated by a geo-political strategy: by expanding its territory of influence from Indonesia to Malaysia and Singapore, JI is gradually strengthening its hold on Asian Muslim countries, wherein leadership of the jihad would be concentrated on Indonesia, the first independent, pure Islamic state (171).

The history of JI as a strong Muslim organization in Asia yet covers the most important relations it had with an external non-Asian organization: the Al-Qaeda. In tracing the religious dynamics between the JI-Al-Qaeda connection, Jones noted the transition JI experienced as it transcended its operations from domestic affairs to international ones. Prior to establishing its connection with Al-Qaeda, JI is strictly a "focused on domestic political struggles," although they have been exposed to the training and other jihad programs launched by Muslim groups in Middle East and South Asia. Significant, however, was the finding that as part of the Islamic militant group network in which JI belongs, its leaders were trained in Sayyaf camps, which is part of the network's "austere practice of Islam" (173).

The pivotal transition of JI from being a militant group to being a terrorist organization is marked by the purposes in which jihad is conducted or declared against 'attackers of Muslims.' Jones determined that JI members are strict adherents of the jihad cause, individuals who feel obligated to consider "operational targets" and "obvious enemies" individuals or groups who attack Muslims. This has changed when the Bali bombing happened, for the victims of the said bombing where not operational targets or obvious enemies of the JI. This distinction marked JI's transition to being a terrorist organization, wherein the "sign of disaffection" noted in Al-Qaeda operations/attacks were reflected in the Bali bombing (174).

From this information chronicling the movements and developments of JI in terms of establishing and widening its network, it can be said that indeed, JI is the "locus of jihad," as it would like to be depicted as a Muslim organization. The linkage between Al-Qaeda is an inevitable connection waiting to happen, simply because both organizations achieved in each other what the other cannot accomplish single-handedly. That is, Al-Qaeda was able to gather support from the Muslim community through the JI, wherein its terrorist training and programs in the guise of declaring jihad against the enemies of Islam were implemented. On the other end, Al-Qaeda provided logistics support to JI in implementing its 'holy war' against individuals and groups it perceives as its 'enemies' or 'targets' who attack Muslims and/or the Islam religion.

Social dynamics

Equally important with the religious dynamics of the development of JI are the social dynamics that further reinforced its image as a terrorist organization. This facet of analyzing JI as a Muslim organization provides two opposing views about JI: one view portraying it as a righteous Muslim organization protecting fellow Muslims from persecution, discrimination and injustice by non-Muslims, and another view depicting it as a terrorist organization whose need to fulfill jihad is greater than the potential (and actual) loss of innocent lives from terrorist attacks and numerous suicide bombings.

Between these two facets, the dominant and most subsisted is the belief that JI is a terrorist organization motivated strongly in its goal of successfully accomplishing jihad at the expense of other people's lives. Singh (2004) explicated on this particular view, further specifying that JI, like other stereotypes held against Muslim organizations, target the U.S. And Christians in its holy war (57):

The Bali perpetrators seem to hate the Americans and Christians more and tend to be less preoccupied with ideological goals. For them, becoming a Shahid or martyr seems more fulfilling, something that also explains the increased spate of suicide bombings in the region...it was more useful not to look so much for a grand international conspiracy behind the specific acts of terrorism but to take a closer look at the psychological profile of the individuals and a closer study of the local context in which terrorists operate.

From this passage, the slant against JI as perceived by the American society is evident in explaining the dynamics that occurred as suicide bombings and terrorist attacks become more prevalently practiced among Muslims against Americans and/or Christians. But more than just a prejudiced or judgmental view against the JI, Singh's report contains a thorough look into the lives of Muslims -- that is, looking at the terrorism problem as the end result of collective actions committed by individuals, rather than an attacks resulting from group influence or ideology. This individualistic look into JI as a terrorist organization harboring members with doubtful "psychological profiles" reiterates the lack of understanding and quick judgment that Western societies/observers tend to subsist to when confronted with the issue of terrorism as it relates to JI, as well as Al-Qaeda.